FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY
1949

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

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STALIN ON REVOLUTION

By Historicus

THE stress laid by Stalin on the importance of theory is so foreign to American habits of mind that we are prone to underestimate the influence which theory plays in determining his action. Any such tendency would lead us into especially grave error when we come to estimating the importance of his theoretical conception of the nature of revolution; for on this he has been amazingly consistent.

In a preface to the first volume of his collected works, Stalin takes the trouble to point out deficiencies in certain views expressed in his youthful writings, years before the October Revolution.[1] Since then eight volumes of the collected works have appeared, but they contain no more prefaces by Stalin; the inference is that he considers the rest doctrinally correct. Stalin exhibits the same meticulous care about doctrine in a letter to members of the Politburo in which he opposes the republication of an obscure article of Engels' in *Bol'shevik* unless the errors in its conception of imperialism are pointed out. Publication of an article in "our fighting magazine," he holds, means that it is to be taken "as directive or at least deeply informative for our party workers."[2] Back of such pains about detail on the part of so busy a man lies a conviction that correctness of theory is vitally important. Stalin denies that "Leninism is the primacy

Note: Where the period of republication of particular items for mass consumption is relevant to the discussion, this information is supplied in parentheses in the footnotes. Thus (1925–1939) means "originally published in 1925, republished until 1939," and (1925 to present) means "originally published in 1925, republished up to the present time."

[1] "Sochineniia," Vol. I, 1946, p. xi. The author of the present study found only one other instance in which Stalin in his mature years modified an earlier statement. "K voprosam Leninizma" (1926) quotes the original version of one paragraph in "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924), relating to the victory of Socialism in one country, and points out its inadequacy; and subsequent versions of "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" contain a revised wording of the passage. ("Voprosy Leninizma," 11th ed., 1945, p. 25, 137.)

[2] *Bol'shevik*, May 1941, p. 1.

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of practice over theory." On the contrary, "the tendency of practical workers to brush theory aside contradicts the whole spirit of Leninism and is pregnant with great dangers for the cause." And again: "None other than Lenin said and repeated tens of times the well-known thesis that: '*Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.*' "[3]

The present study summarizes the body of ideas on revolution which has presumably played a part in Stalin's thought and action, as revealed in his published writings and statements. Except for two reports of interviews with Stalin published in the United States but apparently not in the Soviet Union, it makes use of Russian sources only. The author believes that he has discovered and examined for relevant material nearly everything by Stalin originally published between January 1, 1929, and March 28, 1948; and, in addition, he has read all of Stalin's writings likely to be of central importance as far back as February 1919. Much of the material was republished on a large scale during the periods investigated. The general character of Communist thought makes it extremely unlikely that this would have happened if the statements were considered out of date or in any way inconsistent with current ideology, and, above all, if the outmoded features were not at the same time pointed out clearly. The sacredness in which the faithful hold every word of Stalin's makes it doubly improbable that anything of his which was obsolete would be republished without proper correction. "Voprosy Leninizma" ("Problems of Leninism," the basic collection of Stalin's writings, hereafter referred to in this study as "Voprosy") has gone through 11 editions to date and has been reprinted in many millions of copies; the 1947 printing of the eleventh edition (first published in 1939) states, on the last page, that it amounts to 4,000,000 copies. Stalin's "Istoriia vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii" ("History of the All-Union Communist Party," hereafter referred to in this study as "Istoriia"), first published in 1938, is still being reprinted; in 1946, *Pravda* stated that the total number of copies exceeded 31,000,000.[4] The fundamental rôle played by these two volumes in the indoctrination of party workers and in the compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism justifies us in attributing high value to their testimony on matters of current orthodoxy according to Stalin.

[3] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 14.
[4] *Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1946, p. 2.

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The few instances where passages in republished works are (or at first sight appear to be) inconsistent with passages in new publications will be discussed on their merits when occasion arises. In view of the acknowledged Communist practice of pursuing long-range strategy by means of highly variable tactical lines, the presumption is by no means necessarily in favor of the new statements. The burden of proof must rather fall on whoever maintains that the new statement represents a permanent change in doctrine and not a mere temporary shift in the "line."

The cornerstones of "Voprosy" are found in two works by Stalin published in 1924, "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" and "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i taktika russkikh kommunistov." They contain the essence of his revolutionary theory, which he attributes to Lenin. This theory has been clarified or supplemented from time to time with respect to particular points. Thus it received more explicit Marxist-Leninist philosophical setting in the "Istoriia." But it has never been abandoned or altered in fundamentals.

Americans, though of course admitting the rôle of science in engineering, industry and similar fields, will be surprised by Stalin's conviction that in Leninist-Marxism he has a science of human society and its development in history which makes possible the prediction — and, within limits, the engineering — of the course of history. Thus he writes in his history of the Party: "Marxist-Leninist theory is science of the development of society, science of the workers' movement, science of proletarian revolution, science of the construction of Communist society." And again: "The strength of Marxist-Leninist theory consists in the fact that it enables the Party to orient itself in a situation, to grasp the internal connection of surrounding events, to foresee the course of events and to discern not only how and when events are developing in the present but also how and when they must develop in the future." [5]

Only such a view could explain the strong language Stalin uses on the ideological training of party cadres:

> One can say with confidence that if we could prepare our cadres in all branches of work ideologically and temper them politically to such a degree that they can easily orient themselves in the domestic and international situation, if we could make them fully mature Marxist-Leninists, able to solve the problems of running the country without serious errors — then we would

[5] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 339; "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 598.

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have reason to consider nine-tenths of all our problems already solved. And we are absolutely able to accomplish this task.[6]

II. THE SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION

In outlining Stalin's revolutionary theory, we shall first consider his views on those determinants of revolution which he calls "objective," *i.e.* those historical forces which, though modified by the action of conscious human wills, determine the basic pattern of history regardless of human will.

Stalin calls the philosophical framework of his theory "dialectical and historical materialism." It is, in effect, revolution writ large into the cosmos; its basic postulates are so many reasons why "the bourgeoisie" are on the way down and "the proletariat" on the way up, why "capitalism" must inevitably give way to "Socialism" everywhere, and why this must occur by violent revolution. It is sufficient for our present purposes to state briefly those postulates which are most important for Stalin's theory of revolution.

Relativity. Nature is a "connected, single whole" in which "phenomena are organically related to each other, depend on each other and condition each other." Applied to human society, this means "that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the point of view of 'eternal justice' . . . but from the point of view of the conditions which gave birth to that system and that social movement with which they are connected." Thus a slave-owning economy, which would be absurd for modern conditions, was once a "step forward" in comparison with the primitive communal system; and "a bourgeois-democratic republic," though it would have represented a "step forward" for Russia in 1905, would be a "step backward" for the U.S.S.R. today.

Change. Nature is constantly changing; "there is always something arising and evolving, something declining and living out its time." This means that "the dying off of what is old and the growth of something new is the law of evolution," hence that there are no "'stable' social orders" or "'eternal principles' of private property." It means further that "only that which is rising and developing is invincible," *i.e.* that a rising class, though yet relatively weak, is a better bet politically than one

[6] "Otchetnyi doklad t. Stalina na XVIII s"ezde partii o rabote TsK VKP (b)" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Stenograficheskii otchet," Moscow, 1939, p. 31.

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which has had its rise and, though still relatively powerful, is beginning to decline. Hence, according to Stalin, the Marxists were right in basing their policy on the proletariat even in Russia in the 1880's, because it was evolving as a class, while the peasantry, though in the enormous majority, was declining as a class.

Sudden Qualitative Change. The process of evolution is not simply one of quantitative growth; "insignificant and hidden quantitative changes" repeatedly accumulate to a point at which radical and "open" "qualitative changes" suddenly occur. For human society this means that "revolutionary overturns, produced by oppressed classes, are a perfectly natural and inevitable phenomenon." In contemporary terms, "it means that the transition from capitalism to Socialism . . . can be accomplished not by means of slow change, not by means of reform, but only by means of qualitative change of the capitalist system, by means of revolution."

Progress. The previous postulate, according to Stalin, implies that evolution is progress, *i.e.* that nature moves not in a circle but in an upward direction, from "the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher." [7] We state this here as a separate postulate, because on it depends the claim that revolution is not merely inevitable but right, since it leads to a "qualitative change for the better." Stalin does not go into this, preferring, as Marxists generally do, to stress the "scientific" rather than the ethical aspects of his theory. But that he has deep convictions on the matter is evident from the general tone of his writings. When in an interview with Stalin, Emil Ludwig compares him to Peter the Great, Stalin replies: "The task to which I am dedicating my life consists in elevating . . . the working class. That task is not the strengthening of any national state but the strengthening of a Socialist, and that means international, state. . . ." [8]

Contradiction and Struggle. ". . . the process of evolution from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a 'struggle' of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions . . . in order to overcome these contradictions." This means that "the class struggle of the proletariat is a perfectly natural and in-

[7] This quotation and the quotations used in the preceding three paragraphs are from "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 101, 102, 104, 105.

[8] "I. Stalin, Beseda c nemetskim pisatelem Emilem Liudvigom," *Bol'shevik*, April 30, 1932, p. 33.

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evitable phenomenon," that "we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system but uncover and draw them out, not extinguish the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion." Here, and in the theory of sudden qualitative change, is Stalin's philosophical ground for his position that a basic policy (as distinguished from temporary tactics) of compromise and reform is a mistake.

Materialism. Objective reality is material; consciousness is a "reflection" of matter and a product of it. From this Stalin infers that "the material life of society . . . is primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative," *i.e.* that "one must look for the source of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions . . . in the conditions of the material life of society," of which the ideas and institutions are a "reflection."

The Means of Production. Of the various factors composing "the material life of society," the one which determines "the character of the social system and the evolution of society from one system to another" is "the means of production of material goods." This in turn consists of "productive forces" — the instruments of production and the people who operate them — and "productive relations," *i.e.* the relations between people in the productive process, such as master-slave, capitalist-laborer. "Changes in the means of production inevitably evoke change of the whole social system," including political institutions.

The Primary Contradiction of Capitalism. The prime mover of social progress is change in the productive forces, especially tools: as new types of tools develop they enter into "contradiction" or "nonconformity" with the increasingly outmoded productive relations, until the latter are demolished and new ones created to correspond with the requirements of the productive forces. With this "sudden, qualitative" change comes a change in the whole social system. Such is the inmost dynamic of revolution. Capitalism, for example, develops large-scale industrial plants as productive forces; but "by gathering millions of workers together in enormous factories and plants, capitalism gives a social character to the process of production and thereby undermines its own basis," namely, the productive relations that center around private ownership of industry. Thus the primary contradiction that develops inside capitalism as it evolves is that between actual private ownership and the new productive forces which require social ownership for their full expansion. This maladjustment

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expresses itself in the periodic crises of overproduction familiar to capitalism, and finally in revolution which resolves the contradiction by socializing the means of production.[9]

The foregoing is not a complete summary of Stalin's dialectical and historical materialism, but it gives the basis of his claim to know with "scientific" certainty that Socialist revolution must come sooner or later in capitalist countries. It should be stressed that for Stalin the decisive issue is the substitution of Socialist ownership and operation for private ownership and operation of the means of production: all other differences in modern social systems are of subordinate importance. This is the basis of his insistence to H. G. Wells, in 1934, that the New Deal reforms in the United States cannot affect the ultimate necessity for revolution, and to Harold E. Stassen, in 1947, that the United States and Nazi Germany had the same kind of economic systems.[10]

The next step in our inquiry is to analyze in greater detail Stalin's conception of the social forces, apart from conscious leadership, which contribute to the build-up and final achievement of revolution. These forces are formed around four secondary contradictions, which are aggravated by the primary contradiction between productive forces and productive relations.

The Class Struggle. Antagonism between classes is not peculiar to capitalism, in Stalin's view. It is inherent in slave-owning and feudal social systems as well — in short, wherever one class monopolizes ownership of the means of production and thereby "exploits" the rest. Under capitalism the chief protagonists of class struggle are the "capitalists" and those who must sell their labor to the capitalists in order to live — the "proletariat." The rest of society — petty bourgeois, peasants, intelligentsia — form a comparatively amorphous and fluctuating mass, gravitating now to one side, now to the other.[11]

Hence the proletariat is the inevitable vehicle for the Socialist revolution. In contrast to the peasantry, it is connected with the most advanced form of economy and therefore has "more future." Further, "the proletariat as a class is growing year by year, is developing politically, is easily accessible to organization by

[9] The quotations in this paragraph and the preceding three paragraphs are from "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 103, 105, 106, 110, 114, 117.

[10] "Beseda t. Stalina c angliiskim pisatelem G. D. Uellsom" (1934–1939), *Bol'shevik*, Sept. 15, 1934, p. 8; "Zapis' besedy tov. I. V. Stalina c deiatelem respublikanskoi partii SShA Garol'dom Stassenom," *Pravda*, May 8, 1947, p. 1.

[11] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 120, 15; "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 54, 60, 74.

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reason of its work in large-scale production, and is most revolutionary because of its proletarian position, as it has nothing to lose by revolution except its chains." [12] In contrast to the intelligentsia, on the other hand, the proletariat has the mass necessary for revolutionary power: "for that, a large class is needed, which would replace the class of capitalists and become just as sovereign a master as it is. . . ." [13] Thus arises the central Leninist doctrine that Socialist revolution can occur only through substitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (which, in Stalin's view, is the essence of all capitalist states).[14]

It is ultimately from the growing contradiction between social productive forces and private property productive relations that the class struggle receives the dynamism, the increasing tension, which impels it toward revolution.[15] Just how this occurs is not fully clear from Stalin's writings. The earlier Marxist doctrine of "increasing misery" of the proletariat was modified by Lenin and others in view of the observable fact that workers were not getting poorer. Stalin does not discuss this topic; but possibly he, too, as a disciple of Lenin, does not hold the earlier view. What certainly does increase, according to Stalin, is tension between the two classes — the bourgeoisie put more and more "pressure" on the proletariat, which the proletariat meets with growing resistance and resentment. The "pressure" or "oppression" by the bourgeoisie takes various forms. One is the effort to reduce wages or hold them down, which becomes ever more powerful as capitalism enters its monopoly stage. Another is the actual misery caused by falling wages and unemployment in times of economic crisis — the recurrent crises being due to the fact that the capitalists do not allow wages to rise in proportion to production, thus curtailing purchasing power and resulting in "overproduction." Another form of pressure by the bourgeoisie is Fascism, which deprives workers of important means of resistance — labor unions, parliaments, the freedom to form labor or Communist parties.[16]

As will be explained later, the tension between bourgeoisie and

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[13] To Wells, *loc. cit.* p. 13.
[14] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 26; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 11.
[15] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 117, 121.
[16] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 3, 17; "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1; "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 117, 121, 288.

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proletariat does not increase uniformly but in a wave-like ebb and flow. While tension mounts, the social system nears the flash-point of revolution: there is "aggravation of the revolutionary crisis inside the capitalist countries, accumulation of explosive elements on the internal, proletarian front." [17]

The Imperialist Stage of Capitalism. Stalin, following Lenin, holds that capitalism in its last stage, when it becomes ripe for revolution, turns monopolist and imperialist. The scene is dominated by giant trusts and combinations of international finance which rival each other for control of world markets, raw materials and opportunities for investment of surplus capital. This means that there is no longer an assortment of capitalist systems, one for each country, but one world capitalist system. Revolution accordingly occurs in particular countries as a result of the total interplay of forces within the world system and not, as earlier Marxists expected, simply as the result of local conditions. "Formerly it was usual to speak of the presence or absence of objective conditions for proletarian revolution . . . in one or another well developed country. . . . Now we must speak of the presence of objective conditions of revolution in the entire system of world imperialist economy as an integral whole; the existence within this system of some countries that are not sufficiently developed industrially cannot serve as an insurmountable obstacle to revolution . . . *because* the system as a whole is already ripe for revolution." [18]

From this it follows that revolution need not occur first in the countries that are most advanced industrially, as Marx's historical materialism seemed once to imply. Revolution occurs rather as a break in the world "front" of the capitalist system, and therefore at the point where the chain has its weakest link. So in 1917 it came first in Russia, an admittedly backward country, and in 1924 Stalin said it might occur next in Germany or in India — in any case, again at the weakest point in the world system. In a later comment Stalin points out that the weakest point in the world system of capitalism is not the point where industry is *least* developed, else revolution would have begun somewhere in central Africa. A "certain minimum" of industrial development and of culture is prerequisite for revolution.[19]

[17] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 17, 55.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[19] *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1929, p. 3.

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The direct effect of the rise of monopoly capitalism on the contradiction between bourgeoisie and proletariat has been mentioned. In addition, two further contradictions are now generated within the capitalist system.

One of these is the international counterpart of the class struggle: the great monopolies seek to exploit the foreign as well as the domestic field, which leads to a few powerful capitalist countries dividing up the world as colonial possessions and spheres of influence. Thus arises a contradiction within the capitalist world economy between the exploiting imperialists and the exploited colonies. As tension rises, a revolutionary crisis develops in the exploited countries, taking the form primarily of movements for national liberation from imperialism.[20]

The other contradiction develops between rival capitalist countries. Since some evolve more rapidly than others, they come to demand a larger share of colonies and spheres of influence than the one allotted on the basis of their former power. Since no country will voluntarily hand over part of its present share, tension mounts until imperialist war — for example, the First and Second World Wars — inevitably breaks out as the sole means of redividing the world and restoring equilibrium.[21] In Stalin's thinking, the importance of war as a midwife of revolution can scarcely be exaggerated.

The Contradiction Between Capitalists and Socialist Systems. According to Stalin, the contradictions above described created the "objective" basis for the October Revolution of 1917, but in so doing they helped to generate yet another contradiction, that between the capitalist and Socialist systems. For henceforth the system of world capitalism has lost its monopoly of the world and its claim to be the latest work in progress. Beside it grows a Socialist system which "by the very fact of its existence demonstrates the rottenness of capitalism and shakes loose its foundations." [22] This predicament, together with the loss both of economic equilibrium and of authority in colonial areas occasioned by the war of 1914, constitutes what Stalin calls the "general crisis of capitalism," a condition of permanently impaired health. The capitalist system will never recover its pre-1914 stability and self-assurance.

[20] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 3, 17.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 3, 17; *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1946, p. 1.
[22] "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1.

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Increasing tension grows from both sides of this contradiction between the social systems. It is an axiom with Stalin that capitalists are filled with envy and hatred, and that whenever they can and dare they will seek to intervene in the Socialist country and restore capitalism. This danger he dramatizes as "capitalist encirclement," declaring that Socialism cannot be considered finally achieved as long as this danger of intervention and restoration persists.[23] From the other side of the contradiction, every triumph of the Soviet Socialist system is considered by Stalin to have a profoundly revolutionizing effect on capitalist countries. In 1933 he states: "The successes of the Five Year Plan are mobilizing the revolutionary forces of the working class of all countries against capitalism. . . ." [24] In addition, there are various kinds of deliberate aid on the part of the Socialist system for revolutionary movements inside the capitalist system. These are, properly speaking, not part of the "objective" determinants of revolution.

The primary and secondary contradictions of capitalist society, which we have just described, interact upon one another to produce revolution. There are three chief types of interaction.

Productive Forces vs. Productive Relations: Economic Crises. The effects which the fundamental capitalist contradiction and economic crises have on the class struggle were briefly discussed above. The most striking feature of Stalin's treatment of the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations under capitalism is how little he has to say about it. He does not formulate it expressly until 1938, in his exposition of historical materialism. We have found only one brief earlier allusion to it, as the cause of economic crises.[25]

It would nevertheless be unsafe, as in other cases, to infer from Stalin's comparative silence on this subject that he considers it of minor importance or that he only half believes in it. On the contrary, this doctrine is an integral part of the bedrock of Marxist "scientific" certainty about the future course of history on which

[23] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 25, 32; "K voprosam Leninizma" (1926 to present), *ibid.*, p. 140; "O nedostatkakh partiinoi raboty i merakh likvidatsii trotskistskikh i inykh dvurushnikov," *Pravda*, March 29, 1938, p. 2; "Otvet t-shchu IVANOVU Ivanu Filippovichu," *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1938, p. 3; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 32; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 261.

[24] "Itogi prevoi piatiletki" (1933 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1933, p. 1. The example of the Stalin Constitution is likewise expected to exert such a revolutionizing force. *Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1936, p. 3.

[25] "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1.

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Stalin evidently bases his entire life work. It is his cardinal reason for holding that, no matter what happens, in the long run all the contradictions of capitalism will get worse and worse until revolution cures the source of trouble by substituting Socialism. Indeed, the chief function which this central contradiction of capitalism performs in Stalin's thinking may be to impart certainty to the doctrinal framework. If so, that would explain the brevity of its rôle in his published writings.

If, however, the idea also operates directly in Stalin's concrete estimates of the pattern of forces in the capitalist world system, this should find expression as some definite relationship between the increasing disparity between productive forces and productive relations — the ultimate mainspring of the trend to revolution — and resultant increases of tension in the derivative contradictions of capitalism. The sole clue of this kind discovered during the present investigation is Stalin's explanation of economic crises. Noting that they have occurred in capitalist countries every eight to twelve years for a century, he claims that they are "an example of the non-correspondence of productive relations to productive forces," in other words, of the contradiction between "the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriating the results of production." As capitalism evolves, productive forces (*i.e.* productive capacity) are dynamically expanded but wages are kept as low as possible in order to make more profits. The result is a "relative curtailment of purchasing power;" goods accumulate for which there is no market and a crisis of overproduction is precipitated; finished goods and even productive forces are destroyed, factories are closed and millions suffer unemployment and hunger not because goods are scarce but because they are plentiful. Stalin stresses the destruction of productive forces as conspicuous evidence of the way in which their development is hampered by capitalist productive relations. His account in 1930 concludes: "If capitalism could adapt production not to getting maximum profit but to the systematic improvement of the material conditions of the masses of the people . . . then there would not be any crises. But then also capitalism would not be capitalism." [26]

The rôle of economic crises in Stalin's writings must be stated carefully. He pays almost no attention to them until after 1929

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 1; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 117, 121; to Wells (1934–1939), *Bol'shevik*, Sept. 15, 1934, p. 9.

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and, as his writings show, probably did not expect the world depression. The emphasis given to economic crises after 1929 — notably in the reports to the Party Congress in 1930, 1934 and 1939 — suggests that the lesson of 1929 actually produced an important change in Stalin's thinking about the capitalist world. However, that change appears to have been a modification not in fundamental theory but on an intermediate level between it and concrete data. The doctrine of the contradictions of capitalism remains the basic framework. Within it, after 1929, economic crises play a very prominent rôle as *symptoms* of the progressive decay of capitalism at its roots — namely, of the increasing contradiction between productive forces and relations — and as added *causes* of greater tension in the four secondary contradictions. In 1930 Stalin sums up his first analysis of the world economic crisis by saying: "The most important results of the world economic crisis are to uncover and aggravate the contradictions inherent in world capitalism." [27]

The fact that Stalin depicts the crisis of 1929 as the worst so far in capitalist history, and that of 1937 as worse still,[28] together with his general picture of capitalism as now in its decadent phase, suggests that such crises do in fact play an important diagnostic rôle in Stalin's estimates of the degree of deterioration reached at a given time by the capitalist system, and also that he would expect each future crisis — at the customary interval of eight to twelve years — to be worse than the last. The principle indices used in his discussions of particular crises are statistics of production and of unemployment. These are further possible clues to his method of diagnosis.[29]

The "Objective" Conditions for Revolution: War. We have seen that, for Stalin, capitalism in its imperialist stage has become a single world system in which the total interplay of forces determines the ripeness of conditions for revolution in particular countries, revolutions actually occurring where the world front

[27] "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1. See also "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 11.

[28] "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 9.

[29] Stalin mentions, but does not give statistics on, bankruptcies, ruin of peasants, falling prices, maintenance of monopoly prices at the expense of restricting production, bank failures, trade wars, dumping, currency wars. In 1939 he gives statistics on gold reserves as evidence that the avoidance of economic crisis in Fascist countries is only temporary. See "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1; "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 10.

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of capitalism is weakest in relation to the forces of revolution. The foregoing discussion of capitalist contradictions has provided a ground-plan of the lines along which the revolutionary forces are organized. The next step is to consider the criteria for judging the ripeness of the revolutionary situation. Stalin writes that "the proletarian revolution must be regarded primarily as the result of the development of the contradictions within the world system of imperialism, as the result of the snapping of the chain of the imperialist world front in one country or another." [30] How does Stalin estimate when and where the chain is ready to break?

Pointing out that there are "several absolutely necessary conditions, in the absence of which seizure of power by the proletariat is not to be thought of," Stalin quotes Lenin's formulation of them:

> The fundamental law of revolution . . . consists in this: for revolution it is not enough that the exploited and oppressed masses should feel the impossibility of living in the old way and demand change; for revolution it is necessary that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. Only when the "*lower classes*" *do not want* the old way and when the "upper classes" *cannot carry on in the old way* — only then can revolution conquer. This truth may be expressed otherwise in the words: *revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis* (*affecting both the exploited and the exploiters*). [31]

"Revolutionary crisis" is accordingly Stalin's usual name for the total complex of forces constituting the "objective" conditions necessary for revolution.[32]

Two features stand out in the above quotation: the power of the bourgeoisie is shaken; the proletariat is aroused. More detail is supplied by a sketch written in 1921 but first published in 1947:

> How define the arrival of the moment for revolutionary outbreaks? . . . When the revolutionary mood of the masses . . . brims over and our slogans for action and directives lag behind the movement of the masses . . . When

[30] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 19.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[32] Stalin uses the term "crisis" in so many ways that we must not jump to conclusions from a particular statement. Besides "revolutionary crisis" he speaks of "economic crises," "general crisis of capitalism," "crisis of world capitalism," etc. So "crisis" does not necessarily mean "revolutionary crisis." Moreover, "revolutionary crisis" does not necessarily mean revolution, for leadership may fail to take advantage of the situation. Again, "revolutionary crisis" sometimes means the full ripeness of the objective conditions for revolution, sometimes the long period of rising tensions which in some cases culminates in ripeness, for which Stalin sometimes employs a special term, "the immediate revolutionary situation." On the latter see *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1930, p. 2.

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uncertainty and confusion, disintegration and dissolution in the adversary's camp have reached the highest point . . . when the so-called neutral elements, all that mass of many millions of city and village petty bourgeoisie, begin definitely to turn away from the adversary . . . and seeks alliance with the proletariat.[33]

This introduces a third feature of the "objective" conditions for revolution: the masses (other than the proletariat) swing away from the bourgeoisie and toward the proletariat, thus isolating the former and becoming allies or "reserves," as Stalin's military phraseology often puts it, of the proletariat. The above quotation mentions petty bourgeoisie, but in other passages Stalin stresses even more the rôle of the peasantry as ally of the proletariat.[34] In the present context only the general point is important: the bourgeoisie proper must be bereft of mass popular support and the proletariat must have it.

Support is not confined to the boundaries of one country: the local bourgeoisie must to a considerable degree be isolated internationally, while the proletariat receives direct or indirect support from the proletariat of other capitalist countries and from the proletarian state already in existence — the U.S.S.R. Hence a further condition for successful revolution is that the balance of potential outside aid for revolution as against potential outside aid for counterrevolution must be sufficiently favorable.[35]

To sum up, Stalin's necessary "objective" conditions for revolution are: bourgeoisie isolated and disorganized, proletariat aroused to revolt and supported by the masses, and a favorable balance of proletarian as against bourgeois aid from outside the country. With these as a frame of reference, we are now able to indicate how, according to Stalin, the contradictions of capitalism interact to produce revolutionary crises. Only certain main lines of influence will be described; details vary endlessly with the concrete configuration of forces.

The primary contradiction, both chronically and in its acute

[33] "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 73.

[34] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 23, 56, 60; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 65.

[35] Stalin does not formulate this condition definitely, but it is a clear implication of: 1, his thesis that capitalism is now a world system and revolution the product of forces throughout the system; 2, his emphasis on the international ties of the bourgeoisie and the constant threat of intervention from that quarter (*e.g.* "Ob osnovakh Leninizma," "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 26); 3, his statement that the proletariats of capitalist states, and the state in which Socialism has already won, will assist the proletariats in other countries to achieve revolution. See "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i taktika russkikh kommunistov" (1924 to present), *ibid.*, p. 104. The topic of outside aid for revolution includes conscious leadership and will be dealt with later in this study.

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manifestation as economic crisis, impels the bourgeoisie to increase pressure against the proletariat, against colonial peoples, against each other (in rivalry for spheres of influence) and against the Soviet Union. The culmination of these trends is war of one kind or another: the colonies fight for liberation, the capitalist nations who demand greater spheres of influence fight to get them or capitalist countries attack the Soviet Union as the major threat to their whole system and also as another big area to be exploited. Preparation for war on the part of the bourgeoisie further arouses the proletariat and the other masses who desire peace and resent having to die for their masters, and who also resent the added economic and political pressures — including Fascism, in some cases — which are imposed in order to prepare for war. When the war is to be directed against the Socialist Fatherland, this fact of course greatly adds to the resentment of the proletariat, whose deeper sympathies are on the side of the Soviet Union. Bourgeois preparation for war likewise leads to increased pressure on colonies, with a correspondingly greater tendency of colonies to rebel.[36]

Actual war, however, is the crux of the matter. Stalin writes of the relation of the First World War to the contradictions of capitalism that "the imperialist war . . . gathered all these contradictions into one bundle and threw them onto the scales, thereby accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat."[37] War between capitalist countries further intensifies the resentment of the masses and at the same time both exhausts the strength of the bourgeoisie at home and makes it difficult for them to intervene against revolution abroad. Again writing in 1924 of the First World War, Stalin speaks of "the enormous significance of the fact of mortal war between the chief groups of imperialists in the period of the October Revolution, when the imperialists, occupied with war among themselves, lacked the ability to concentrate forces against the young Soviet power, and the proletariat just for that reason was able to get down to the work of . . . consolidating its power. . . . It must be presumed that now, when the contradictions among the imperialist groups are becoming more and more profound, and when a new war among them is becoming inevitable,

[36] "Politicheskii otchet TsK" (1927), "XV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 44; "Ob itogakh iiul'skogo plenum TsK VKP (b)" (1928), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 336; "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1; "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1.

[37] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 4.

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reserves of this description will assume even greater importance for the proletariat." [38]

Thus for the past quarter century, according to the overwhelming testimony of his writings, Stalin has expected the next crop of revolutions to come during, or in the immediate aftermath of, the Second World War. To the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 he stated that a new imperialist war "will surely turn loose revolution and place in jeopardy the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened in the course of the first imperialist war." [39] His history of the Party makes explicit the connection between war and the development of a "weak link" in the chain of world imperialism: "Lenin showed that precisely in consequence of this unevenness in the development of capitalism imperialist wars occur, which weaken the forces of imperialism and make possible a break-through in the front of imperialism at the point where it proves to be weakest." [40]

Imperialism, he maintains, is the fundamental antagonist of the Soviet Union, and Fascism only its worst reactionary form. "Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Himmler and the other administrators of present-day Germany are the chained dogs of the German bankers." [41] The capitalist, not the Nazi, is the ultimate enemy. The theoretical framework is made fully explicit in Stalin's election speech of February 1946: "It would be incorrect to think that the Second World War arose accidentally or as a result of the mistakes of some statesmen or other. . . . The war in fact arose as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of contemporary monopolistic capitalism." [42]

The case of a war against the Soviet Union, according to Stalin, presents an additional factor favorable to revolution. To the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 he declares: "It can hardly be doubted that this war will be the most dangerous for the bourgeoisie. . . . The numerous friends in Europe and Asia of the working class of the U.S.S.R. will endeavor to strike from the rear their oppressors who have started criminal war against

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 56. Stalin here used term "reserves" to include all favorable factors, not merely men.

[39] "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1. The inevitability of war is the central theme of the foreign affairs section of each of Stalin's reports to the Party Congresses from 1925 to the last one in 1939; the direct connection with revolution is obvious in each case, and made explicit in most.

[40] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 162.

[41] *Pravda*, May 1, 1942.

[42] *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1946, p. 1.

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the Fatherland of the working class of all countries."[43] Though Stalin hopes for proletarian revolutions in certain colonial areas, he values all local movements for national liberation, whether proletarian or not: in any case, each step they take toward emancipation is "a steam-hammer blow against imperialism" and thus has "objective" revolutionary significance, *i.e.* weakens the bourgeoisie of imperialist countries by depriving them of markets and raw materials.[44] Hence a colonial war would become an added factor promoting a revolutionary crisis in the metropolitan country.

The Law of Ebb and Flow. According to Stalin, the October Revolution of 1917 ushered in "a new era in the history of humanity — the era of proletarian revolutions," in fact, "the epoch of world revolution."[45] This means, in terms of his theory, that the contradictions in the world system of capitalism have evolved to the point where revolutions are generally in order. Actual revolution, however, occurred first in only one country, and Stalin expects further revolutions usually to occur in one country at a time, as state after state breaks away from the capitalist system and joins the Socialist one.[46]

But the course of the revolutionary movement is not expected to be uniform. Stalin notes that it has always moved in a wave-like rhythm of ebb and flow, rise and fall. For example, one wave reached its crest in the 1905 Revolution and subsided in the Stolypin reaction. Another rise occurred in the years 1912–1914. Under the stress of the First World War a major crest came with the two revolutions of 1917 — though in the short interval between them there were also rapid changes of ebb and flow — and the wave spread out to Europe in the years immediately following. In 1925 Stalin announces that another decline has set in, corresponding to a "partial and temporary stabilization of capitalism," but he now generalizes the alternation of ebb and flow in a prediction of the future: "The epoch of world revolution . . . is a whole strategic period, embracing a whole series of years and, I dare say, even a number of decades. In the course of this period there can and must be ebbings and flowings."

[43] "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1.

[44] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 48, 3, 17, 54; "XIV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 12; "XV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 44; "Sochineniia," Vol. IV, p. 166, 238, 378.

[45] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 214, 338; "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 54.

[46] "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i taktika russkikh kommunistov" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 102.

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Though an ebb tide has set in, Stalin goes on to say, the contradictions of capitalism will inevitably bring on a new flood tide in due time. With the flood tide new victories may be won for the revolution; if they do not complete world revolution, there will follow another ebb, and so on until revolution has spanned the globe.[47] In 1927 Stalin announces that the "stabilization of capitalism" is drawing to a close, a new "crisis of world capitalism" is gathering, and with it is beginning another revolutionary rise. In 1930 and 1934, successive reports to Party Congresses continue the same line of thought: the contradictions of capitalism, accentuated by the world economic crisis of 1929, are converging inevitably on another imperialist war. Therefore "a revolutionary crisis is ripening and will continue to ripen."[48] In his report to the Party Congress in 1939 he announces that the imperialist war has already begun and is gradually becoming a world war.[49]

Up to March 1948, Stalin has published nothing to indicate that the revolutionary wave — so long expected in connection with World War II — has passed its crest, though his doctrine of ebb and flow suggests that he must expect another ebb within a few years unless capitalism collapses completely in the meantime. Thus the entire period from 1929 to March 1948 moves before Stalin's eyes on a rising tide of revolutionary opportunities.

III. THE ART OF REVOLUTION

Having outlined Stalin's conception of the "objective" determinants of revolution, our inquiry now turns to the "subjective" side: the rôle of conscious organization.

Communist Leadership. Notwithstanding the remorseless and unavoidable evolution of the contradictions of capitalism, making Socialist revolution sooner or later inevitable, Stalin holds that actual revolution can occur only through conscious human efforts. In this he is a disciple of Lenin, and his history of the Party records with sympathy Lenin's battles against "reformist" Marxists, compromisers, opportunists, gradualists — any and all who held that the "objective" factors would automatically bring

[47] "K itogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP(b)" (1925–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 109, 111; "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 55; "Beseda s inostrannymi rabochimi delegatsiiami," "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 301; "XV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 44; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 27, 80, 84, 127, 138, 140, 221, 258.

[48] "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; "Politicheskii otchet TsK" (1927), "XV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 38, 44; "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1.

[49] "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd," p. 11.

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about the change to Socialism, or that anything short of the most resolute and uncompromising revolutionary policy should be adopted.[50]

Stalin's ultimate reason for this position lies in his dialectical and historical materialism. As has been noted, one postulate of this theory is that objective reality is material, and consciousness only a "reflection" of it. This view now requires further elaboration. Stalin does not mean that consciousness plays no causal rôle, but only that its rôle is secondary. The direction of history, its movement from one mode of production to another, with consequent changes in class structure, social institution and ideas, is indeed determined by the evolution of the means of production, and no conscious human effort can change this direction. But consciousness does have a positive and important function: it affects, not the pattern of history, but its pace. It can accelerate or retard the coming of the inevitable. Social theories which accelerate historical evolution do so because they "reflect the needs of the development of the material life of society" and by mobilizing the masses lead them in the direction of revolutionary change. Social theories arise "because they are necessary for society, because without their organizing, mobilizing and transforming work the solution of the problems which have come to a head in the evolution of society is *impossible*."

This is Stalin's ground for holding that conscious leadership is necessary for revolution. The primary contradiction in capitalism gets worse and worse, and increasing strain works out from it through the secondary contradictions, causing suffering, war and destruction: but conscious effort, following correct theory, is necessary to help these blind forces produce the readjustment which alone can bring relief. Hence arises the necessity for the Communist Party. Stalin writes that "Socialist ideology arises not from the spontaneous [working class] movement but from science." The Party is that vanguard of the working class which, because it is guided by "scientific" insight into the ills of capitalism and the sole means of cure, can and must organize the proletariat and lead it to revolutionary victory: "The Marxist Party is a part of the working class. . . . The Party differs from other detachments of the working class primarily in that it is . . . the *leading* detachment, the *class-conscious* detachment . . . armed

[50] For references in this and the following two paragraphs, see "Istoriia" (1938 to present), especially p. 11, 36, 105, 337, 343, 110, 111, 16, 45, 339.

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with knowledge of social life, knowledge of the laws of the class struggle, and for this reason able to lead the working class and to direct its struggle."

Stalin's conception of Marxist theory is likewise his justification for the character and organization of the Bolshevik Party as opposed to Marxist parties of the western type. Because the Party is the embodiment of "scientific" truth, and because that truth is uncompromisingly revolutionary — teaching that class war must be fought to a finish — the Party must be "monolithic," a centrally controlled army under strict military discipline, tolerating no other parties except for temporary reasons of expediency, hunting down and destroying compromisers — all who are disposed to take the edge off the revolutionary drive, to let things move more gradually — both in society at large and within its own ranks. The same claim to infallible "science" lies at the base of Stalin's theory of the Party purge, so strange to western modes of thought: "The Party strengthens itself by purging itself of opportunist elements. . . ." A procedure that to western minds is a sign and a further cause of weakness is for Stalin a means to strength because strength derives ultimately, not from numbers, but from "knowledge" which harnesses revolution to the laws of history: the purge eliminates those whose allegiance to this "knowledge," and the program based on it, is dubious.[51]

From Stalin's point of view "democratic liberties" have always been compatible with strict Communist Party control. In his report on the Draft Constitution, he claims that the Soviet system is more democratic than any other. And in reply to foreign critics who object that the one-party system is undemocratic, he praises the constitution because it leaves in force the dictatorship of the working class and "the present directing position of the Communist Party." [52] Further, Stalin is on record as holding that proletarian revolution may legitimately be carried out when the proletariat is only a minority of the population — the Party, of course, being only a minority of the proletariat.

Stalin expresses the contrast between Bolshevism and western Socialism most vividly in his 1934 interview with H. G. Wells,

[51] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 40, 45, 135, 337, 343; see also "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 64–75.

[52] "O proekte konstitusii Soiuza S.S.R." (1936 to present), *Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1926. p. 3.

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already mentioned. Wells approaches Stalin from the point of view of a western Socialist; he states that conceptions of violent class war are obsolete; leading businessmen are not ruled wholly (or even primarily in many cases) by the profit motive and there is therefore no radical conflict of interest between capital and labor; modern technology makes Socialism inevitable through gradual extension of government controls; hence the need is for intelligent direction, not violent revolution; eastern and western Socialists should develop a common language and work together rather than emphasize their historic antagonisms. Stalin replies with denial on all points and puts the crux of the matter as he sees it thus: ". . . the replacement of one social system by another social system is a complicated and protracted revolutionary process. It is not a merely spontaneous process. . . . No — revolution . . . has always been struggle, an excruciating and cruel struggle, struggle for life and death."

Communists, he continues, do not idealize force and violence: they would gladly dispense with them if the bourgeoisie would consent to turn things over peaceably to the proletariat. But abundant historical experience teaches (as he said to Wells) that "classes which have had their day do not leave the stage of history voluntarily." His history of the Party picks up this theme in describing (p. 125) how the revolutionary period comes after social forces have evolved spontaneously to a certain point:

> After the new productive forces have matured, the existing productive relations and their bearers, the ruling classes, turn into that "insurmountable" obstacle which can be removed only by means of the conscious action of the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution. . . . The masses are welded into a new political army, create a new revolutionary authority and use it to abolish by force the old system of productive relations and establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development gives place to the conscious action of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution.

The "combat staff" of the new political army is the Communist Party.[53] Effective Communist Party action is Stalin's "subjective" condition for revolution which, when timed with the "objective" conditions previously described, actually brings revolution to pass. As he puts it to the Seventeenth Party Congress: "Some comrades think that as soon as there is a revolutionary crisis the bourgeoisie must be in a situation from which there is no way out. . . . that the victory of revolution is thus

[53] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 66.

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secure. . . . This is a profound mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win it. Moments occur when the situation is revolutionary, the power of the bourgeoisie is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat sufficiently strong and authoritative to lead the masses and take power in its own hands." [54]

World Strategy: the Soviet Union as Base. Before we proceed to examine Stalin's views on how revolution is "prepared for and won" by the Communist Party, a word of caution is in order. As generals are not accustomed to publish their operational directives, so it is unreasonable to expect Stalin to publish his. From his writings it is possible to reconstruct certain main lines of strategy and tactics, but the writings also contain definite acknowledgment that "illegal" or underground activities play a major rôle in Communist operations. Speaking of the revolutionary uses of compromise and reform, he states: ". . . in revolutionary tactics under a bourgeois régime, reform naturally becomes an instrument for disintegrating this régime, an instrument for strengthening revolution. . . . The revolutionary accepts reform in order to use it as a means of meshing the legal work with the illegal work, in order to use it as a cover for the strengthening of the illegal work which aims at revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie." [55] Therefore it must remain a question to what extent Stalin's published views on Communist strategy and tactics are supplemented or modified by doctrine reserved for the Communist high command.

In any case, Stalin's approach is characteristically military, and it is hardly by accident that his writings are strewn with military figures of speech — tactics and strategy; staff, cadres, vanguards, reserves; strong points, forward positions; advances, assaults, retreats, manœuvres; encirclement, flanking movement, regrouping of forces, etc.[56] An early sketch not published until 1947 shows most succinctly the connection between theory and

[54] "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; see also "Beseda s pervoi amerikanskoi rabochei delegatsiei" (1927–1939), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 266; "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 337.

[55] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 63. See also "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 127, 133, 136, 151.

[56] Stalin remarks that he and other younger members of the Central Committee were required by Lenin to study the fundamentals of warfare. ("Otvet tov. Stalina na pis'mo Razina," *Bol'shevik*, Feb. 1947, p. 6.)

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strategy: "The *theory* of Marxism, studying primarily the objective processes . . . defines the tendency of evolution, points out the class or classes which are inevitably rising to power or which are inevitably falling, must fall. . . . The *program* of Marxism, basing itself on the conclusions of the theory, defines the goal for the movement of the rising class, in this case of the proletariat. . . . *Strategy*, guiding itself by the directives of the program and resting on a calculation of the contending forces, internal . . . and international, defines that . . . general direction along which the revolutionary movement of the proletariat should be directed with a view to achieving the biggest results with the . . . developing correlation of forces. . . ." [57]

The program thus defines the objectives at which strategy aims. Stalin distinguishes the "maximum program" — "Socialist revolution, overthrow of the capitalists' rule, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat" — from the "minimum program" formulated for a particular phase of the total process.[58] Stalin writes in "Voprosy" that "Strategy has to do with the main forces of revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passage of revolution from one stage to another, remaining essentially without change for the whole period of a given stage." The first stage was 1903 to February 1917, the second March to October 1917. The third stage began after the October Revolution: "*The goal is to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries.* Revolution spreads beyond the limits of one country; the epoch of world revolution has begun." [59]

The fundamental, not merely incidental, intention to use the Soviet Union as the base for world revolution has thus been on the record in Stalin's most important doctrinal work, repeatedly republished for mass circulation from 1924 to the present time. In another passage which has had similar authoritative distribution from 1924 to the present Stalin elaborates his view:

> . . . the very development of world revolution . . . will be more rapid and more thorough, the more thoroughly Socialism fortifies itself in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

[57] "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 62; see also p. 162.

[58] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 40, 38; "Sochineniia," Vol. V (1947), p. 63, 162.

[59] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 54 (italics added); see also "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 173–180; "K itogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP (b)" (1925–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 110.

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While it is true that the *final* victory of Socialism in the first country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true that the development of world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the aid rendered by the first Socialist country to the workers . . . of all other countries.

In what should this aid be expressed?

It should be expressed, first, in the victorious country "carrying out the maximum realizable in one country *for* the development, support, awakening of revolution in all countries" . . .

It should be expressed, second, in that the "victorious proletariat" of the one country . . . "after organizing its own Socialist production, should stand up . . . *against* the remaining, capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their governments" . . .[60]

This passage deserves detailed comment. The supreme aim of world revolution is the logical outcome of Stalin's entire theoretical position as outlined in the present study — notably the thesis that capitalism is a single *world-system* fatally torn by contradictions which can be cured only by a consciously directed Socialist revolution. Granted these assumptions, the determination to use the foothold won in the Soviet Union as a base for world revolution is elementary common sense. This outlook is confirmed by many other passages in widely published statements by Stalin.[61] The sole contradictory passages — unless cunningly interpreted — are remarks made by Stalin to two foreigners, under circumstances where it is obviously to his advantage to convey another impression. For example, he tells Roy Howard in 1936 that the Soviet Union has never had plans for fostering revolution in other countries because exporting revolution is nonsense.[62] The other statement, made to Mr. King, of Reuters, in May 1943, will be described in a moment. These two statements are not republished in "Voprosy" or otherwise for wide and lasting distribution in

[60] "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i taktika russkikh kommunistov" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 104. The latter part of this passage, including the reference to using armed force, is a quotation from Lenin which Stalin employs also in "K voprosam Leninizma" (1926 to present), *ibid.*, p. 142, and in "K itogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP (b)" (1925–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 122. This repetition in widely circulated works is added evidence that Stalin means every word.

[61] See the statement to Ludwig above, and the vow of fidelity to the principles of the Comintern quoted below; also "Mezhdunarodnyi kharakter oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii" (1927, 1934 to present), "Voprosy" 11th ed., 1945, p. 179; "Sochineniia, Vol. IV, p. 166, 238 and Vol. V, p. 85, 169, 179; "K itogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP (b)" (1925–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 132. This list of corroborating passages is by no means exhaustive.

[62] "Beseda tovarishcha Stalina c predsedatelem amerikanskogo gazetnogo ob"edineniia 'Skripps-Govard N'iuspeipers' g-nom Roi Govardom," *Pravda*, March 5, 1936, p. 2.

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the Soviet Union. When they are weighed against the mass of contrary evidence on Stalin's views presented above, the only conclusion is that they are misleading.

In 1938 the Party history appears with the revolutionary motto on its title page: "Workers of all countries, unite!" And the introduction declares: "Studying the history of the CPSU(b) strengthens confidence in the final victory of the great cause of the party of Lenin and Stalin, the victory of Communism in the whole world." The history also repeats the fundamental quotation from Lenin on the country of Socialism "rising against" the capitalist world after organizing its own production; states that "the victory of proletarian revolutions in capitalist countries is a vital interest of the toilers of the U.S.S.R.;" and quotes Stalin's "great vow" of "fidelity to the principles of the Communist International." All these points, it should be remembered, are made in a work used for mass indoctrination down to the present time.

In 1936, Howard asks Stalin if he has not to some extent abandoned his plans for world revolution. Stalin replies, "We never had such plans and intentions," thus excluding the interpretation that what he is saying to Howard represents in any way a change of mind.[63] He then declares that "we Marxists hold that revolution will occur in other countries too. But it will occur only when the revolutionaries of these countries find it possible or necessary. The export of revolution — that is nonsense." But this statement says nothing about ways in which local revolutionaries may be used, directed, and aided by outside agencies; the only "export" of revolution which it denies would be the very crudest kind, which dispensed with forming even a minimum of local Communist leadership. Carefully analyzed, then, Stalin's remarks turn out to be a sort of legalistic quibble used to convey a general impression which is in fact false.

It has at times been thought that some of Stalin's statements during the current period indicated a change of mind on his part with regard to long-term relations with the "capitalist" democracies. A careful search through all his published statements from July 1941 to March 1948 yields only one case which appears to warrant such a belief — a letter in May 1943 to King, Reuters

[63] The denial that the U.S.S.R. ever had "such plans and intentions" amounts to denying that it had ever given aid to revolutions abroad, *e.g.* to China. The import of the statement for the future can be no greater than its application to the past.

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correspondent (mentioned above), about the dissolution of the Comintern. The interview with Stassen merely says that the important point is not whether coexistence is possible but whether both sides desire it. If "one side" does not want coöperation, "the result will be conflict, war." [64] In other words, if "one side" does not like the terms of the Soviet Union, it is lacking in desire to coöperate. Also, when Stassen asks if wartime experience has changed things, Stalin denies that he ever said the two systems could not coöperate; he thus implies that his views remain unchanged and makes it impossible to attribute to his current statements on coöperation a more generous meaning than to his earlier ones. Stalin's remark that the postwar international security organization "will be effective if the Great Powers . . . continue to act in a spirit of unanimity" [65] is another expression of this same conception of "coöperation;" when queried by Hugh Baillie about the veto, Stalin denies that the Soviet Union has abused it in the United Nations or the Council of Foreign Ministers.[66]

But the letter to the Reuters correspondent on the dissolution of the Comintern is an explicit contradiction of Stalin's earlier statements of revolutionary methods and aims. Here he says that the dissolution of the Comintern is right because, among other reasons: "(a) it exposes the lie of the Hitlerites that 'Moscow' intends to intervene in the life of other states and 'bolshevize' them. Henceforth an end is put to that lie. (b) It exposes the slander of the enemies of Communism in the workers' movement to the effect that the Communist Parties of the various countries act not in the interests of their own nation but according to orders from outside. Henceforth an end is put to that slander too." [67]

These propositions, reminiscent of the 1936 Howard interview, can be reconciled with Stalin's established revolutionary doctrine only by very special pleading. Since they are made to a foreign correspondent and contain no express disavowal of pertinent basic writings currently republished in quantity in the Soviet Union, the balance of evidence is that they are merely part of the current tactical and propaganda line and do not reflect a funda-

[64] *Loc. cit.*, p. 1.
[65] "XVII godovshchina velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii," *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1944, p. 2.
[66] "Otvety tov. Stalina I. V. na voprosy prezidenta amerikanskogo agentstva Iunaited Press g-na Kh'iu Beili," *Pravda*, Oct. 3, 1946, p. 1.
[67] "Otvet tov. I. V. Stalina na vopros glavnogo korrespondenta angliiskogo agentstva Reiter," *Pravda*, May 30, 1943, p. 1.

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mental change. The most decisive evidence to this effect is the republication of Stalin's vows of fidelity to Lenin and his cause originally made before the Second Congress of Soviets on January 26, 1924. Toward the close Stalin says that "Lenin was the leader not only of the Russian proletariat, not only of the workers of Europe, not only of the colonial East, but also of the earth's entire toiling world." Then he makes his last vow, set off in boldfaced capitals from the rest of the text: "In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us fidelity to the principles of the Communist International. We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our life in order to strengthen and expand the union of toilers of the whole world — the Communist International." [68] In the light of this vow, repeatedly republished, Stalin's real view evidently is that the Comintern was dissolved only in form, not in spirit. Stalin's charge that the United States and Great Britain are not interested in agreement and coöperation with the U.S.S.R., made in the interview by a *Pravda* correspondent, are also to be read against this background.[69] The passages in Stalin's various interviews in which he indicates the possibility or desirability of coexistence and coöperation between capitalist and Socialist systems do not really contradict the strategic aim of world revolution because they refer to a temporary tactic.

The second paragraph in the long passage quoted above places the problem of the "final" victory of Socialism in one country within the wider context of world revolution, thus excluding the hypothesis that the more limited objective — involving merely enough additional revolutions to end "capitalist encirclement" and provide security for the Soviet Union — marks the outer limit of Stalin's program for Communist expansion. Further, the passage quoted indicates that the Soviet Union will first be prepared as a base, and only then, "*after* organizing its own Socialist production," will be used more aggressively to aid revolution abroad. This tallies with the predominant absorption of the Soviets with internal affairs during the earlier five-year plans. Further, the phrase does not define the stage at which production is to be considered adequately organized. Hence the prospect of

[68] "Po povodu smerti Lenina," in V. I. Lenin, "Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh," 4th ed., Moscow, printing of 1946, Vol. I, p. 8, which in turn refers to Stalin's "O Lenine," 1942, p. 17–22. The vow is also quoted in "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 257. Thus it has been widely circulating in at least three authoritative versions during the current period.

[69] *Pravda*, Oct. 29, 1948.

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three or more additional five-year plans, as announced in 1938 and again in 1946, may indicate that the base is still not ready for contemplated operations.

Finally, the passage definitely states that armed force will be used against capitalist governments if necessary. There thus is nothing except expediency to limit the aid which Stalin contemplates giving to revolutions abroad. However, the phrase "if necessary" indicates that armed force is not to be used by preference; ahead of it come propaganda and Communist Party control, by which is meant that the Soviet Union should attract to itself "the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in these countries against the capitalists."[70]

The ultimate resort to armed force is a logical development of the Leninist thesis that only consciously-led revolution can drive the capitalists from the stage of history, as explained in the preceding section. The assumption that the world has been fundamentally divided into two camps since the October Revolution runs through Stalin's writings from his early days and is grounded in his Marxist philosophy.[71] Stalin pictures the long-range evolution of the two camps as follows:

> Most probably, in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centers of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and the system of these countries throughout the world, centers of Socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centers throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill up the history of the development of the world revolution.[72]

The systems are expected to be organized around two centers:

> Thus in the course of further development of international revolution two centers will form on a world scale: a Socialist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to Socialism, and a capitalist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to capitalism. The struggle between these two

[70] Stalin's belief in the necessity for strict Party discipline on an international and not merely a national scale is illustrated in his speeches in the Comintern in May 1929, in which he castigates members of the American delegation for refusing to accept a decision of the Presidium disciplining American Party leaders: debate and criticism are permissible in advance of decision, he concludes, but once a decision is made all must accept it, else there can be no "collective direction." ("O pravykh fraktsionerakh v amerikanskoi kompartii," *Bol'shevik*, Jan. 15, 1930, p. 8–26.)

[71] "Sochineniia", Vol. IV, p. 232, 380; "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 26, 54; "K voprosam Leninizma" (1926 to present), *ibid.*, p. 113, 140; "Itogi pervoi piatiletki" (1933 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1933, p. 1; "Privetstvie tov. I. V. Stalina," *Pravda*, Sept. 7, 1947, p. 1. These are only a few of the many passages which reflect a two-world conception.

[72] "Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i taktika russkikh kommunistov" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 105.

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centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism in the whole world.[73]

The plan to make the Soviet Union the base for world revolution implies that it will be one of the two centers. Evidence will be presented later that the United States is expected to be the other. The ultimate inevitability of war to the finish between the two camps is made clear in one of Stalin's favorite quotations from Lenin: "We live . . . not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable." [74] Stalin appended to this forecast of inexorable wars a succinct, "Clear, one would think." Thus Stalin expects not merely one but several world wars before the end of capitalism.

At the very close of the struggle the forces of Socialism will be so superior that Stalin foresees an exception to the general rule that revolutionary violence is necessary to overthrow capitalism: "Of course, in the distant future, if the proletariat wins in the most important capitalist countries and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a Socialist encirclement, a 'peaceful' path of development is fully possible for some capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the 'unfavorable' international situation, will consider it expedient to make serious concessions to the proletariat 'voluntarily.'" [75] The technique of "cold revolution," as it has been called, illustrated recently in Eastern Europe, may be interpreted as a variety of "Socialist encirclement" in that it also dispenses with the need for overt violence. In any case, the passage quoted excepts "the most important capitalist countries," and so does not apply to the United States.

Flexibility of Strategy and Tactics. We are now in a position to

[73] "Beseda s pervoi amerikanskoi rabochei delegatsiei" (1927–1939), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 287; also reproduced in the introductory section of a popular edition of Lenin's works, "Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh," 4th ed., Moscow, printing of 1946, Vol. I, p. 28. See also "K itogam rabot XIV konferentsii RKP (b)" (1925–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 111; "Politicheskii otchet TsK" (1925), "XIV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 19; "Ob itogakh iiul'skogo plenuma TsK VKP (b)" (1928–1934), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 338.

[74] "K voprosam Leninizma" (1926 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 140; see also p. 113. Quoted again in "Otvet t-shchu IVANOVU Ivanu Filippovichu," *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1938, p. 3.

[75] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 32. On Socialist encirclement see also "XVIII s"ezd Sten. otchet," (1939 to present), p. 33, 36.

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link Stalin's strategy and tactics with his conception of the "objective" conditions making for revolution. It is the business of strategy and tactics, he holds, to prepare the "subjective" conditions of revolution — *i.e.* the mobilization of the proletariat and its allies — and bring them into action at the most favorable times and places as determined by the development of the "objective" conditions.[76] More than this, preparation of the "subjective" conditions really involves gaining leadership of social forces which often in the first place develop spontaneously. Describing the skill shown by the Communist Party in Russia in 1917 in uniting "in one common revolutionary stream such different revolutionary movements as the general democratic movement for peace, the peasant democratic movement for seizure of the landed estates, the movement of the oppressed nationalities for national liberation and national equality, and the Socialist movement of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," Stalin declares that "undoubtedly, the merging of these diverse revolutionary streams in one common, powerful revolutionary stream decided the fate of capitalism in Russia."[77]

In general, despite his comparatively rigid doctrinal framework, Stalin's conception of Communist strategy and tactics is highly flexible. It rests on a continual assessment of the status of forces in both the capitalist and the Socialist systems. Thus he writes: "*Tactics*, guiding itself by the directives of strategy and by experience of the revolutionary movement . . . calculating at every given moment the state of forces inside the proletariat and its allies (greater or less cultivation, greater or less degree of organization and class-consciousness, presence of particular traditions, presence of particular forms of movement, forms of organization, *basic* and *secondary*), as well as in the camp of the adversary, profiting by discord and every kind of confusion in the camp of the adversary — marks out those *concrete courses* for winning the wide masses to the proletarian side and leading them to battle stations on the social front . . . which most surely pave the way for strategic successes." [78]

[76] "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 62, 74, 161; "O pravykh fraktsionerakh v amerikanskoi kompartii," *Bol'shevik*, Jan. 15, 1930, p. 13, 23; "Voprosy sverdlovtsev i otvet t. Stalina," *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1930, p. 2.

[77] "Istoriia" (1938 to present), p. 204.

[78] "O politicheskoi strategii i taktike russkikh kommunistov" (written 1921, first published 1947), "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 63.

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In view of this flexibility, and of the way in which Stalin expects Communist leadership to win control of many movements which originate spontaneously, it must be concluded that the "objective" conditions of revolution are not fixed quantities in Stalin's thinking, but rather interdependent variables which are to be manipulated to satisfy just one equation: revolution occurs where the Communist command concentrates superiority of forces at a point on the Capitalist front where the bourgeoisie can be isolated and overwhelmed. In other words, "revolutionary crises" do not have to be waited for; they can to some extent be organized; and an extremely favorable balance of outside aid can compensate to a considerable degree for a deficiency in favorable internal conditions.

For the period of world revolution, Stalin's grand strategy is to use the Soviet Union as a base linking the proletariat of the west with the movements for national liberation from imperialism in the east into "a single world front against the world front of imperialism." In this way he harnesses two of the major contradictions of capitalism to his chariot — contradictions between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and contradictions between capitalist and colonial countries. The front thus formed is to be used to exploit the third contradiction of capitalism — that between capitalist countries, whose rivalry for spheres of influence must lead periodically to war, the event most propitious for revolution.[79]

One of the chief conditions to which tactics must be adjusted, according to Stalin, is the ebb and flow of the forces favoring revolution. Aggressive tactics should be timed with a rising tide; tactics of defense, the assemblage of forces, and even retreat go with an ebbing tide.[80] The importance of gauging the direction of the tide is illustrated by Stalin's remarks in 1929 concerning a controversy with Bukharin, who apparently held that the "stabilization of capitalism" was persisting unchanged: "This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the sections of the Comintern. Is the capitalist stabilization going to pieces or is it becoming more secure? On this the whole line of the Communist Parties in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we in a period of decline of the revolutionary movement . . . or are we

[79] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 17, 54; "Sochineniia," Vol. IV, p. 166, 238, 378.

[80] "Ob osnovakh Leninizma" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 55; "Sochineniia," Vol. V, p. 64.

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in a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary rise, a period of preparing the working class for coming class battles — on this depends the tactical position of the Communist Parties." Stalin holds that it is a period of revolutionary upswing.[81]

Stalin's insistence on flexibility of tactics is ground for a very important maxim in the interpretation of his public statements; one must avoid, if possible, mistaking a change in tactics for a change in fundamental doctrine and strategic objectives. The example of a change in tactics often thus mistaken is Stalin's remarks about peaceful coexistence of and coöperation between the Socialist and capitalist systems. The whole body of mutually reinforcing propositions in Stalin's philosophy adds up to a veritable religion of conflict and contradiction. This is described as not only inevitable but desirable, until revolution is achieved. Here we find further strong evidence that Stalin's statements on coöperation represent nothing deeper than a tactic.

Stalin first announced a period of "peaceful coexistence" for proletarian and bourgeois worlds in 1925, saying that the revolutionary movement was ebbing and capitalism achieving a temporary stabilization. But the context of his statement makes plain that he expected peaceful coexistence to be as temporary as the stabilization.[82] In 1927 he stated that capitalist stabilization was coming to an end and that the period of "peaceful coexistence" was likewise giving way to one of imperialist attacks. But he added that the Soviet Union must continue to pursue a policy of maintaining peace for the following reason:

> We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until the colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or, finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over division of the colonies. Therefore the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us.
>
> The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the coexistence of two opposed systems.[83]

This concern for peaceful relations in order to build the Socialist economy at home should be read in the context of the previous

[81] "O pravom uklone v VKP (b)" (1929 to present), *Bol'shevik*, Dec. 1929, p. 20.
[82] "XIV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 8, 10, 17; "K itogam rabot XIV Konferentsii," "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 110.
[83] "XV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 47.

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discussion in this paper of the Soviet Union as a base for world revolution; in that light, a peace policy is an intelligible tactic. Stalin continues to advocate it in the years after 1927, while at the same time urging the Communist Parties to adopt aggressive tactics in keeping with the end of capitalist stabilization.[84] Thus appears an important variation of tactics on different levels of activity: peaceful coexistence for the Soviet Government, preparation for attack by Communist Parties.

The peace policy has another tactical function in Stalin's strategy of revolution. He notes how successfully the Communists capitalized on the general popular craving for peace during the October Revolution; accordingly he manœuvres the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties into position as apostles of peace, unmasking the imperialist "warmongers" in order to profit by popular sentiments for peace in the future. Particularly interesting in this connection is the way Stalin combines his peace stand with verbal onslaughts on Social Democratic pacifism as a mere mask of the warmongers.[85]

Apart from their bearing on peace, the tasks of developing trade and obtaining technological assistance from capitalist countries have a direct relationship to building the industrial base of the Soviet Union, especially during the early stage of the five-year plans. Stalin makes several unsentimental and businesslike proposals for improved relations along these lines, particularly with the United States.[86] His fullest and frankest statement on coöperation between Soviet and capitalist worlds is made in 1927, shortly before his announcement that the capitalist stabilization is coming to an end. To the American Workers' Delegation, who asked to what extent such coöperation is possible and whether it has definite limits, Stalin replies:

> The matter concerns, obviously, temporary agreements with capitalist states in the field of industry, in the field of trade, and, perhaps, in the field of diplomatic relations. I think that the presence of two opposed systems . . . does not exclude the possibility of such agreements. I think that such agreements are possible and expedient under conditions of peaceful development. . . .
>
> The limits of these agreements? The limits are set by the opposition of the

[84] On aggressive tactics, see "O pravom uklone v VKP (b)" (1929 to present), *Bol'shevik*, Dec. 1929, p. 15–49 (including passage quoted immediately above in text); "O pravykh fraktsionerakh v amerikanskoi kompartii," *Bol'shevik*, Jan. 15, 1930, p. 8–26.

[85] "Ob itogakh iiul'skogo plenuma TsK VKP (b)," "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 336; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 15; "Oktiabr'skaia Revoliutsiia" (1924 to present), "Voprosy," 11th ed., 1945, p. 78.

[86] "Gospodin Kempbell priviraet," *Bol'shevik*, Nov. 30, 1932, p. 12; interview reported by Eugene Lyons, *New York Herald Tribune*, Nov. 24, 1930, p. 1, 2.

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two systems, between which rivalry and struggle go on. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreements are fully possible. . . .

Are these agreements merely an experiment or can they have more or less lasting character? That depends not only on us; that depends also on those who contract with us. That depends on the general situation. War can upset any agreement whatever. . . .[87]

A few pages later the same interview reads: "Thus in the course of further development of international revolution two centers will form on a world scale: a Socialist center . . . and a capitalist center. . . . The struggle between these two centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism in the whole world." This passage places coöperation clearly as a temporary tactic on the way to world revolution. When read against the foregoing as background, Stalin's statements to Howard, Duranty, Lyons, Werth, Elliott Roosevelt and Stassen, to the effect that the two systems can coexist and compete peacefully, appear not so much inconsistent with his basic principles as merely elliptical: he neglects to specify how long and on what terms. To that extent the effect is misleading, as we have seen, and properly comes under the heading of propaganda.

IV. REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

In a speech in the Comintern in May 1929, Stalin rebukes representatives of the American Communist Party for exaggerating the "specific traits" of American capitalism. The basis for the activities of all Communist Parties, he states, is the "common traits" of capitalism, which are fundamentally the same for all countries — the specific traits of capitalism in a particular country merely supplement the general traits. This implies that Stalin makes no major exceptions on behalf of the United States in regard to the application of his theory of capitalism and his objective of world revolution. In April 1947, Stalin presents an unchanged view in his talk with Stassen: he even says that the economic systems of the United States and of Nazi Germany are identical — namely, monopoly capitalism. When Stassen argues that the American system is really very different, he is politely but firmly parried.

As we have noted, Stalin's portrait of the capitalists paints

[87] "Beseda c pervoi amerikanskoi rabochei delegatsiei" (1927–1939), "Voprosy," 9th ed., 1932, p. 280, 287.

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them as utterly unprincipled and ruthless men, dominated by the lust for profits, to which they are willing to sacrifice all else. In his interview with Lyons (intended for publication in America and appealing for better business relations) he remarks, apropos of the alleged sanctity of the old war debts, which were a stumbling block: "Since when has the bourgeoisie placed principle above money?" In his report to the Eighteenth Congress in 1939, he complains of the policies of the United States and other countries toward Germany and Japan, and declares: "Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of nonintervention, to talk of treason, of treachery, etc. It is naïve to read a moral to people who do not recognize human morality." [88] To Wells in 1934, he says that American or other capitalists will never permit abolition of unemployment because they need a "reserve army of unemployed" to ensure cheap labor; capitalists are "riveted to profit" and "see nothing except their own interest." The government is merely their tool: if Roosevelt seriously threatens private property and the profit system, they will put in another president.

How does Stalin regard Americans in general? His admiration for American technological prowess and business efficiency are well known. To Ludwig in 1931 he also mentions the democratic simplicity of American manners; but he denies "worship of everything American." As far as Soviet sympathies with the majority of any other nation are concerned, those with the Germans are beyond comparision with "our feelings toward Americans." [89] On no occasion does Stalin appeal to lasting ties of sentiment or culture as a basis for coöperation with the United States. Even to Howard in 1936 he specifies that neither of the rival systems will evolve into the other. "The Soviet system will not grow into American democracy, and vice versa." The utterly unsentimental basis of Stalin's approach to coöperation despite ideological differences is made particularly clear by his statement to Stassen in 1947 that the Soviet Union would have coöperated with Germany as much as with any other capitalist country if Germany had desired. Stalin bids for coöperation on the basis of interest, such as maintaining peace and securing profitable trade.

Stalin has long evinced a belief that proletarian forces are backward in the United States. To the American Labor Delegation in 1927 he comments that American labor leaders are "reactionary"

[88] "Otchetnyi doklad (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 14.
[89] To Emil Ludwig, *Bol'shevik*, April 30, 1932, p. 38.

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and "reformist," and points to the small fraction of workers who are unionized. He also observes that both political parties are bourgeois, and asks: "Don't you Comrades consider that the absence of your own mass workers' party, if only one like the English [Labor Party], weakens the strength of the working class in its political struggle with capitalism?" In 1947 he remarks to Stassen that he sees little difference between Democrats and Republicans. Likewise in speaking to American Communist Party representatives in 1929 he attacks them for "rightist factionalism," saying: "It cannot be denied that American life offers an environment which favors the Communist Party's falling into error and exaggerating the strength and stability of American capitalism."[90] He has said nothing since to indicate a change of opinion. Thus such evidence as his writings afford points to an expectation that the United States will be one of the last countries to go Communist.

This conclusion is reinforced by Stalin's views on the American economy. He notes that the United States — "the chief country of capitalism, its stronghold" — is hardest hit by the economic crisis of 1929, and that the crisis of 1937 originates here. But he also observes that the country leads world recovery in 1925 and 1933, and in 1939 he implies that it will pull out of the later crisis.[91] Thus the United States is the center of the capitalist world system, its "stronghold," and, though affected by the general decadence of capitalism, shows some remnants of health in its powers of recovery. As early as 1925 Stalin observes that the center of capitalist financial power is moving across the Atlantic, and he describes how the United States, with England as partner, is becoming the hub of the capitalist system. . . ."two chief, but opposed, centers of attraction are being formed," he writes, "and, in conformity with this, two directions of pull toward these centers throughout the world: Anglo-America . . . and the Soviet Union . . ."[92] In the years immediately following, Stalin sees the United States and England becoming rivals rather than partners, but at no time up to the present has he implied that the United States has ceased to be the center of world capitalism. To Stassen in 1947 he comments on the unique oppor-

[90] "O pravykh fraktsionerakh v amerikanskoi kompartii," *Bol'shevik*, Jan. 15, 1930, p. 8.

[91] "XVI s"ezd" (1930–1939), *Pravda*, June 29, 1930, p. 1; "Politicheskii otchet" (1925), "XIV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 11; "Politicheskii otchet" (1927), p. 38; "XVII-omu s"ezdu" (1934 to present), *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1934, p. 1; "Otchetnyi doklad" (1939 to present), "XVIII s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 9.

[92] "XIV s"ezd. Sten. otchet," p. 10, 19.

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tunities for rapid economic development enjoyed by this country from the beginning, and also points out that with the elimination of Germany and Japan as competitors it has access to world markets as never before, and thus has opportunity for further development.

Thus Stalin's conception of the United States as the "stronghold of capitalism" dovetails with his picture of the future course of world revolution. The United States is expected to be the center of the rival world system which finally must clash with the Soviet system until capitalism goes down and Socialism conquers the world. This means that Stalin expects revolution in the United States only near the end of the "epoch of world revolution." [93] As he declares to the American Commission of the Comintern in 1929, "when a revolutionary crisis has developed in America, that will be the beginning of the end of all world capitalism."

V. THE NEXT PHASE

Thus it is probable that Stalin hardly expected revolution to occur in the United States during World War II or its aftermath. But the evidence presented in the present article makes it likely that his perspective on this period was (and is) as follows:

(1) The time for the next harvest of revolution is at hand. The world war, predicted since 1927, has come to pass, and the upheaval it has created will bring to a climax the contradictions of capitalism in a way that will make revolution possible in "a number of countries in Europe and Asia." [94] Precisely such revolution is required to guarantee once and for all that the forces of capitalism will not obliterate Socialism (even in the U.S.S.R. itself) and compel the whole process to begin again from scratch. Therefore the minimum revolutionary objective for World War II and its aftermath is to bring enough countries into the Soviet camp to effect such a guarantee.

(2) The "law of ebb and flow" implies that unless the whole of capitalism collapses under the present revolutionary wave, the

[93] The factor of geographical position obviously supports such a view also. Stalin recognizes that proximity is an important factor in assisting revolution in another country from the Soviet base. Among the unfavorable circumstances of the October Revolution in Russia he mentions "the absence, next to it or in its neighborhood, of a Soviet country which it could lean upon. Undoubtedly, a future revolution, in Germany for example, would be in a more favorable situation in this respect, for it has nearby so powerful a Soviet country as our Soviet Union." "Voprosy" (1924 to present), 11th ed., 1945, p. 79.

[94] "XVII s"ezd" (1934 to present), p. 1.

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surviving remnant will temporarily stabilize itself a few years after the end of the war and an ebb in the tide of revolution will set in: the revolutionary objective for World War II must therefore be consolidated before the tide begins to ebb. This imparts a certain urgency to revolutionary tactics in the immediate postwar period.

(3) Though the Soviet Union has not yet equalled the United States in industrial production per capita, its industrial and military strength has increased greatly since 1928, and with the defeat of Germany and Japan its relative strength among the Powers of Europe and Asia will be enormous. Therefore the Soviet Union will be in position to serve as base for much more active fostering of revolutionary movements in other countries, though not ready to establish Communism throughout the world. This indicates a much more aggressive tactic toward other countries, but not so aggressive as deliberately to bring on war for world hegemony in the immediate future.

The success of this tactic would depend in part, according to Stalin's theory of revolution, on the extent to which the critical areas were isolated from foreign influences hostile to revolution. This gives a major clue to Stalin's war and postwar policies toward Britain and the United States. Many of them can be regarded as a delaying action: by retarding realization on the part of these countries of what is really going on, then minimizing efforts to intervene as realization gradually dawns, they, in effect, tend to isolate the "bourgeoisie" in the countries singled out for revolution until Communist control is established. Stalin's profession of nonaggressive war aims served to lull suspicion. So did the dissolution of the Comintern and his comments thereon. So did his statements on the possibility of coexistence and coöperation and the necessity for unanimity among the big Powers after the war. These and similar moves imposed a serious reluctance on the part of the Allies to do or say anything that could be construed as a breach in the spirit of wartime collaboration. When at last Allied public opinion began to denounce Soviet or Communist actions, the same statements served as a basis for propaganda counterattack. Stalin launched this attack with his comments on Churchill's speech at Fulton, declaring it a "dangerous act," sowing discord among the Allies, harming the cause of peace and security, in short, warmongering.[95] There-

[95] "Interv'iu tov. I.V. Stalina s korrespondentom 'Pravdy' otnositel'no rechi g. Cherchillia," *Pravda*, March 14, 1946, p. 1.

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after those who like Churchill object to Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere are denounced as "warmongers," and an attempt is made to mobilize against them the popular craving for peace.

Even the United Nations has to some extent been exploited by Stalin's tactics. The possibility of using the veto to cripple Allied action in revolutionary areas is obvious. But if, as some think, Stalin might prefer a deal based on spheres of influence to the United Nations pattern, such an arrangement could be depended on to further, not to limit, revolutionary operations. Within his sphere Stalin would have a free hand, and Communist action would also continue across the demarcation line into the other sphere.

When Stalin looks to the more distant future, the United States, which has emerged from the last war more truly than ever the "stronghold of capitalism," probably continues to figure in his thinking as it has done in his basic writings since the mid-1920's — as the center around which the capitalist system will form for the final war to the death between the two systems. Meanwhile, Stalin (*Pravda*, February 10, 1946) projects further industrial expansion in the Soviet Union on a scale which suggests, other factors aside, that the climactic struggle will not be risked before 15 or 20 years have elapsed. Stalin's theory of "ebb and flow" would lead him to expect a new stabilization of capitalism within a few years, followed some years later by another wave of crisis and revolution generated by capitalism's inexorable contradictions. He apparently is timing completion of the Soviet base of operations for the crest of this next wave. Tactics of the moment may swing this way or that, but the Marxist doctrine to which he is committed is uncompromisingly revolutionary. In that doctrine, world Communism is the supreme aim, Soviet power the major instrument by which it will be achieved.

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NO PEACE, NO WAR

By Max Beloff

THE historian who searches for historical parallels can find little that is relevant to the circumstances of the present day. It is of course true that all great wars tend to conclude not with a spectacular and universal return of peace to an afflicted world, but with a series of smaller wars which gradually taper off until peace is reached. The First World War was no exception to this rule, and not until after the end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922 — four years after the Armistice on the western front — could one begin to talk of a postwar period. Two centuries earlier, the great wars caused by the ambitions of Louis XIV came to a real end only with the northern settlement in the Treaty of Nystadt, in 1721, six years after that monarch's death, and eight years after the principal belligerents had come to terms by the Treaty of Utrecht. Nor is it a novelty that victorious nations should fall out with one another on the morrow of victory. The difficulties caused by Russian and Prussian ambitions at the Congress of Vienna, and the advantage taken of them by Talleyrand, provide a classic instance. It is not, therefore, by the novelty of the situation so much as by the extent of the turmoil, the rapidity of the new alignments and the lack of any signs pointing to a peaceful solution to our predicament that the present period is distinguished from other postwar periods. Indeed, the current preoccupation with subjects such as rearmament would tend to suggest an atmosphere of a prewar rather than a postwar kind.

Many reasons have been and can be put forward in explanation of these facts. One can point to the unparalleled savagery of the Second World War, to the extent of the devastation and of the breakdown in the normal mechanisms of civilized living, to the fears engendered by the exploitations of new and tremendous weapons, and to the unleashing of the passions of race and class on a gigantic scale. The student of politics will be tempted to add another explanation to the list and to regard as unique in modern times the reduction in the number of Great Powers to two, and two only. It is clear now, as it was not clear when the war ended, that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are the only two Powers that have, for the moment at any rate, the physical capacity for

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political activity of other than a narrowly defensive kind. The "Big Five" of the United Nations Charter have proved as illusory as most of the hopes pinned upon that tragic document. China is ridden by civil war to such an extent that it is rather a victim than an actor on the world scene; France seems more deeply divided than before by the internecine hatreds that prevented her from reacting in time to the Nazi menace; Great Britain, although preserving a great measure of internal unity and stability, is unable out of its own resources to meet its economic needs and is faced with great problems of social and structural change. If the influence of Great Britain is again to be exerted decisively on the world scene, it will be as the center of some new grouping of like-minded peoples rather than as a single Power. Of the defeated Powers, Germany is for the moment devastated and partitioned, and Japan occupied and closely controlled. Both remain of potential political significance; and Germany might well become a great and menacing Power once more. Italy — in spite of her considerable progress toward recovery — has been shown to have been a Great Power only by courtesy. For the moment, then, political power is polarized as never before.

Even were there nothing particularly menacing in the relationship to each other of the United States and the U.S.S.R., this fact that they stand alone would probably in itself suffice to provide a certain amount of tension. Such great centers of power would be bound to exercise an attraction outside their own borders; smaller Powers and rival parties within national frontiers would be bound to look to them for support. But this inevitable process has been magnified and accelerated by the peculiar nature of the Soviet state. If the postwar development of Soviet policy has done nothing else it has at least silenced most of those who assured us during the war years that the U.S.S.R. had settled down into the familiar likeness of a national state, that its foreign policy was by and large the same as that of the Tsarist Empire whose nuclear territories it inherited, and whose imperial heritage it has now reclaimed. It is true that some legends die hard, and that one still reads books asserting that Stalin's defeat of Trotsky marked a turning-point in Soviet history and the abandonment of the idea of world revolution. But no serious student now denies that to understand the U.S.S.R. and the international problem that it represents, one has to appreciate the extent to which its rulers believe their fortunes to depend upon a thriving revolu-

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tionary cause, and their historic mission to lie in the expansion of Communism upon a world scale. In this respect, everything that has happened over the last year and a half confirms the analysis of Soviet policy made by "X" in his now celebrated article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," that appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in July 1947.

It is because of its function as the headquarters of an international movement that the U.S.S.R. can use in its own interests the efforts of large sections of the population in almost every country of the Old World and of devoted if smaller groups throughout the Americas as well. Compared with the resources that the Russians command in this way, the "fifth columns" and Quislings of Hitler were feeble in the extreme. It is of course true that one must not leave out of account the military resources that the U.S.S.R. itself controls. It is Communist power along with Communist ideology that attracts adherents — as was true of Nazi power and ideology on their lesser scale. But to say that the problem is that of the Red Army, and the Red Army alone, is to overlook the effectiveness of Communism at least for destructive purposes, in countries as far removed from the Red Army's potential area of action as Burma and Indonesia.

Because of the power of attraction that the U.S.S.R. possesses, the United States has acquired, more or less involuntarily as we may believe, a power of attraction of its own. It is not so much that it possesses an ideology that has a wide appeal — the lip service paid to words like freedom and democracy must not blind us here — but rather that all those who fear that their interests, material or cultural, are in danger from the Russians are bound to seek the support of the only Power in a position to give support effectively. In the process, of course, the United States is bound to find itself with some very queer protégés. But so long as world politics is forced by the Russians onto an *either-or* level, it is difficult to see how this can be avoided.

From this point of view, one has every sympathy with those Americans who object to the present political conflict being described as one between the United States and the U.S.S.R., as though they were dragging reluctant neutrals into a struggle with which no other nation had a direct concern. On the contrary, there is no reason to believe that a withdrawal of America from its European and Asiatic advanced posts would pacify those areas and diminish the intensity of the Russian offensive. As things

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stand at present, it would simply serve to hand over those areas to Russian domination and exploitation. Things would have been different had the original presumptions of the Western Powers proved correct. If Great Britain and France on the one hand, and China on the other, had proved equal to the task they were set, then the idea of a "third force" in Europe and Asia would have had something to it. It would then have been possible for these Powers to have played a balancing rôle between the two colossi, and, by the mere threat of making common cause with the United States, have prevailed upon the Russians to accept another period of truce between themselves and the non-Communist world.

But even in Western Europe, where there are at least the signs of recovery, it becomes more and more clear that Western Union cannot function, or even come into being, except as part of a wider Atlantic Union. The best it can hope for is to be a full-fledged partner in the Atlantic community, and not a mere pensioner of North America in the economic or military sense. It is the triangle London-Washington-Ottawa, not London-Paris-Brussels, which now prevents Communist domination throughout the Old World.

Europeans are apt to play down, where possible, the fact of this dependence upon American power because it is made so much of by Communist propaganda. The Communists have always made use of the sentiment of nationalism when they could — in colonial countries against the Empires, in occupied Europe against Hitler (after June 22, 1941), and now in Europe at large against the domination of "Wall Street." But it is unwise to conceal the truth from oneself because of the use one's enemy may make of it. If American aid in the defense of Europe were less conspicuous, the Communists would argue that isolationism was in the saddle once more, that the Americans had washed their hands of Europe, and that there was now no alternative but to accept the fact of Soviet hegemony.

II

It is this polarization of power that makes the two peoples concerned so preoccupied with each other. Each reacts after its own fashion. The Russians apply the crude and ready-made categories of their official Marxist doctrine: the troubles of the world are due to American imperialism seeking new conquests to bolster up a declining capitalism and to avoid the inevitable

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slump; American monopoly of the atomic weapon produces the present tension; America's object is to recruit the lesser Powers as mercenaries to be hurled into an aggressive war upon the Soviet Union, which is the only bulwark against American plans of aggrandizement; and so on. The rôle of scapegoat that every totalitarian régime requires, and that in the Soviet Russian melodrama has been assigned at different times to Great Britain, France and Germany, is now conferred upon the United States. And this diagnosis of the world's malady is repeated by the whole chorus of the satellite states, and by Communists and fellow-travellers wherever they are permitted to find voice.

In the United States, where free inquiry and an empirical approach to such problems are still dominant, there is the familiar round of questions about the nature of the Soviet state, the roots of its policy and the direction of its next assault. There is, in fact, a concentration upon the Russians, and an exclusion of other international developments that is almost unhealthy in its intensity. It suggests that the initiative in the conflict lies wholly with the Russians; and this should not be the case.

For the greatest paradox in the whole situation is the contrast between the real and the apparent balance of forces. However measured — by population, by natural resources, by technical efficiency, by organizing capacity — the free world disposes of much greater reserves of strength than the Russians command. Were this not the case, were the positions reversed, we may be fairly certain that we should by now have faced armed aggression, not political warfare. Nevertheless in the political warfare of the past three years, we have allowed the Russians to hold the initiative — an initiative that they have exploited with persistence and skill.

This can be explained only by the existence of real weaknesses on the American side that must be probed to the utmost if the Communist attack is to be halted. In the first place, it is true that a program of constant vigilance on a wide front is one inherently unsuited to a democratic country. The rapid decisions that such a policy demands from time to time are particularly unsuited to the United States, a country with a constitutional structure designed to promote delay and to obtain full popular consent to every move. But any democracy — even if its constitution is as streamlined for action as that of Great Britain — is bound to resist a long-term policy of preparedness, however ready it may

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be for sacrifice in the face of clear and present danger. Mr. Cordell Hull's memoirs, and the first volume of Mr. Churchill's, are eloquent recent testimonies to these two points.

But there is the even more inescapable fact that if "containment" is hard to pursue successfully the apparent alternative of bringing the issue to a head is equally out of reach. For the only meaning that can reasonably be attached to this solution is to use the superior military power of the United States, offensively. A solution of this kind seems to be ruled out by the very nature of a democracy. Democracies do not wage offensive wars, even if labelled "preventive." Hostility toward war is an essential part of the code of values that marks the concept of civilization we are concerned to defend. Even if this were not so, and if Russian provocation were to overcome American patience, the United States would enter such a war knowing that even victory would not bring the answer to the problem. It might, and probably would, eradicate the Soviet régime as the Nazi régime was eradicated; but the chaos and destruction that would be caused in the process would provide a fertile ground for Communism — a Communism that might present itself as the only alternative to anarchy. The complications in the path of recovery after World War II show clearly how vulnerable is the complicated fabric of modern industrial civilization, how thin is the barrier to chaos.

The United States is, then, inexorably driven back upon the policy of "containment" in some form, or as it would be better to describe it, into a condition, where Russia is concerned, of "no war, no peace." And in such a situation the Russians have not only the advantage of being able to act without the normal restraints of the democratic process, but also the advantage of having the simpler task to perform. For it is obvious that the task of dislocating an economic and social system is simpler than that of construction and development. The working of E.R.P. demands, as has already been shown, an enormous effort of goodwill and intellectual enterprise to overcome the obstacles of differing national and group interests, and to balance successfully economic, political and military considerations. But in order to set back the E.R.P. program, and perhaps to make Americans and Europeans despair of its success, all that need be done is to hamper productivity by strikes and other forms of disorder that can easily be organized in difficult times by an unscrupulous and well dis-

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ciplined minority. And on the internal front, as on the international one, a democratic government suffers from obvious handicaps: how to distinguish between what may be the well-founded grievances of an underprivileged group from activities of a clearly subversive nature; how to deal firmly with the latter without surrendering its own democratic title deeds. Strikes in the west; banditry and terrorism, leading to open insurrection in the east — the Communist tactic is easy to define but hard to combat.

In that sense, then, those who seek to interpret Soviet action and to forecast the future development of Soviet policy are correct in their assumption that the Russians hold the initiative. But it should be the object of such analysis to find the points at which initiative may be wrested from them, and the free world pass from the defensive to more positive tasks.

III

There is, as we have seen, no need to waste time in arguing once again the old question as to whether or not the U.S.S.R. regards itself as the vanguard of world revolution. The present generation of Russia's rulers are quite obviously incapable of dissociating their own security and the survival of their régime from the triumph of Communism; and they have been remarkably successful in persuading their allies in all countries in which Communism is not yet dominant that the latter's only chance of achieving their aims lies in their total subordination to the Soviet viewpoint. Whatever may be their own refinements upon the doctrine, the Communists fundamentally present themselves to the world as the bearers of two slogans, and two alone. They stand for the exaltation of the masses as against all individual and group rights — which is what they mean by "popular democracy" — and for the equality of races as against the assumption of race superiority. It is the fact that on the whole the latter belief is genuine, while the first is largely fraudulent in its implications, that makes Communism in the long run a much greater danger in Asia and Africa than in Europe.

These are formidable advantages, since the fraudulent nature of "popular democracy" — the extent to which it promotes the creation of new hierarchies, and the suppression of individual liberties which it demands — are hard to demonstrate except by experience; and once a country has undergone the experience it is difficult to see how the process can be reversed. On the other

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hand, there are the ineradicable weaknesses of the Soviet régime itself — weaknesses of which the dominant group has shown itself well aware. In the first place, the Soviet régime has so far displayed no capacity for rivalling the free world in the production of material goods and is forced to attempt to maintain a fictitious picture of the outside world in order to substantiate its own claims to have given its people a better lot than that of the working classes of non-Communist countries. The effort required at the end of the war to "reëducate" Soviet troops who had seen the outside world for themselves was obviously a major strain upon the whole apparatus of indoctrination upon which so much depends. For this reason, if for no other, the Soviet rulers are obliged to insulate their people more and more from external contacts; and the more they cut themselves off from the main currents of world thought, the less likely it becomes that they can keep in the van of scientific and technical progress.

In the second place, the Soviet rulers are obviously aware that while the Russians are probably, like most other peoples, in the main loyal to their own government as against the foreigner, the régime as such inspires little enthusiasm except among its direct beneficiaries. The wartime manifestations that were wrongly interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union was transforming itself into a mere continuation of Tsarist Russia were actualities. But all they showed was the conviction among the Soviet rulers that if they were to demand from the people superhuman efforts against the invader, it would have to be in the name of Russian patriotism, and not of devotion to the Communist Party. The Party was pushed into the background and the army exalted for the best of reasons; and it was only when victory was in sight that the Party was pushed into the foreground to receive the applause that should have gone elsewhere.

But this does not mean that the exploitation of Russian nationalism has ended. Among the facts about Soviet-controlled Europe that have become even clearer since X's article appeared is the fact that the Soviet system can, in the minds of its dominant group, work only under conditions of complete uniformity throughout the area which they control. The suggestion that the countries of Eastern Europe could work out a sort of halfway house of their own between Communism and capitalism, between "popular democracy" and parliamentary institutions, has been shown to be an illusion. The Czech *coup* gave the final indication

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that this had nothing to do with the problem of Russia's defense, or that of securing "friendly governments" on the frontiers. No government could have been friendlier than that of Czechoslovakia, or less open to attraction either by the German oppressors or by the Western Powers still suffering from the taint of Munich.

This task of enforcing economic, political and ideological uniformity is obviously proving an immensely difficult one. The idea that the local left-wing elements could be relied upon for the job has not stood up to the test of experience; nor has much impact been made by attempts to exploit Pan-Slavism. Attempts to dragoon local leaders into complete subservience may — as Jugoslavia has shown — lead to a clash between the Soviet demands and local considerations backed up by the strength of national feeling. Such experience is bound to drive the Soviet rulers to the belief that the only people they can trust are Russians themselves, or people so long resident in the Soviet Union and so thoroughly indoctrinated that their point of view has become that of the Russian Communists rather than that of their country of origin. It is obvious that the internal tensions that have revealed themselves in the Polish régime, for instance, tend to take the form of a clash between "Russian" and "native" Communists. The Soviet rulers have thus been placed in a dilemma. If they permit the countries of the Soviet zone to develop along their own lines, social forces will emerge and new ideas will be canvassed that may react unfavorably upon the Soviet Union proper. But if they adopt the opposite point of view and press on with agricultural collectivization, and other measures lacking local support, they can do so only at the cost of creating a more vigorous opposition that forces them to tighten controls still further. It is the latter course which apparently commends itself as the lesser evil.

The expansion of the Soviet Union into Europe has thus confronted its leaders with a new phase in the relationships between Communism and nationalism; just as in Asia, there is always the prospect that Soviet backing for indigenous national movements will lead to events analogous to those in China in 1927. Indeed, so inexorable is the logic of conflict in these two principles that it is not too much to see parallels between European and Asiatic experience, and to argue that the real prototype of Tito is to be found in Chiang Kai-shek, in spite of Tito's refusal to

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admit any departure from a strictly Communist line. Eighteen months later, then, there is nothing that has happened to disprove X's contention "that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential." These deficiencies exist and are recognizable. The problem is how we can take advantage of this to frustrate Soviet expansionism and to bring about the conditions in which the régime itself will undergo sufficient change to make Russia a genuine partner in a free world. X's view seems to have been that the main chances of positive action lay outside the scope of foreign policy in the ordinary sense, and that they would depend to a great extent on how far the United States could develop a rival ideological attraction through the successful handling of its own internal problems.

It would be foolish to ignore the importance of this contention. Since the United States is the only other Great Power, any weakening of the power of the Soviet ideology is bound to provide room for the further spread of American influence. It is important that this influence should be one that other peoples will welcome for its own sake and not merely as a lesser evil. In this respect, if one agrees that in the long run events in Asia and Africa will be as decisive as those in Europe are proving in the short run, then to the preaching and practice of political democracy and social justice must be added that of racial equality. This does not mean that the idea of immediate independence for all dependent peoples should be accepted without question — for this may simply place such peoples at the mercy of Communist exploitation. But it must be admitted as a principle of action that no opportunities of social or political development shall be denied anywhere in the world on grounds of race alone.

On the other hand, it is clear that a mere mending of the fences combined with internal reform is not in itself a complete program. It is still worth asking whether there are not measures — other than preventive war — that can help directly toward the end we have in view.

IV

Political warfare resembles the warfare of guns in more than one way. It is essential to be clear about one's objectives, and this means possessing detailed knowledge of the adversary's position. It is also essential that one should be certain about one's own resources. In both respects, perhaps, political warfare is more dif-

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ficult and mistakes are easier to make. People are still arguing about such features of World War II as the "Vichy" policy of the American Government, while discussions of the military measures employed to defeat the Germans are largely left to experts.

In the present case, we do not know to what extent the rulers of Russia may have found it difficult to persuade their exhausted people on the very morrow of victory that a new menace was looming in the west. How did they manage to still the demand for some degree of normal life at home and for some real letup in material austerity, in military preparedness and psychological tension? Many observers of the Russian scene reported that such a demand was strong in the closing period of the war. We can never know what would have been the effect of an offer by the west of unconditional and massive material aid. There may be a case for saying that what is most likely to weaken the hold of a martial and expansionist ideology is a growth in the desire for material comfort; and that such a desire grows by what it feeds upon. At any rate, we may take it that an attempt to act upon such lines is now politically unthinkable on our own side, and that the Soviet leaders are sufficiently firmly in the saddle to enable them to refuse any such offer even were we to make it. But this does not mean that in the long run some such opportunity may not recur. For the present, all we can do is to try to avoid actions that may help the Soviet rulers in their task of persuading their people that the west is irrevocably hostile and prepared to deny them not (as is reasonable) the chance of further territorial expansion, but the economic opportunities that they may feel they have earned by their sacrifices in the struggle against the common enemy. It is all too easy to forget in our justified impatience with recent Soviet policies how dangerous that enemy was and how great those sacrifices were.

These considerations should be borne in mind in all discussions of international economic policy, and perhaps in the discussions of atomic energy as well. That energy, after all, has other than military applications. For we must remember, in defining our objectives, that we are not simply trying to weaken the Russians as such. We are trying the much harder task of proving that their government is wrong, both in its analysis of the world situation and in its belief that its present expansionist aims have a chance of success. And we are trying to do all this without having recourse to the self-defeating expedient of a shooting war.

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Considerations of this kind must be present to our minds when dealing with major political issues. This is not the context in which to deal with the most pressing of immediate political problems — the problem of Germany. Clearly some way out of the present impasse must be found or all long-range discussions are futile. One cannot too often reëmphasize the fact that German ambitions have not been abandoned as a result of Hitler's defeat, that Germany's former military leaders are clearly engaged in a calculated campaign of self-rehabilitation with the Fuehrer's "intuition" instead of the Socialist *dolchstoss* of World War I as their scapegoat. For this reason, it is not at all unnatural that suggestions about the rebuilding of a Western Germany with its economic, social and hence inevitably its political structure largely unchanged should genuinely cause alarm among the Russians — an alarm that would exist even were the Soviet régime a genuinely peace-loving one. We, after all, are on the alert for every sign of militarization in the Soviet Zone; and in any clash between east and west, Western Germany would be the more valuable adjunct. It is worth while urging that our whole German policy should be rethought, bearing in mind that nothing could so strengthen the hold of the Soviet Government upon possible waverers as their being in a position to argue that Western Germany is to be the spearhead of a new offensive against the east.

It is, of course, quite reasonable to argue that at present the Soviet Government's control of all channels of information is so tight that nothing we do or say can make any difference to the peoples of the Soviet Union itself. This is perhaps a case where we are simply not in possession of the facts necessary to come to a decision. But it is worth pointing out that the fairly constant trickle of Russians seeking asylum in the west suggests that there is not inside their own country that total ignorance of the conditions of the outside world that one is sometimes tempted to believe.

At all events, it is obvious that, for the moment at any rate, the so-called satellite countries of Eastern Europe are not cut off in this way, however formidable the formal obstacles to free communication. Whatever the conduct of the satellite governments may be at U.N. or elsewhere, Eastern Europe is not yet simply a Soviet bloc, and it is clearly enormously to our interest not to make it one. In this respect, too, the problem of Germany is

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highly relevant. Any idea that the western Powers were responsible for reviving Germany's military potential would bind the Poles and Czechs of all parties to the Russians in a way that nothing else could. The most effective piece of political strategy that the Russians brought off in the territorial settlement was not their own gains, but the Polish gains at the expense of Germany. For these made it certain that German revisionism would be directed against Poland in the first instance and thus that Poland would be bound at all times to seek Russian support. If the Poles fail to accept Russian directives, there is always the bogy of the Russians throwing them overboard to win again the friendship of the Germans. We would be wrong to give the impression in Eastern Europe that German revisionism has at least a covert backing from our side. We are not in a position to win an auction on that basis and we should be foolish to try.

Nor has this argument relevance to Eastern Europe only; the German danger is very much in the minds of the continental peoples of Western Europe, and to neglect it is to give a valuable handle to Communist propaganda. But our efforts to keep alive our own influence in Eastern Europe, and so to prevent the successful creation of a homogeneous bloc, cannot be confined simply to accepting the political demands of these peoples. It also demands a considerable watchfulness over our general economic and political relations with them.

There is too ready an assumption that what we are trying for is to put the clock back to 1938. It cannot be done. It is arguable that, politically speaking, a differentiation must be made between most of the territories that Russia regained in 1939–40 and later territorial accessions or possible accessions in the future. Whatever sympathies may be felt for the peoples of the Baltic States, it is as certain as anything can be in these matters that their fate is now permanently linked with that of the other peoples of the old Russian Empire. Their real hopes lie in a transformation of the whole Soviet Union into a more liberal grouping of peoples, within which not only they but other Soviet nationalities may find more genuine possibilities of self-determination, without the economic and political atomization that modern conditions have rendered increasingly obsolete. Only a war could drive back the Soviet Union to its 1938 frontiers; and a war that did that would do much more.

Clearly, the same arguments do not apply to countries like

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Poland and Hungary. Here the danger is rather that we should imagine a possible restoration of the economic and social structure of the prewar era. The fact that they are being driven to the complete Sovietization of their economies should not mean that they are presented with no alternative other than a return to the semi-feudal past, or the adoption of "free enterprise." The really vital opposition to the Russians in these countries may well come from those groups who see the possibility of welfare-planning on their own lines and who, in the case of Poland at any rate, appear to be capable of remarkable achievements, if forced subservience to Moscow does not upset their plans. It is groups such as these rather than some émigré circles who may be the most worth cultivating, and any talk of setting up "governments-in-exile" is all too likely to bolster propaganda about American "imperialism." It is by adding social self-determination to political self-determination that American policy can be fully consistent. As far as possible we in Great Britain and the United States must seek out and go along with the natural tendencies of the European Continent, making allowances for historic experiences different from our own.

The argument for continuing to explore every means of maintaining economic relations with Eastern Europe is not limited, therefore, to the mollifying effects that prosperity might have. Economic relations are one means by which the Iron Curtain can be pierced, and it should be a fixed point in the policy of the western Powers not to allow the isolation that the Russians are attempting to impose within their sphere to become complete. Indeed, the fact that it promotes at least a minimum of movement between east and west is the one remaining thing to the credit of the United Nations — the one thing that makes one pause before condemning the whole thing as a dreary futility, as nothing but a platform where diplomats exchange insults, while the real work of the world goes on outside.

It is indeed important that this should be appreciated; and it is to be feared that some representatives of the western Powers are too easily pleased when they feel that they have shown up some particular duplicity of the Soviet Government. It is far more important to continue to advance constructive proposals on matters like disarmament and atomic energy, even with the foreknowledge of Soviet obstruction, than to content ourselves with negativing Soviet proposals that are obviously insincere. Other-

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wise we will find the Soviet Government cleverly playing from weakness, as Litvinov did at Geneva from 1927 to 1933, and capitalizing for their own purposes the general desire of all peoples for disarmament and peace.

Indeed, the criticism of the policy of "containment" as hitherto practised is that it seems to combine an undue rigidity where relations with the Soviet bloc are concerned, with, perhaps, an undue timidity to grasp the Communist nettle outside the area of direct Soviet control. Since the real enemy is not the Russian people nor its East European neighbors, but international Communism, this would seem to be almost a reversal of the correct procedure. Nor need we fear that more stringent measures in regard to Communism will bring a war with the Soviet Union any nearer. The Soviet Government has never based its foreign relations upon considerations arising out of the internal régimes of other countries. Since all non-Communist régimes are anathema in its eyes, it is unconcerned about the precise degree to which they depart from the ideal. The idea that is spread in fellow-traveller circles that the Russians will be more amenable to a left-wing government has been proved completely false by Great Britain's postwar experience; indeed, the disillusion of some British Socialist leaders on this score explains some of the personal bitterness that creeps into their utterances about the Soviet Union. It is hardly necessary to add that no sentimental considerations about the fate of their agents abroad will affect Soviet policy in the least. The measure of freedom to be allowed Communists must in every country be decided strictly on the basis of the local situation. There is no natural right of sabotage.

It is obvious that it is on the periphery of Soviet influence that this problem is most serious. It raises certain major questions of the extent of permissible intervention that cannot very easily be answered. In Europe, the outstanding example is provided by the case of Greece. The mere giving of military aid to the Greek army and of economic aid to the existing Greek Government has failed to bring the rebellion to an end. There may be a case for direct military intervention to seal off the frontiers between Greece and those countries whose aid to the rebels has been established. There may equally be a case for much more direct intervention in Greece's internal affairs, if an end is to be put to conditions that seem to make rebellion endemic far away from these frontiers.

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A similar problem on a much greater scale confronts American policy in China. Here, as elsewhere in Asia, the problem is how to build up the maximum resistance to Communism without alienating national sentiment. In China, there is the particular danger that the idea may spread that Japan (like Western Germany in Europe) is the preferred anti-Communist bulwark, thus enabling the Communists to enlist nationalist feeling on their side, just as the admitted corruption and inefficiency of the Chiang Kai-shek régime has helped them to gain for the time being the sympathies of many non-Communists.

In southeastern Asia the problem is different. The Russians are remote, and local Communism has no such strong base as Manchuria will henceforth provide in China. Here the real asset of the Communists is their ability to produce disorder with the minimum outlay. And disorder is itself sufficient. Trouble in Burma means interference with rice exports and food shortages in rice-importing countries — India, for instance. This in turn powerfully assists Communist propaganda there. The Powers previously dominant in this area cannot for various reasons play their old rôle, and the United States with its traditional anti-imperialism has regarded this fact with too much equanimity. It is essential that some means be found of providing at least the elementary services of government — the provision of law and order so that the ordinary citizen can go about his business. The problem is how the United States can assist in doing this without affronting the powerful if still undeveloped force of local nationalism. The evident increase recently in Soviet attention to the affairs of the Middle East suggests that parallel problems may arise in this area as well.

V

It is thus obvious that the policy of "containment" to be effective demands more than the exertion of counter-force at every point where a direct Russian threat develops. Indeed, it demands rather less exclusive concentration upon Russia itself than has recently been common. We must neither be put off our policies by Soviet abuse nor waste time in answering back. The fact that American strength is at present the only real deterrent to a Soviet advance is something that we can benefit from fully only if at the same time we do everything possible to bring about general stability and prosperity in the outside world. In this sense it is incorrect

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to talk of opposition between the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan." But the bringing of stability does not mean simply the outpouring of material goods. It must mean positive measures in every area concerned; and these can be fully effective only if the local problem is studied in detail, remembering always the importance of enlisting in opposition to Communism every valuable indigenous force.

If in the long run the problem of Soviet expansionism can be solved only by a radical change in the nature and outlook of the Soviet régime, the short-run problem is always whether to look for opportunities of local and partial settlements. These may be of two kinds. There are situations in which the Soviet Union may accept the fact that stability has been reached in a certain area and prefer to call off its offensive. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1946 may be taken as an example of this kind. There are other situations, of which the position in Berlin is an obvious example, whose characteristic is that by their very nature they endanger peace, even though neither side wants war. In either case, it is surely in our interest to seek an agreement if possible, even while remaining fully aware that the Russians will not hesitate to go back on it if circumstances make it to their advantage. The point is that every local agreement in a conflict such as this is mainly important because of the resources that it releases for use elsewhere. We should be able to make better use of the equivalent resources in men and materials than the Russians are. At the same time it is important to remember that any diminution in the proportion of our resources which we are obliged to use directly in the conflict is a help to economic prosperity and renders less acute the greatest danger that we face — the danger that democratic peoples will not have the patience to see a long and toilsome journey through to the end.

However optimistic we may be about the long-run issues involved, the most immediate task is to accept the fact that the menace of Soviet Communism is likely to be a feature of our world for some time to come. No single step will remove it; there is no button to press and no magic formula to utter. Our fundamental reliance must be upon the superiority of free institutions over any and every brand of totalitarianism.

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RIFT AND REALIGNMENT IN WORLD LABOR

By David Dubinsky

WHAT is the present situation in the international labor movement? What are its problems, its trends, its perspectives? What is labor's rôle in the struggle to attain and maintain peace? Why is the World Federation of Trade Unions disintegrating? What is the outlook for a new alignment in the ranks of international labor? Here are problems whose solution deeply concerns all mankind, for the task of labor in world reconstruction is decisive.

The World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.) was an outgrowth of the coöperation of Great Britain and Soviet Russia against their common enemy — Nazi Germany — in the Second World War. In 1941, the British Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.) had agreed to set up an Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, and in 1943 and 1944 the Russians urged that this Committee be enlarged. The British T.U.C. sought to draw in the American Federation of Labor, but the A.F. of L. had had experience with the political tactics of Communists in trade unions, and rejected these overtures. It proposed instead that steps be taken to reconvene the International Federation of Trade Unions (I.F.T.U.), the activities of which had been interrupted by Hitler in 1939. However, the Russians, who were not members, wanted an entirely new International into which they would come as founders and which they would control. By January 1945, the French Confederation of Labor was securely in the grip of the Communists, and proceeded to make a pact with the Soviet trade unions to "coördinate" the postwar program of organized labor in the two countries, not only against "Fascism," but against "imperialist capitalism." Thus, months before the war was over, the Russian attack on the western democracies was already being organized.

Against considerable opposition in the Executive Committee of the I.F.T.U. — especially by the Dutch and Belgians — and under the leadership of the British T.U.C. (supported by the C.I.O., which was interested in establishing its first international labor connections), the W.F.T.U. was launched in October 1945. At its very first convention signs of weakness were evident. For

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one thing, the new organization did not include America's dominant trade union movement, the A.F. of L. Another weakness was that, unlike its predecessor, which was an international economic organization of labor, it was steeped in politics.

No one can draw a too heavy line of distinction between a political international organization of labor and an economic international organization of labor. In an international political organization there are to be found national affiliates whose members include workers of various crafts and industrial callings, and even individuals who belong to other economic groups in society. Their bond is a common ideology, a basic set of guiding political principles. On the other hand, in an international economic organization there are to be found national trade union affiliates in whose ranks are workers of varied and even conflicting political ideologies. Here, the binding force of the workers of sundry political viewpoints is devotion to the protection and promotion of their common economic interests. Both types of international labor bodies may hold some common views, just as the Second (Socialist) International — an example of a "political" labor organization — and the International Federation of Trade Unions both considered Nazism, Communism, Fascism and Falangism totalitarian and anti-democratic. But though the experiences and the enemies of two such organizations may now and then be identical, their composition, aims, structure and functions are entirely different.

The camp of labor, like the community of nations, is today in the throes of a deep crisis. No doubt the discord in the United Nations has had its influence here. But it would be a mistake to say that the conflicts within world labor parallel those which are rending the United Nations. In the W.F.T.U., the French, Italian, and Chinese delegates are lined up against the British. Only the organization which is second in strength in the ranks of American labor is represented. Most of Latin American labor, recently organized into the Inter-American Confederation of Labor, is likewise outside the federation; only the *Confederacion de Trabajadores*, which shows a Communist tendency under the leadership of Lombardo Toledano, owes the W.F.T.U. allegiance.

Reporting for the Administrative Committee when the W.F.T.U. was founded, the late Mr. Sidney Hillman declared that "The working people of the world . . . have shown that they can submerge all national and ideological differences in the

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higher interest of the great common cause which unites us all." But Lord Citrine, the first president, was more realistic, declaring that in order to succeed the World Federation must: 1, devote itself to trade union problems and keep out of politics; 2, have sound finances and efficient administration; 3, reach an agreement with the various international trade secretariats — like the International Transport, Metal, and Mine Workers Federations — and obtain their affiliation.

In three years, not one of the prerequisites has been met. The W.F.T.U. has acted primarily as a political body. It has displayed very strong bias against the democratic countries, and has championed totalitarian Russia and its satellites with intense and consistent partisanship. It has shut its eyes to the destruction of the workers' rights and labor standards in Czechoslovakia and the Balkan countries. Because of Russian hostility to the Marshall Plan, it has refused to act even on the most vital of all economic issues facing the European workers — the reconstruction of the Continent. In the United Nations Economic and Social Council, it has levelled sundry accusations against various non-Slavic countries. But it has adamantly refused to support the proposal of the A.F. of L. for a survey by the International Labor Organization of the extent of slave labor and the destruction of workers' rights in some lands — a problem which goes to the heart of trade union interests. Its publications have been unceasingly vituperative toward the United States and Britain. In Greece, the Middle East, Korea and Japan, it has intervened to oppose Britain and the United States and to give fanatic support to Russian foreign policy. Last July, after the attempt on Togliatti's life, its General Secretary, Louis Saillant, telegraphed warmest support to the Communist leader in the name of the Executive Committee. This was, in effect, support of the strictly political general strike ordered by the Communist-controlled *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro*. It was also in rank violation of the decision made by the Executive Committee at Rome in April 1948 to establish collective leadership in the W.F.T.U. in order to prevent precisely such lone-hand acts by the General Secretary in the name of the entire world body.

Paced by the International Transport Workers' Federation, practically all the trade secretariats have officially rejected every invitation to affiliate with the World Federation. Last September, the issue came to a head when such powerful bodies as the metal

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workers, coal miners, transport workers, and others in joint meeting at Paris turned down the W.F.T.U. proposal for affiliation and established an International Coördinating Council of their own. This is undoubtedly the most crushing defeat the World Federation has received. The trade secretariats are the bloodstream of a living international labor organization; without them no labor body can deserve the name international or function on a world scale. The British labor leader, Arthur Deakin, in addressing the Margate Conference of the British Trades Union Congress in September 1948, spoke in these terms:

> The World Federation of Trade Unions is rapidly becoming nothing more than another platform and instrument for the furtherance of Soviet policy. Wherever we meet, you can see the alignment of the forces. The Communists are carefully looked after and segregated from the rest. They meet in a different place. The same merry game has been going on here this week. . . . We have tried to forge the instrument that our conference asked us to. I suggest to you that it is utterly impossible. . . .
>
> The World Federation of Trade Unions was the successor of the International Federation of Trade Unions which was an immeasurably superior organization.

Mr. Deakin is the President of the W.F.T.U.! Could there be a more bitter condemnation?

Under these circumstances, and in line with the decision of the Margate Congress, the General Council of the T.U.C. decided on October 27, 1948, to call on the World Federation to dissolve. The resolution recognized the fundamental differences which existed on questions of policy and organization and the impossibility of preventing the intrusion of politics. The final word of the General Council was: "In the event of the World Federation of Trade Unions refusing to agree to the suspension of its activities, a withdrawal from the World Federation of Trade Unions must follow." This is the end. With the T.U.C. getting out, the C.I.O. should find it extremely difficult to stay in. The trade union movements of the Low Countries and Scandinavia could hardly continue affiliation after a departure by the British. The Communists still control the majority of the trade union organizations in France and Italy; but the upshot of the split in the W.F.T.U. is likely to be a strengthening of the independent, non-Communist trade unions like the Force Ouvrière. After his return from the April 1948 executive meeting in Rome, General Secretary-Treasurer Frank Rosenblum of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who is a vice-president of the W.F.T.U., said he was

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convinced that there was no Communist domination of the organization's affairs and that "at no time did the Russians impose their will on the Executive Bureau or the General Council." But that seems a lone opinion.

II

The experience with the W.F.T.U. confronts world labor with a number of vital questions involving fundamental policy, everyday practice and long-range perspective. The basic reason for A.F. of L. opposition to the creation of the World Federation was that the trade unions in the non-totalitarian countries were fundamentally different in nature and purpose from those under totalitarian régimes and, therefore, could not function together in one international labor body. This had been clear to members of the American Federation of Labor for some time. In democratic countries, trade unions are voluntary institutions. They are organs of large sections of the working people, grouped according to their jobs and skill, not according to political belief, and are dedicated primarily to the defense and promotion of the rights and interests of labor. In this capacity, the trade unions are free agencies which can and often do exercise considerable influence on governmental policies and legislation. Free trade unions are instruments for making democratic governments more responsive to the wishes and interests of great masses of the people.

In totalitarian countries, on the other hand, the process is completely reversed. Instead of the unions helping to determine the policies of the government, the governments determine the course of the unions. The trade unions are instruments of the government — used by it to impose its will on the masses of the people. This was the unbridgeable difference between the Nazi Labor Front and the trade unions in the United States, Britain, Scandinavia and other democratic countries. This continues to be the unbridgeable chasm between the Communist unions and the labor unions in our country. In Russia, the difference is dramatized by the following facts. The All-Union Central Federation has not held a convention since April 1932. Its most important elected officers (Tomsky and others) have been imprisoned, driven to suicide or shot. There are reports that a national trade union convention is being planned for April 1949. Those now holding office were never elected by a national convention, but selected by the Communist Party and appointed by the govern-

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ment. Citrine, in his book entitled "I Search for Truth in Russia," characterized the Soviet trade unions as "state organizations" without "any separate existence." [1]

Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution provides for the existence of only one political party — namely, the Communist Party. It declares that this party is "the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." Thus it is the Soviet Constitution itself which provides that all associations of any kind whatsoever are to be run and directed by Communist Party "cells." On March 14, 1947, *Pravda*, central organ of the Russian Communist Party, declared:

> The trade unions enter a new period of their activities and in this important period, the party organization must give them the necessary help, incessantly watch the preparations for the conclusion of collective agreements and strengthen the entire organizing and educational work of the unions. . . . In this respect, the directing and leading rôle of the Party organization is particularly important.

Labor's disastrous experience with Communism, Fascism, Nazism and Falangism affords tragic proof aplenty that there is no room for genuine free trade unions in countries under totalitarian yokes. Free trade unions — unions free from control by governments, employers or political parties — are a specific feature of democracy. What is more, just as there can be no free trade unions without democracy, so can there be no democracy without free trade unions.

The history of American labor reveals that free trade unionism could flourish only if all forms of "company unions" — unions promoted and dominated by employers or their agents — were rejected. The primary and permanent service of the Wagner Act to organized labor in America lies above all in its legal support of this doctrine of free unionism. But modern totalitarianism has produced a new form of company unionism — the union controlled by the totalitarian state and its monolithic party. The overriding objective of such "unions" is not the defense of the interests of the workers. The real aim is to mobilize the workers to further the political objectives and economic plans of the totalitarian state. The theory is that there cannot possibly be any conflict between the interests of the workers and the wishes of the state. In fact, these unions prevent the workers from

[1] Sir Walter Citrine, "I Search for Truth in Russia." London: Routledge, 1938, p. 185.

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organizing themselves to protect their rights which are ruthlessly invaded, and from offering any opposition to the consequences of dictatorial economic and political policies.

In Czechoslovakia, for instance, it is the *Ustredni Rada Odboru* — the Central Council of Trade Unions — which today has been the Government's main instrument for putting through the longer work week and the speed-up in labor. In Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany the government-controlled unions fulfilled similar purposes. Nor is it any different in Russia where the unions are supposed to have more than 27,000,000 members. These unions perform some praiseworthy social welfare work, but the control from above is absolute. The workers do not have the right to strike. Wages are fixed exclusively by the Government and its agencies. The factory manager has more power than the manager of any non-union plant in America. Semi-military discipline prevails. The only collective agreements which the Russian workers know are those offering total compliance with the Government's economic plans and the promotion of Stakhanovism.

While the Soviet "trade unions" act inside the U.S.S.R. as agents of the Government and its various departments charged with managing Russian economy, their rôle on the international scene is that of instruments of Soviet foreign policy and nationalistic expansion. That is why in the 1930's the A.F. of L. opposed every move to affiliate the Soviet unions to the International Federation of Trade Unions; it even threatened to withdraw if they were admitted. Significantly, the unions in Great Britain and other countries, which at one time favored an alliance with the Russian unions, were motivated by political rather than trade union objectives, stemming from the situation in foreign affairs prevailing at the moment, *i.e.* the need to form an alliance between the democratic countries of Europe and Russia against Nazi Germany. In 1945, the alignment with Russian unions and the creation of the W.F.T.U. were thought of as duplicating the pattern of coöperation of the Big Three at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

The American Federation of Labor has held that even in the realm of foreign affairs, military or diplomatic coöperation with the U.S.S.R. should not be permitted to becloud the diametrically opposite purposes and characters of trade unions in a democracy and those under totalitarianism — whether the form of the absolute state be Fascist, Nazi, Communist or Falangist. In so far as

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the international labor movement is concerned, the A.F. of L. has always insisted that the preservation and promotion of basic civil liberties — such as freedom of speech, press and assembly — are prerequisite to the existence of a bona fide free trade union movement. It has always maintained that any attempt to obscure this vital truth jeopardizes the gains which labor took many decades to achieve.

The experience with the W.F.T.U. has brought into bold relief the folly of attempted coöperation by free trade union movements with the state-controlled company unions of Russia and her satellites. Such coöperation serves only as a convenient avenue for Communist infiltration and capture of free trade unions. In France, Italy, Latin America, Japan, Korea, Southeastern Asia and the Middle East, the World Federation has been of inestimable aid to Communist agents in penetrating the ranks of labor, seizing control of labor organizations, and poisoning the minds of the workers with pro-Soviet and anti-democratic propaganda. At the Rome meeting of the Executive Committee of the W.F.T.U., Communists such as Di Vittorio, Kuznetsov and Saillant succeeded in preserving the thin façade of so-called "international trade union unity." This saved the Communist control of the Italian C.G.I.L. There was a growing trend against the Communists in the ranks of Italian labor after the April 1948 elections, but this declaration of formal unity checked it.

Such coöperation has served only to prevent the trade unions in the democratic countries from playing their rightful rôle in world affairs. If the free trade unions have not yet been fully mobilized for the success of the European Recovery Program, it is because they have been hog-tied by their association in the W.F.T.U. with the Russian and satellite "unions" which have individually and collectively worked to sabotage the Marshall Plan. Communists outside the Iron Curtain have, of course, worked with them.

Incidentally, the bitter opposition of the Communists inside the World Federation to postwar reconstruction of the western democratic countries should surprise no one. This implacable hostility to the Marshall Plan is only a continuation of the attitude toward reconstruction of "capitalist" countries maintained by the Red International of Labor Unions (the old Profintern), the precursor of the W.F.T.U. Alexander Lozovsky, General Secretary of the Profintern, declared his opposition to reconstruction

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after World War I in language startlingly similar to the tirades of Kuznetsov, Saillant and Di Vittorio against E.R.P.:

> But we consider this disturbance of the capitalist system, not as a temporary one, not as an accidental one which may be cured, but as a crisis which will bring present society to final catastrophe. On the one hand, therefore, we have an attempt to cure and in the future to attain the normal development of the capitalist organism, and on the other, an effort not to remedy it but to "cure it to death" if we may so express it. Not an attempt to revive it, but to destroy this society, which from our point of view is too slow in dying. . . . Our international . . . has for its aims the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is stated in our constitution and in the main resolutions of our Congresses.

Had it not been for the extensive educational activities of the Free Trade Union Committee of the A.F. of L. in Germany after the Second World War, and for its energetic intervention there in behalf of free trade unionism, the Communists acting through the machinery of the World Federation might by now have seized control of the reviving German trade unions. An attempt to assume full dictatorial power over the whole country would undoubtedly have followed, as in Czechoslovakia, and could have been thwarted only by the use of force by the American and British armies of occupation, possibly at the risk of war.

Not an instance can be cited where the association of democratic trade unions with state-controlled unions in the World Federation has been of any use in persuading the totalitarian workers' organizations to bring pressure to bear on their dictatorial governments for the improvement of labor standards, the extension of human rights in domestic affairs, or the pursuit of peaceful policies in international relations. Never has the W.F.T.U. assisted any struggling free democratic union in any country. On the contrary, this collaboration has greatly facilitated the work of the Communist Quislings as instruments of Russian imperialism. Moreover, so long as the British Trades Union Congress and the American C.I.O. remain in the World Federation they are in the very uncomfortable position of seeming to sponsor, in the international field, the very practices which they bitterly fight at home. Both organizations have hitherto denied this. But it is solely because of their association with the Communist unions in the World Federation that they have been lukewarm to the idea of an energetic international drive to smash the Communist campaign against the E.R.P. Arthur Deakin's proposal at the Margate Congress to dissolve the W.F.T.U.

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marks the beginning of the end of this unhappy collaboration.

It has been argued by some that if the A.F. of L. had affiliated with the World Federation, the democratic forces would have been strong enough to prevent it from becoming a tool of Russian foreign policy, and might even have given control to the free trade unions. I cannot claim such powers of miraculous healing for the A.F. of L., despite the encouraging expansion of its international activities in recent years. The Rome sessions of the Executive Committee of the World Federation proved again that in any organization in which the Russians participate, criticism by democratic organizations can, at best, result only in frustrating and dangerous compromises which leave all the trump cards in the hands of the Communists. It is not possible for a devout Communist to make a concession in good faith. In domestic affairs, no free trade union can or will accept the affiliation of a company union which takes its orders from the employers. The genuine union would delude itself if it expected that company outfit to submit to decisions which were arrived at democratically. It is a far more crass and costly illusion to suppose that democratic organizations can expect the "company unions" of totalitarian masters to act otherwise.

In the W.F.T.U., furthermore, the Russians are in a position to concoct for themselves an overwhelming majority whenever they find it necessary. In the trade union field, as in politics and government, Russian rulers do not actually count their members. All they have to do to get a majority in the World Federation is to report a mass influx of members into their own unions or those of the satellite states. The Russians and other Communists in control of the world labor organization would resist inspection of their membership records with as much vigor as their diplomats resist international inspection and control of atomic weapons. By now, the liberal and democratic forces should have learned that in joining "front" organizations they stand no chance of outplaying the unscrupulous and ruthless Communists. There is no way of defeating an opponent in parliamentary manœuvre if the rules of the game mean nothing to him.

III

But if it is apparent that collaboration with Communist unions is impossible, it is no less clear that international labor solidarity is desirable. "Labor" represents millions of human beings, in

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many countries. Genuine international labor coöperation among free organizations can be a powerful stimulus to world peace and can help guarantee it. With world economy growing more and more integrated, and the various national productive systems so largely dependent on each other, labor's interest in continued production and adequate living standards necessarily assumes a far more international character than ever before. In fact, the success of the E.R.P. in an economic and social sense can be assured only through the full international coöperation of the free trade unions in the countries concerned.

The seeds of such coöperation have already borne some fruit. Last March and last July, the free trade unionists of Europe and the representatives of the A.F. of L., the C.I.O., the United Mine Workers and the Railway Labor Unions gathered in London to work out ways of ensuring the collaboration and full mobilization of all the bona fide labor organizations in support of the E.R.P. At these conferences nationalistic viewpoints receded before a continental approach. A Trade Union Advisory Committee was established to function in close coöperation with the Office for European Economic Coöperation for the purpose of aiding the economic recovery of the Continent and protecting and promoting labor's rights, interests and standards in the consummation of this program. In short, a fundamental realignment in the ranks of world labor is in progress. The need for protecting the rights of the workers as human beings and as producers, the urgency of rescuing the world from hunger, the necessity for speeding postwar reconstruction, and the fight to win an enduring peace against the menace of totalitarian aggression provide a timely and realistic basis for international collaboration by the free trade unions of the world. Once the British T.U.C. frees itself completely from its paralyzing ties with the World Federation, the Trade Union Advisory Committee will be able to go forward. It has great potentialities. It represents all the non-Communist trade union bodies of Western Europe and the United States, and if it becomes really active in mobilizing labor for the European Recovery Program, it will gain constant strength and authority.

A new and genuine international federation of free trade unions is in the making, though we cannot yet set a date for its birth. The Russians and their satellite unions will, of course, resist such a realignment to the bitter end. They will continue to exploit the name "World Federation of Trade Unions" to the limit, even

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though its membership is narrowed to include only Russian-controlled unions. In counteracting these Communist attacks, the rôle of the British T.U.C. will be decisive in Europe, for continental labor is still divided and weak, especially in France and Italy. The reviving German trade union movement is, naturally, weakened by its very setting in a vanquished, partitioned and occupied country. And American labor is still divided, though one can hope that the increased unity of action abroad will stimulate organic unity between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. at home.

A new and most significant factor in the international labor movement is the vastly expanded participation by the A.F. of L. in world labor affairs. This is not a temporary manifestation of passing interest, but something which has been gaining momentum in the last three years and providing new hope and encouragement to democratic trade unionists everywhere. The refusal of the A.F. of L. in 1945 to join the W.F.T.U. was accompanied by activities in the sphere of international labor on an unprecedented scale. Had the A.F. of L. shown such interest and energy while it was affiliated to the International Federation of Trade Unions, the latter would probably never have been dissolved and the W.F.T.U. could never have been created.

The constructive approach of the A.F. of L. toward international labor coöperation has not been limited to counter-propaganda against Communism and other aspects of totalitarianism. The San Francisco Convention of 1947 adopted a resolution, presented by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, which first put forward the idea of an international conference of free trade unions to mobilize labor for the Marshall Plan. It is the A.F. of L. which has been most consistent in emphasizing that the free trade unions must not be on the defensive, but must exercise vigorous initiative and coördinate their activities for democracy, reconstruction and peace on an international scale. The avowedly non-Socialist A.F. of L. has also insisted that aid to European countries must not interfere with the fundamental democratic right of the people of each country to decide freely the forms of economic organization and ownership of their basic industries and public utilities. This is the only way to meet and defeat internationally-directed assaults on human liberty. The recent crisis in French coal mining where the Communist strong-arm squads — under Cominform orders — seized mines and wrecked their

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machinery to cripple the part played by France in the E.R.P. shows the urgency of international democratic labor action.

The increasing representation accorded American and European labor in the administration of the E.R.P. is a valuable safeguard against damage to efforts for continental reconstruction — both from the so-called Left, and from the predatory, selfish, nationalist interests on the Right. This special E.R.P. task should reinforce the appointment of labor attachés to all United States Embassies so that the State Department will have a better understanding of labor unions and labor problems in all the countries.

Whether the Communists call their world organization and central bureau Profintern or W.F.T.U., whether they call it Comintern or Cominform, they never lessen the activity of their armies of agents, propagandists, party members and fellow-travellers. Whether a Communist Party in any country calls itself by that name or some other name, whether a "front" organization calls itself the League Against War and Fascism one day, or the American Peace Mobilization the next, the essential characteristic of all these organizations as segments of an international movement for Bolshevik world domination does not change. The lesson must be reiterated: the attempt to work with Communists is futile folly. The lesson applies to trade unions, to other organizations and to individuals. When working with Communists for a good cause we hurt that cause, because it is sure to be used by them as an instrument for achieving their own different aims. This is confirmed by Stalin himself in his "Foundations of Leninism" when he says: "A revolutionist [Communist] may sponsor a reform because he sees in it a means for linking up constitutional action with unconstitutional action, because he feels he can make use of it as a screen behind which he can strengthen his clandestine work." Collaboration by trade unionists and liberals with Communists serves only to provide them with a means of deception and with prestige which they subsequently exploit for party purposes.

This has been our experience in the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. As head of the C.I.O., John L. Lewis had considerable and costly experience of this sort. Philip Murray's experience as head of the C.I.O. bears out this truth. The leaders of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers — the late Sidney Hillman and his co-workers — once believed they could work with the Communists in the American Labor Party. But though

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they have remained faithful to Mr. Hillman, these trade unionists have had to withdraw from the American Labor Party on the grounds that it is a Communist Party auxiliary. Henry Wallace, in the so-called Progressive Party, is today in the stage where Lewis and Hillman once were. The question arises: must trade unionists and liberals burn their fingers badly before learning this incontrovertible lesson? Was it really necessary to go through this very expensive experience of collaborating with the Communists, first in the C.I.O. and then in the W.F.T.U.?

Precisely because Communists place the capture and control of the trade unions as the first prerequisite for foisting their dictatorship on any industrial country, it is imperative for the democratic trade unions of all countries to pool their resources and join their forces in the protection and promotion of their welfare and liberties.

Toward meeting this need, the A.F. of L. has been maintaining permanent representatives in Europe and in Germany. The Free Trade Union Committee of the A.F. of L. has been publishing monthly the *International Free Trade Union News* in English, French, German and Italian. Moral and material support is being rendered to democratic trade union forces in France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Latin America. A paramount reason for the effectiveness of the A.F. of L's activities in the international labor field has been their entirely independent character. At times, we had to take sharp issue with our Government over the failure of the American military authorities to accord sufficient recognition and rights to the reviving free labor movement as a powerful buttress of democracy in Germany. We have had similar experiences in Japan.

The free trade union movement is a bulwark of democracy, indispensable to its defense and progress. No effective coöperation of the democratic countries is possible without world coöperation of free labor. Postwar economic reconstruction will stabilize democratic institutions and enhance their progress only if it is accompanied by improved living standards for the working people everywhere. The safeguarding and improvement of the living standards of the working people are the first task of the free trade unions. In the present world situation, this can be achieved only by international action. The international solidarity of democratic labor and the world-wide and lasting coöperation of the free trade unions are an indispensable practical goal.

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LIMITS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING

By Barbara Ward

IN recent years, the battle between the planners and the anti-planners has become fairly engaged. In the decade before the recent war, the planners tended — in Britain at least — to hold the field of popular theoretical writing and of polemical literature. But since the appearance during the war of Professor Hayek's book, "The Road to Serfdom," a vigorous counterattack has been launched and a number of recent British books on economics have taken the anti-planning side. The debate is being conducted on the whole in terms of forceful dogmatism, and this is not surprising when one remembers how easy it is to be dogmatic about the theoretical basis of a case.

In theory, the planners can claim that they are in the full stream of human progress. What has created the tremendous physical advances of the last century if not man's increasing scientific control over his environment? The masterpieces of modern engineering have all started with the blueprint. Is it not reasonable to argue that the same methods — of plans and blueprints and "social engineering" — will not have equally happy results when society itself is their raw material? To apply planning to human government is simply to rescue one more vital sector — perhaps the most vital sector — of men's lives from the tyranny of the irrational.

The reply of the anti-planner is equally cogent. "Men are not sticks and stones and metals," he protests. "Among men you cannot find — and ought not to induce — the same uniformity of reaction which you find in material things. Nor can you ever be as certain of the purpose to which men ought to be devoted. The best use of a given amount of iron and steel may be to make a bridge, but who can say what is the best use to which a given number of men can be put? Is it not significant that the best examples of planning are to be found either in time of war — when the purpose of every citizen and of society as a whole is singlemindedly to fight for victory — or in totalitarian societies where the uniformity and predictability of all the citizens is the first aim of education? You can, in a word, apply social engineering only by making men resemble the raw materials of ordinary engineering — by depriving them of all liberty of choice, of all

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variety, and indeed of everything that characterizes a free man."

So long as this debate is unanchored by any reference to fact, there is no reason why it should be brought to any conclusion. And unfortunately the number of facts upon which the observer can call is still strictly limited. The concept of planning the economic life of a community is extremely new. Those who connect it with Communism will look for it in vain in Marx's works. He believed that the maladjustments of capitalist society mainly sprang from the institution of private property and the falsification which private profit introduced into the distribution of wealth. Remove that inhibition and society would function without friction. Nor does the concept of planning figure in the early writings of Socialism. In Britain, for instance, neither the Fabians nor the Guild Socialists ever talked of it at all. And even if they had done so, their talk at that time could only have been theoretical. The statistical data necessary for the drawing up of a national plan was simply not available. The careful statistics of every aspect of the national economy which are kept in certain countries today are essential conditions of any sort of plan and the extent to which the lack of them stultifies government action may be seen any day in 1948 in Paris where 16 governments of vastly varying efficiency seek to draw up four-year forecasts of their production and trade. The figures produced by some governments are so notional as to make impossible any real reliance upon their plans. Thirty years ago, there were not even notional figures. It follows that there could be no plans.

Professor Jewkes in his strong attack upon government direction and control, "Ordeal by Planning," suggests that the first plan worthy of the name was the German attempt at the total planning of their war economy after 1916, the so-called Hindenburg Plan. Its first application to civilian uses was made by Lenin. Professor Jewkes does not hazard a guess whether Lenin was or was not inspired by the German model, but certainly he found nothing in Marxism to tell him how to build a modern economy in a shattered demoralized community which, contrary to all Marx's predictions, had not yet achieved a structure of capitalist industry. Professor Jewkes cites a quotation from Lenin, used by the Webbs to illustrate Lenin's empirical approach:

> Couldn't you produce a plan (not a technical but a political scheme) which would be understood by the proletariat? For instance, in 10 years (or 5?) we shall build 20 (or 30 or 50?) power stations covering the country with a network

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of such stations . . . We need such a plan at once to give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to work for.

Thus planning entered the stage of history, like so many other revolutionary ideas, by a side door, almost unnoticed by the man who first conceived it and aimed at something — propaganda value — which was later to be at best of very secondary importance. When Stalin took up the idea in 1928, he made it the lever of Russia's gigantic plunge into industrialization. And if planning is to have a birthday, 1928 is perhaps the most appropriate year.

It follows that the idea of central planning as a vital instrument of economic and social policy is only 20 years old. That fact alone should encourage caution in making dogmatic estimates of its value or its dangers. Few new techniques have proved themselves in 20 years. This caution is reinforced by a number of other reasons. Most of the concrete examples to which both planners and anti-planners appeal today are drawn from quite exceptional circumstances. The planning with which the world is unfortunately most familiar is planning for war. Planning at such a time is inevitable, for no community left to its own devices will produce enough weapons and armaments to secure victory. War-making coupled with "business as usual" was a fantasy worthy of Mr. Chamberlain and the "phoney war" of 1939 and early 1940. But the planning which diverts a large proportion of the nation's resources — 60 percent in Britain — to the making of bombers and tanks has a singleness of purpose which it is hard to repeat in time of peace. This is not to say that some of the administrative techniques may not be usefully studied, but planning for war is not and cannot be an exact analogy of planning for peace.

Some nations — chief among them Britain — have, however, carried their planning over into peacetime. Here surely is the laboratory specimen from which conclusions of scientific accuracy can be drawn. Unfortunately, the conditions of postwar planning are still exceptional since a large part of the planning and control has been not the "purposive direction of the economy" but a desperate rearguard action against acute shortages. So many of the controls which have proved most oppressive to the ordinary queue-standing woman in the street have been dictated not by planning as such but by a desire to make very short supplies go as far as they can and at the same time to avoid the inflationary

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pressure which free bidding for those scarce supplies would have inevitably produced. The contrast between the British economy, which is controlled but financially exceptionally stable, and the neighboring French economy, where neither the attempt at control nor the attempt at no control has checked galloping inflation, is a warning against too hasty generalizations about the evils of control when controls are being applied at a time of acute scarcity. It may be said in parenthesis that if any vital commodity — such as iron ore or petroleum — were to prove permanently scarce, there can be little doubt that countries most devoted to the ideal of free enterprise would accept governmental supervision of the scarce material.

There is another warning contained in the contrast between Britain and France. It is the difficulty of extending generalizations about planning from one national community to another. However good the theoretical case for planning, it is quite clear that some governments today cannot plan successfully. To give only three preconditions of planning — the civil service must be reasonably efficient and honest, citizens must be reasonably ready to pay their taxes and in general, the conception of respecting the regulations laid down by the government must be reasonably widespread. These conditions are present in Britain, in Holland, in Scandinavia. They are absent in France and Italy. Very few generalizations about the possible scope of planning based on the five former countries would be really applicable to the two latter.

For the same reason, it is difficult to go to Russia for a great deal of guidance on the possibilities of planning. In the first place, accurate and detailed information is exceptionally hard to secure. But even more frustrating is the total difference in political atmosphere. If a society has lost its freedom — or never enjoyed it — the experience of its government can only be applied with difficulty to free communities whose leaders are struggling to combine a measure of direction with the preservation of all essential liberties. To give two instances, planning in a free society has to find ways and means of tempting workers from redundant to expanding areas of employment. It also has to persuade businessmen to adapt themselves to a general policy for the location of industry. Both problems involve delicate questions of incentive and pressure. But what problems do they raise in Russia where the inhabitants of the whole Crimean region were transported *en bloc* to Siberia three years ago and where penal labor camps,

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starred across the Arctic wastes, forever await the recalcitrant? There are differences in background so vast that the experience of the Russians in planning, interesting though it may be from the point of view of administrative technique, can only be used with the utmost discretion in discussing the problems of free society.

II

These reservations are not introduced to prove that there can be no intelligent discussion of planning. They are simply set down as a guard against excessive dogmatism. The truth is that the world does not yet know very much about the most important issue raised by economic planning — which is the question whether or no planning is a valuable addition to the techniques of a free society. To put the question at all admits something which most democrats are ready to admit — that free society is not perfect and that all the various national versions of it in the western world have a long way to go before they make the ideals embodied in them — of freedom and justice and charity and plenty — a living reality. The great claim put forward by the planners is that planning is a technique for curing the observed inadequacies of modern industrial society and possibly the clearest method of examining its claims is to take those shortcomings which are generally admitted to weaken western democracy and to examine the extent to which economic planning offers a cure.

There is, however, one clarification to be made before this examination can be undertaken. The extent to which Socialists have adopted the idea of central planning has led many people to believe that planning, nationalization, workers' share in management and other planks of the Socialist platform are indistinguishable and that to say one is to say them all. This present article, at least, is concerned only with planning; and the questions of state ownership and control will be considered only in so far as they have some direct connection with the practice of planning.

The two concepts — of planning and nationalization — are essentially distinct. Hitler was a great planner, but he left the actual structure and ownership of industry virtually untouched. Or, to give a more topical example of the distinction, the British Government today has on the whole given more attention to nationalization than to planning. The various sessions of parliament have devoted more time to altering the ownership of the

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coal mines, the Bank of England, land transport and the public utilities than to any other activity. The administration also inherited from the war and has maintained a number of controls, most of them designed to deal with the problems raised by shortage. But any general economic planning, any genuine "purposive direction" of the economy has been almost entirely confined to the efforts of Sir Stafford Cripps. At the Board of Trade, he was first responsible for the dedication of a large part of British industry to the export drive — which this year has achieved a 50 percent increase on the volume of 1938 — and when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was able in one year to check inflation and introduce strong elements of deflation into the British economy.

There is only one direct connection between planning and nationalization, and so far it is only a theory. Some Socialists argue that it will be impossible for a government to plan effectively such matters as capital expansion or the control of the trade cycle unless public ownership of an important sector of industry — say, coal mining, transport and iron and steel — gives the planners the last word in determining the investment policy of these industries. This theory assumes that no government could secure the collaboration of industry without taking it over — which is certainly far from being proved in Britain, where, for instance, the steel industry has coöperated fully with the Government even when under the threat of nationalization. In Italy, an even more paradoxical case exists for, although by means of the *Instituto di Ricostruzione Industriale* (IRI), Mussolini's great holding company, a very large sector of heavy industry and transport *is* owned by the Government, the Government has no views on evolving a policy of planned capital development and no intention apparently of using its "public sector" as part of a general policy of planning.

The connection between planning and public ownership can therefore be regarded — for the time being at least — as being to a considerable extent accidental. And it is planning that concerns us here.

III

It is impossible to examine all the shortcomings of modern industrial society which the practice of general economic planning is supposed to counter. There are, however, one or two main dif-

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ficulties which laisser faire economics apparently do not solve automatically, and it is primarily in relation to these that the case for and against planning can best be examined.

The first is at once an economic and social problem. It is that the unfettered workings of the free enterprise system create wealth but create it very unevenly. The accumulation at the top is far greater than the accumulation at the bottom. This phenomenon creates the economic problem of insufficient demand. The machines pour out the products in greater abundance than the markets can absorb them and the resulting gluts help to produce the alternations of expansion and contraction known as the trade cycle. Nor is it simply a question of lack of demand within the national economy. On a world-wide scale, the failure of demand has produced such imbecilities as textile mills closing in Lancashire and New England while the productivity of Chinese labor suffers for lack of cheap cotton garments. The social problem is even more obvious — the growth of unrest, the resentment of the masses, the spread of Communism.

It is in this field that the most widespread use of "purposive direction" has been made. Almost every government in the western world uses taxation — one of the most flexible instruments of central planning — to redistribute income and to provide out of state funds services and amenities for the mass of the people which were once the preserve of a small minority. The delicacy of all instruments of planning is illustrated by the problem of determining at which point the use of taxation to redistribute wealth in society becomes an obstacle to the accumulation of wealth by society. Taxed beyond a certain point, neither businessman nor worker will create and produce with the necessary zest. Taxation also has unfortunate consequences in relation to the trade cycle which will be discussed later. But in spite of these limitations, taxation as an instrument for regulating the scale of incomes and thus the flow of purchasing power in a community is the most widely accepted method of central planning by the state, and those who extend their dislike of planning even to a frontal attack upon taxation may observe in France today the disastrous economic and social consequences of the existence in a nation of a middle class that refuses to be taxed.

During the war, various experiments were made, particularly in relation to food, to deal with the problem of poverty by other means than those of taxation — although the money pro-

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vided by taxation has been the basis of the extra services. Free milk, fruit juice and vitamin schemes for mothers and children, school meals for children, subsidies for certain basic foods are all methods used in Britain to plan the diet of the people. Only the last of these — food subsidies — is controversial and it has become the target of all those who believe that taxation is now so high as to check initiative. The figure of some £480,000,000 spent on food subsidies in the last year has become one of the biggest items in the Budget; and since these subsidies assist rich and poor alike and reduce costs in the Ritz equally with the workmen's canteen, their incidence appears somewhat irrational. In Belgium, food subsidies in general were removed while the more poorly paid workers continued to receive special privileges. Experience suggests that, in the long run, the direct intervention of the state as a buyer and provider of foodstuffs is more cumbrous than financial measures, such as children's allowances, rent rebates and tax exemption which leave food prices unaffected but ensure an adequate income to the poorer workers.

The question of food prices brings us to the second field in which government planning and intervention is already a widespread practice. The yields of the world's harvests are so uncertain that unchecked they introduce a dangerous element of instability into economic life. This at least has been recognized for some 30 years and attempts were made after the First World War to regulate supply and in this way to keep some stability of price. Rubber schemes, tea schemes, coffee schemes, organized by the producers, were all tried and in general failed. The great depression of the early 1930's brought the primary producers of the world to their lowest ebb. In Britain it was a time when docks and thistles grew in some of the finest pasture land. In America, the ruin was accentuated by the horrors of drought. The cocoa growers of Nigeria were as hard hit as the rice growers of Siam.

Out of that experience, two policies have grown. The first is support for the farmer at home. One of the biggest American excursions into direct planning is probably its system of price support for agricultural products. This removes a large sector — one of the largest — of the American economy from the free play of supply and demand. It seems certain that, whatever the fall in world demand, wheat at 75 cents the bushel will never appear again in the United States. Similarly in Great Britain, the Government is now pledged to a £100,000,000 development pro-

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gram in agriculture, underpinned at every point by guaranteed prices. In both countries, there are critics who will say that this intervention by the state is false planning, since it has been undertaken without relating the expense of agricultural subsidies to the national income as a whole and without demanding in return any guarantee of increased efficiency and productivity. But if planning be defined as purposive intervention by the state to achieve certain economic ends, the governments of the western world are definitely planners in the agricultural field.

This policy of planning in agriculture has been extended to foreign trade by means of guaranteed import prices and government bulk purchase. Remembering the slump of the thirties, few governments are ready to embark on plans of agricultural expansion unless they receive some guarantee of a continued market. One of the crucial economic discussions at the recent Commonwealth Conference in London concerned the length of time over which the British Government would be prepared to guarantee markets for Australian and New Zealand produce. Both governments were being urged to extend their areas of cultivation. Both in return demanded guarantees which only a government ready to "plan" its agricultural imports could give. The same anxiety for guaranteed markets has appeared at Geneva in the negotiations on trade between Eastern and Western Europe. Poland and Rumania demand guarantees if they are to devote a large part of their agriculture to the grain and fodder and dairy products demanded by the industrialized nations of Western Europe. Finally, with the coming into operation of the Food and Agricultural Organization and its central organ, the World Food Council, the planning of food supplies has now entered the international field.

It is possible to argue that the methods of rigidly guaranteed prices and of bulk purchase are too costly to the importing government to become lasting instruments of economic planning, but it is difficult to contend that planning can be done away with altogether in this field. The very insecurity of production had already led the producers to begin some embryonic planning on their own behalf — and, of all types of planning, planning done by producers for producers tends to be economically the most costly to the consumer. If stability and abundance are to be secured, control must be vested in a governmental agency, at the national or international level, and although the techniques of planning in this vital sector will doubtless improve, there can be

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little doubt that governmental planning will never be abandoned.

It was the Great Depression that turned so many governments of such very different political complexions to the idea not only of agricultural planning but of planning as such; and it is still true that the greatest single field in which central planning is most generally advocated is in the control of the trade cycle. Such agreement would hardly be possible if there were not now a general agreement on the nature and causes of the trade cycle — an agreement which did not exist 25 years ago, when every kind of explanation still had currency, from Jevons's sun spots to Marx's labor theory of surplus value. Thanks to Lord Keynes's pioneering work, there is now fairly general agreement that trade cycles are caused by fluctuations in the investment of capital and that general prosperity can be secured only by "a high and stable level of capital investment."

There are two ways in which generally unplanned economies can become a prey to instability and stagnation. The case of stagnation may be treated first, since it does not appear to be general. No one, for instance, would criticize American capitalism for being "stagnant." But two older capitalist societies, Britain and France, showed signs of this loss of vitality between the wars. At a time when neither government ventured to plan, when taxation was small, when trade unionism was weak — in a word at a time when the bugbears usually blamed by businessmen were absent, the British and the French economies ceased to expand and, in the case of France, positively diminished.

The reason in both cases appears to have been the same. In any industrial society, it is estimated that economic health can be maintained only if between 10 and 15 percent of the national income is being invested in fresh capital development. In Britain between the wars, the average level was no more than 3 percent. In France between 1929 and 1938 it must have been a minus quantity, since France in 1939 was less highly capitalized than in 1928 and those who remember the "hot money" which was continually escaping from the franc to the safety of the dollar between 1935 and 1939 will not be surprised to learn that the French entrepreneur class indulged in considerable "dis-saving" during that period.

Clearly if those whose function it is to save and invest do not do so, the government must intervene. Significantly, the first aim of the Monnet Plan published in France in 1946 was to bring

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back the level of France's capital equipment to that of 1929. It may be repeated in passing that the determination of a government to ensure a high level of investment in its economy may or may not be combined with nationalization and state control. Such is not the intention of the Monnet Plan, and in October 1948 Sir Stafford Cripps repeated his government's desire to secure the necessary 10 to 15 percent of annual investment by voluntary means. On the other hand, the stupendous expansion of the Russian planned economy has undoubtedly been due more than anything else to the decision to devote perhaps 30 percent of the annual wealth created by industrialization to fresh capital investment. But, although Russian experience thus confirms the necessity of a high level of capital investment, the economic backwardness and political tyranny of Russian society unfortunately make it difficult to draw detailed conclusions from the Soviet experiment useful to western society. It shows that under a certain set of social and economic conditions, total central economic planning does not break down. Nor — for 300 years — did the elaborate system of slaves and janissaries worked out by the Turks. But not to break down is hardly a proof *per se* of desirability.

The question of the stability and regularity of capitalist society is more important than that of buoyancy, since the phenomenon of the trade cycle was born almost with the capitalist system itself and has dogged all communities, progressive or not. It is in this sphere that there is most general agreement on the possibility and necessity of central economic planning by the state — the testimony varying from business colossi such as Lever Brothers and convinced anti-planners such as Professor Hayek and Professor Jewkes to the warmest supporters of the Labor Party. The theory is fairly straightforward. It is that capital goods need to be replaced only after a number of years, and that since confidence is one of the principal factors in business planning, the new orders for capital goods tend to be made all together when times are good and to fall off together when demand begins to slacken. The rise and fall in the capital goods sector sets the tone for all the rest, and the slump beginning in the nineteenth century mainly in the textile industry (which then represented the highest concentration of capital), and in the twentieth century in iron and steel, spreads to consumers industries and involves the whole economy in its downward spiral.

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Hitherto the practices of the state have served to encourage this phenomenon. We have seen how taxation is now one of its settled instruments of planning, but traditional methods of taxation accentuate the trade cycle. When times are good and the call on the government for such services as unemployment pay are small, taxes flood in from booming industry and the drain on the exchequer is small. The government therefore tends to remit taxation and may begin public works on its own account. Thus it sends the rising boom up another couple of spirals in the process. The boom breaks, business falls off, receipts from taxation drop, unemployment rises, the drain on the exchequer mounts. The government therefore increases taxation and cuts its own expenditure — thus deepening the deflation that is beginning to blight the economy. In other words, government methods of taxation in the past have been exactly calculated to make booms more busting and slumps more profound.

From this situation, many statesmen, economists and publicists have drawn the conclusion that the government can play a vital part in creating general stability in the community if it will use its twin instruments of taxation and public expenditure to counteract the normal workings of the trade cycle. When times are good, taxation should be held steady and perhaps increased, a budget surplus should be secured and reserves laid aside for a carefully drawn out scheme of state expenditure to be undertaken when demand shows sign of slackening. When these deflationary signs appear, the government should remit taxation, particularly all taxation on money devoted to capital expansion — thus guiding industry to phase its development programs and not huddle them all in the upward sweep of the cycle. During this deflationary period, an unbalanced budget might be permissible and budgeting might make the five or ten year period rather than the one year its basis of calculation. Another possibility might lie in the presentation of two budgets, one for the annual income and commitments of the state, the other for its capital expenditure.

These expedients have not yet been tried out, but Sweden during the depression made a limited and successful experiment in the planning of public works and Britain's housing program in the thirties was another instance of state-guided expansion. And it is also true that the industrial upswing of most countries after the Great Depression took the form of that most tragic of all forms of public works — a rearmament program. But these

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were not part of a coherent policy. No government yet has made a fully consistent and stable attempt to control the trade cycle. Indeed, the postwar trade depression is still only lurking in the wings of history. The stage is still held by wartime dislocation, inflation, full employment and continued shortages. It may be, too, that the Russian menace presages another period of economic activity in part sustained by rearmament. But if the free world secures the chance of peace, sooner or later the problem of the trade cycle will return, and this time the free governments will at least meet its challenge with weapons in their hands.

IV

This very brief survey covers only three of the possible fields of government action — admittedly important ones, but still only three — and no absolute conclusions should be advanced on such relatively scanty evidence. Yet they do at least suggest that not only has some measure of central economic planning come to stay but that this fact offers no inevitable threat to free society. On the contrary, such are the dangers of political shipwreck attendant upon the onslaught of economic depression that control of the trade cycle may well be the condition of preserving free society in this century.

But the admission that some economic planning may be necessary does not throw much light on a secondary but vitally important question — how should this planning be accomplished and by whom? By the government, certainly, for only the central authority can possess the relevant data upon which to base its decisions. But which organ of the government? Ministers? Civil servants? Independent planning boards? And, again, by what means? Should planning be confined to general measures, largely financial in character or should intervention be much more direct and detailed and diffuse?

Some people may feel that in this field at least the experience of different nations in waging war and, in particular, the experience of Great Britain both during and after the war can give valuable examples of what technically is the best (or worst) way to plan. Something certainly can be learnt, but, once again, complete certainty is impossible owing to the very specialized circumstances in which wartime planning was carried out — in particular by the men who have in this first age of planning been called upon to plan. The instances quoted here are drawn from British

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experience, for it is in Britain that the most determined effort has been made to carry on the experiment of planning into the peace and British experience with the personnel of planning should be particularly relevant.

It is surely not to be thought that if a measure of central planning is adopted as part of the permanent structure of democratic society no change will be made in the type of men called upon to do the planning or in the type of training they receive. The British permanent civil servants upon whom the great burden of planning has fallen were trained on the whole for quite other tasks. Their traditional work was that of administering known regulations with the utmost impartiality and equity, and a large part of their time was spent in seeing that things which went beyond the regulations did not happen. Onto this body of men was thrust the quite opposite task of initiating, directing and guiding the economic life of the country in a positive sense. It is a tremendous tribute to their adaptability that the results have not been more unsatisfactory than has in fact been the case. Yet such training lends itself inevitably to a restrictive attitude. The various officials controlling raw materials, for instance, are far better trained to refuse an application than to stimulate a proper use. They are, moreover, bound by every fiber of their tradition to the principle of equity. To give a concrete instance, they would rather see ten manufacturers receive one windowpane each than that one manufacturer should "secure the advantage" of a single ten-paned window. Yet from the point of view of imparting vigor, energy and encouragement to the men of initiative in the business world, there is no doubt that one window is an incentive, and one windowpane is not.

There is a further problem. The civil service commands financial rewards so totally out of line with those offered by industry that it cannot attract throughout its structure men of the type necessary to make economic planning effective. The "big executive" gravitates naturally to business, not to the civil service. One of the reasons for the relative effectiveness of planning in wartime is the number of able business people who go into the public service. They have all, almost without exception, returned by now to their accustomed work.

It follows that in judging the experience of planning in Britain in the last nine years, and especially in the last three, one must remember that the planners themselves are on the whole not the

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men a democratic society is likely to put in charge of planning once planning is finally established as a technique of government. Different scales of pay and totally different methods of training will undoubtedly be evolved. What we are judging today is essentially a makeshift.

Having said so much, what should the judgment be? There are certain tentative conclusions which British experience seems to suggest. The first is that the more ruling decisions have to be sent to a single central authority, the more the vigor and speed of the economic machine will be impaired. Ask any businessman what has been the cruellest cross he has had to bear under the present system of control, and he will reply "Delay." Control today can still be excused by the continuance of extreme shortages (of which the most extreme is the dollar shortage). But whatever the excuse, control from the center hampers initiative, and decentralization of decision is essential.

A second point is that physical controls are the hardest and most cumbrous to manage. When a ministry has actual control of the supply of a raw material and it can be obtained only on its allocation, the second greatest time waster becomes inevitable — the filling in of forms and the keeping of records. Moreover, violations of the regulations laid down covering the use of the raw material need to be followed up and prosecuted, and this, in turn, entails supervision at every level of use. Complete supervision is of course impossible, but it nevertheless keeps a great many men controlling and supervising other men, instead of working to produce themselves. The British Civil Service is now larger than at any time in its history. By common agreement, it is much too large.

A point worth mentioning in this context of supervision is that, once acute shortages have been overcome, direct control of prices by the central authority tends to rigidity on the one hand and excessive policing on the other. Control during the period of real shortage is naturally essential, and surely few economic boasts have been so little fulfilled as the claim of American business that to sweep away price controls would bring about a fall in prices. But in normal times the working of the market (within the limits set by supported prices in agriculture, fixed transport charges and the like) is the least cumbrous basis for the calculating of prices. To accept the market rate naturally lays on the government the duty of seeing that no man's income is so small as to

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exclude him from a share in the market; but the regulation of incomes is a more reliable instrument of planning than the control of prices.

One other conclusion is worth mentioning. No amount of detailed control will be effective if the tide of economic life has set against the controls. In Russia, the government may be able to turn the tide by removing unwilling peasants to Siberia by the million. Such methods are unavailable to free governments, which to a great extent must carry public opinion with them. If, for instance, the financial policy of a government is inflationary and surplus money is constantly tempting manufacturers to the production of high-cost luxuries or amusement parks, no regimentation of controls, however draconic, will prevent precious raw materials from drifting away to nefarious uses. The best method of ending the abuse is, to quote *The Economist*, to control the weather and not to ration the raindrops. Sir Stafford Cripps, by putting an end to Dr. Dalton's senseless inflationary policy, by achieving a genuine budget surplus and by persuading both sides of industry to limit dividends and wage increases, was able between the autumn of 1947 and the summer of 1948 to change the whole economic climate in Britain. And once the climate had changed, the "rationing of the raindrops" began to matter infinitely less.

Now if there is some validity in these conclusions, they suggest that central economic planning will be most effective when it uses financial rather than physical controls. This would seem to be true whatever the structure of society, whatever the system of property, whatever the pattern of classes. Given total public ownership, the various public corporations would still be better managed if they had not to refer everything to centralized ministries. Coöperative undertakings would be in the same case. And the point is obvious in the mixed society of public and private ownership which seems to be the likely democratic pattern for many years to come.

But to say that the state should avoid detailed physical supervision is not to condemn it to ineffectiveness. On the contrary, the budget, taxation, supervision of capital expenditure and the judicious use of allowances and subsidies provide the whole apparatus necessary for ensuring the general well-being of society, provided the politicians who set the course and the public servants who execute policy are fully aware of the aims and methods

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they ought to pursue. Nor does the confining of general economic planning to the field of finance mean that all kinds of experiments may not be made in the structure and ownership of industry and above all in the ways of associating work people more closely and rationally with the industries in which they work.

And if at the last one step into dogmatism may be permitted, it is to assert that the confining of government to certain essential purposes is more in keeping with the traditions of western political theory than the thoughtless, feckless passion for the state as such which has obscured so much that is generous and sound in the minds of modern reformers. Distrust of government is probably the soundest instinct of western society, doubly sound in a century which has within 40 years produced a Hitler, a Mussolini and a Stalin. No one can doubt the state's duty to secure the welfare of all its citizens. Equally no one can doubt its tendency to eat its citizens up in the process. A theory of economc stability and social progress which nevertheless keeps within reasonable bounds the direct control of government is the only safe theory for free society.

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THE COMMONWEALTH PROBLEM: UNION OR ALLIANCE?

By Robert Gordon Menzies

THERE has been a great stirring of minds on the subject of the British Commonwealth and Empire. Its name; its structure; its internal rights and duties; its means of family consultation; its place in the world — all are in debate.

In the nature of things, uniformity of ideas about it would be unlikely. For example, there are no real racial difficulties in the relations of an Australian or a New Zealander, either with his fellow citizens or with the land from which his grandparents came. He has no difficulty in understanding the institutions of the home land which are also his own. He rejoices in being British, and has a respectful but affectionate and almost proprietorial interest in the Crown which makes a common "subjecthood" a matter not of subordination but of pride. But in this matter a Canadian has great difficulties to face. There are marked differences of race and tradition between the major groups of inhabitants of the major provinces, and there is in the immediate proximity a powerful United States which must exercise an influence upon many matters, including the psychological problems of national security. These and other factors have inevitably encouraged the growth of a conception of local and special Canadian nationality which differs very clearly from that to which we Australians are accustomed. Again, the problems of the Union of South Africa are in a sense known to and understood by students, but can be fully appreciated only by those on the spot. Eire also chronically produces problems; we who look on from a distance are sometimes tempted to be impatient about them, forgetting, as men commonly do, that distant difficulties always falsely seem capable of relatively easy solution. The new Indian Dominions have, in their accession to independent self-governing nationhood, brought with them a host of new questions as well as what all hope will be an increasingly strong and fruitful partnership in world affairs.

This curt and inadequate summary need not be elaborated; but its elements must constantly be borne in mind if we are to make a reasonably objective approach to the total problem of the

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British Commonwealth association. For these immense and inescapable differences of approach have meant that nothing is static. A process of adjustment and accommodation constantly goes on. It is not, and cannot be, a dry academic process. It proceeds from practical and human impulses, and does not lend itself to that deductive application of broad theories to particular facts which is so popular among younger nations and peoples but which is so opposed to the "step by step" inductive method which has been the characteristic contribution made by British genius to the solution of constitutional problems.

In the result, we are moving from one formula to another, whether we like it or not. My purpose is not to attack this process as such (though I have a fear and distrust of formulae), but to point out that the time has come when we should ask ourselves in what direction we are travelling. As we take one step after another, we should know in broad terms our route and destination. Will the present search for an all-embracing formula which will place an Irish Republic or an Indian Republic inside a Commonwealth which up to now has been bound together, both legally and sentimentally, by a common allegiance to the British Crown, weaken or strengthen the Commonwealth? Is it necessary? Is it inevitable?

The more I have thought about it, the more convinced I have become that we must now, once and for all, decide whether the British Commonwealth is to remain as an organic structure in which there must be some permanent binding element which preserves unity, or whether it is to broaden out into a merely functional association, an alliance between otherwise separate and independent nations. The difference between these two courses is not verbal, and cannot be eliminated by mere drafting ingenuity. It is profound. It goes right down into the hearts and instincts of British people all over the world. Are we to be one family under one head, the King, or are we to be a business (and perhaps defensive) partnership with no more guarantee of permanence than any other such association has had in the past?

I state my own faith at once. Alliance is not enough. Organic union under the Crown is vital if we are to play our full part in the world and its vexed affairs. This notion does not exclude other and most friendly associations and agreements. It would even permit associate, as distinct from full, Commonwealth membership. But it gives expression to the belief that British

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unity under the Crown will be destroyed if and when we accept a new formula under which we are not to be British, our nations are not to be united organically, and the Crown is no longer to be significant except to some members in some places.

II. THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF DOMINION AUTONOMY

One of the many disadvantages of a formula is that while it is originally hailed as an expression of agreement it all too easily becomes a cause of disagreement. The words come to be regarded as legal, as terms of art; problems of interpretation arise. Every lawyer knows that a contract is frequently the beginning of a dispute, and not its end. Sometimes, as in the case of the Balfour formula of 1926, some phrases are remembered and applied, while others are forgotten. This process has had a significant effect upon current discussion of Commonwealth relations. The words of the formula used in describing the Dominions were: "They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

In the years since 1926, and especially in the last few years, all the emphasis seems to have been placed on the expressions "autonomous," "in no way subordinate one to another," and "freely associated." These have been treated as connoting a voluntary partnership of quite independent nations, and have therefore given rise to the growing conception of the Commonwealth as a mere functional association. But this does no justice to the formula as a whole. In it separate autonomy is limited or conditioned by the significant words "within the British Empire," "common allegiance to the Crown," and "British Commonwealth of Nations." It was by the intermingling of all these phrases that the Imperial Conference of 1926 sought to explain the new Dominion status. There was to be full legal power of self-government; but while that power was complete, it was to be exercised within the broad structure based on a common Kingship and allegiance, on such a coördination of policies as would preserve the British Empire as an entity, and on the use of the word "British" as a compendious description of the whole. Such a complex of ideas is difficult to state or explain; but with practical good sense British people felt that it would work.

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"Does it work?" is still the instinctive test applied to every British political arrangement.

The importance of the common Crown as the nexus between the self-governing nations of the British Commonwealth should be reëmphasized. Among other things, it points to the real need of a broad common foreign policy. For if the words "in no way subordinate" are treated as unqualified, clearly each British nation may, if it chooses, adopt policies and enter into obligations so diverse and indeed inconsistent that intra-Empire conflict may be provoked. If the great issues of peace and war are to be dealt with as if the Commonwealth relation involved no common obligations and connoted no unity of action, the Kingship is in clear danger of destruction. The King makes war as the head of the state. He cannot be at peace and at war with the same Power at the same time, unless the truth is that he is the several head of several states, in which case there is no common allegiance to the Crown at all.

It is frequently said, of course, that the proposition that our independence is qualified in the way I have described is mere "colonialism," and is intolerable to progressive Dominion thought. My reply is that the notion of an unqualified autonomy is mere obscurantism. The world has moved through many shifts and dangers in our lifetimes. We have learned and forgotten many lessons. But we cannot, at our peril, forget that no man liveth alone, and no nation can dwell in isolation. Independence is always dependent on somebody else's independence, so that in the result we see that independence is interdependence. For British people, this means that our autonomy is not absolute; it is created and preserved by our common allegiance to one Crown, that is, by our family right to rely upon each other.

So much for our foreign affairs. The power of each Dominion to deal in its own way with its own domestic affairs has never, I believe, been questioned in my time. There were one or two vestigial remains of earlier doctrines, such as the limitation upon the right of a Dominion Parliament to make laws having extra-territorial operation, but these were later on usefully dealt with in the Statute of Westminster itself.

As I have just mentioned the Statute of Westminster, it may be not inappropriate to remind those who are seeking ways and means of making us British people monarchists and republicans at one and the same time that in the Statute, in 1931, the second

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recital repeats that "the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and . . . they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown."

In an age of clichés, I pause to remark that "a common allegiance to the Crown" means one allegiance, of one nature, to one Crown, and admits of no ambiguity.

I sum all this up by saying that if we are united yet equal in all things (as we are), it is because of our brotherhood. We are brothers because we are the children of the same father. The less political power the King has, the more significant becomes his function as the living expression of a bond which distinguishes the British Commonwealth and Empire from all other groupings of nations: a bond which marks it out as something vital, organic, unique.

III. THE CONCERTING OF COMMONWEALTH POLICY

In dealing with this problem I at once adopt the words of the Australian Minister for External Affairs, spoken in the Australian House of Representatives in 1943:

> Australia cannot safely limit her interests even to the gigantic area of the Pacific. Twice Australia has taken a prominent part in a world war that commenced because of European questions. With Britain vitally involved, so at once were we. Our concern with Europe cannot be limited to the waging of wars. We must have some say in taking steps to prevent wars and in changing the conditions which are likely to cause wars. In short, we cannot contract out of Europe. The reason is plain. The center of the British Commonwealth and Empire is in Europe. From Europe have come all our immigrants. In peacetime much of our trade was with Europe. Our culture is European. European colonies are our neighbors in the Pacific and one of the three great powers of Continental Europe, the Soviet Union, is also a world power and will be a great force in the Pacific of tomorrow. Therefore the peace, order and good government of Europe are vital to us. We are greatly concerned in the European settlement of the future. . . . We are firmly of opinion that the time has passed when either the peace or prosperity of mankind can be regarded as divisible and one continent or one nation can be treated in isolation from another.

If we cannot contract out of Europe we certainly cannot contract out of the British Empire. For it is demonstrable that for good sober reasons of fact the British nations must achieve joint foreign policies if they are to remain firmly associated. It was during my own term of office as Prime Minister of Australia that we first established legations in the United States, Japan and China. The reason for such establishment was that Australia,

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to use my own words, had "primary responsibilities in the Pacific." The same notion is inherent in a view recently expressed in this review [1] that because Australia is the nation most immediately interested in the Far East and the Western Pacific she should there be regarded as the spokesman of the whole Commonwealth. There is much force in this contention. But there is equally clearly a reciprocal proposition; that because Great Britain is the British nation most immediately interested in Europe she should there be the spokesman for all the rest of us.

But how can either Australia or Great Britain speak for the Commonwealth in such zones unless there has been a prior consultation designed and effective to produce one policy? A single spokesman cannot propound varying policies at the same time. Again we see that if the British nations are to have coherence in world affairs they must act jointly; this once more reminds us that the theoretical idea of utter individual autonomy may easily be pushed too far.

Is the present machinery of consultation adequate? This question has been so much debated that I hesitate to propound it once more. Yet it is of great importance. Constant contact through High Commissioners, a stream of outward and inward cables, occasional meetings of individual Ministers, and rare meetings between Prime Ministers, all these and other minor means exist. But I believe it is still true to say that great policies can be worked out in London, intimately affecting a Dominion, but either not really discussed with the Dominion concerned or discussed so late that critical comment or opposition by that Dominion would be embarrassing.

Proposals to establish an Empire Secretariat which could know of and fully consider all matters affecting British countries have been rejected. Thus, in 1946, a meeting of Prime Ministers in London mildly approved of the existing methods, but added: "While all are willing to consider and adopt practical proposals for developing the existing system it is agreed that the methods now practised are preferable to any rigid centralized machinery."

I have never shared the view of those who see in a London secretariat a subtle threat to Dominion independence. But, if the objection is to centralized machinery, why not set up decentralized machinery? There would be no difficulty in estab-

[1] "Postwar Strains on the British Commonwealth," by Nicholas Mansergh, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1948.

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lishing a small but highly qualified and constantly informed Empire Secretariat in each Dominion's capital, containing representatives of each self-governing British country. At Canberra at present there is a nucleus of one, set up under the Australian-New Zealand Treaty. The existence of such a joint secretariat in each capital would provide not only a splendid means of pre-consultation but a fine demonstration of the organic nature of British unity. This suggestion is very much in line with those made by Mr. Paul McGuire in his recent book, "Experiment in World Order." He was good enough before writing this book to discuss his proposals on this matter with me, and they command my warm agreement. After all, consultation is designed to produce mutual understanding and a community of ideas leading to common policies and concerted action. If it is to do this it must occur *before* decisions are made or even half-made. Again, if consultation is to occur early enough to be effective, having regard to the state of flux in which human affairs exist it obviously must possess continuity. The work of collating and exchanging facts and ideas must therefore be done not merely *ad hoc* but with permanency.

In this necessarily brief sketch of some of the modern problems of British Commonwealth development it is perhaps appropriate to point out the much-forgotten truth that the internal relationships of the British Empire are not merely those between Dominion and mother country, but are also those between Dominion and Dominion. Because it is true that the relationships between Canberra and Pretoria and Ottawa and Wellington are of immense importance if the total Empire structure is to be soundly built, the case for a decentralized Empire Secretariat becomes overwhelmingly strong.

A point commonly ignored in discussions of this problem of British Commonwealth machinery is that a secretariat with its constant means of consultation would, whether centralized or decentralized, increase the authority of each Dominion and not derogate from it. It is one of the supreme advantages of the organic conception of the British Commonwealth that each of its constituent parts has in fact not one but three capacities:

(a) It has its own intrinsic capacity as an individual nation: the kind of capacity to which it would be reduced, not elevated, if the British Commonwealth and Empire were to be resolved into its constituent parts.

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(b) It has its corporative capacity as a nation exercising, on the right facts and at the right time, influence over the policy of other nations in the Commonwealth.

(c) It has an added capacity and strength derived from the fact that the joint policy so influenced will attract the coöperation and, if necessary, the active support of those other nations.

In brief, proposals for a permanent organization of British Commonwealth coöperation, so far from involving some lessening of the autonomy of the Dominions, would in reality add immensely to their power and prestige.

IV. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

There were those who thought that the organization of the United Nations at San Francisco would diminish the importance of the British Commonwealth and Empire. This view derived some color from the fact that the Dominions are members of the United Nations in their own right, and that some of them have gone to considerable lengths to prevent other people from thinking that the British countries have some unity of foreign policy.

There was also an early disposition to exaggerate the power of the United Nations to enforce settlements and restrain aggression. As time has gone on, however, considerably more realism is being shown in this regard. Most of those many millions of British and American people who support the general idea of the United Nations would, I think, be prepared to admit that, in view of the veto, the Security Council's power of enforcement is negligible; and that if strength is to be placed behind intelligent world sentiment and judgment with a view to restraining aggression, that strength must be produced by individual nations acting outside the Charter, or, in other words, acting as they would if there were no Security Council at all. After all, so long as the Security Council is impotent to deal with a Great Power (as it will be so long as that Great Power can frustrate a decision), so long will it be both unnecessary and improper for the Council to call upon member states to furnish large military forces. The military strength of the United Nations must be related to what the United Nations can lawfully do — which is, as the matter now stands, very little in the field of action, though still perhaps a good deal in the field of debate.

All these considerations have, I think, led many people back to the truth that not only does the United Nations not render the

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British Empire obsolete, but that in reality all special and regional organizations of a pacific but realistic kind are of immense importance as giving solidity and strength to the international structure.

If the question were put: "Would the chances of preserving peace through the San Francisco Charter be increased if the British Empire were tomorrow completely liquidated?" there can be little doubt that the overwhelming majority of British citizens and a handsome majority of American citizens would answer "No." It is because of the growth of this realization that recent discussions about Western European Union and a North Atlantic Pact are seen to refer, not to something which represents the abandonment of the international ideal but, on the contrary, to something calculated to give it life.

There have, however, been two aspects of the Western European Union proposals which have excited confused comment and considerable misunderstanding. The first is the question of the relation between Western European Union and the British Commonwealth, Great Britain being in a sense a European country, and also the principal nation of the British Commonwealth. The second concerns the nature of Western European Union and, in particular, whether it should be a legally established *de jure* political federation of the same genus as that of the United States of America, or whether it should be based upon the idea of practical *de facto* coöperation through executive representatives upon such matters as development, trade, finance and defense.

These two problems are, in fact, closely related. If attempts are really going to be made to force or encourage a European federation of the strict legal kind, with Great Britain as a constituent state and therefore with some of the more important elements of British sovereignty merged in a new European sovereignty, the conflict between such an idea and the continuance of a British Commonwealth under a common Crown is at once quite obvious. But if what is being aimed at is that the European countries should learn to live together by a series of practical working arrangements made from time to time upon specific matters, then participation of Great Britain in such arrangements will be in no sense inconsistent with her membership and leadership of the British Commonwealth.

It is a mistake to suppose that the British countries have complete rigidity of mind about their mutual preferences or their

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internal coöperation. It can be assumed that Great Britain would enter into no European arrangements without the fullest consultation with and approval by her Dominions. This being so, her participation in a European pact would be all the more effective because it would bring with it such powerful outside backing and consent.

In the same way, participation by the United States in a North Atlantic Pact would not involve that loss of sovereignty which the federal system inevitably connotes. It would, on the contrary, strengthen the independence of each participating nation by providing real means for its protection.

In a recent visit to the United States I felt that in some quarters — though not, so far as I could judge, in Washington itself — the idea of a legal, political Federation of Europe had been greatly oversold. Nobody can reasonably expect that in a few days or a few years nations with different languages and histories and traditions and institutions, and with a long record of wars and disputes behind them, will agree not only to be friends but also to enter into new constitutional arrangements under which some of the greatest powers of government will pass from the control of their own people into the hands of a federal parliament in which they must be, in the nature of things, a permanent minority.

I believe that, viewed in practical coöperative terms, what we call Western European Union will be a good thing for Europe, and therefore a good thing for the British Empire and the United States. But over-zealous advocates of legalistic paper schemes do not forward the processes of unity. On the contrary, they tend to retard them by making inevitable unnecessary disappointments. They are putting on the roof before laying the foundations.

V. CONCLUSION

My conclusions may be quite shortly stated. If the British Commonwealth is to possess an organic character and structural strength, it must remain as a free union of nations whose people owe a common allegiance to a common Crown. Around that nucleus there is ample room for general or special arrangements with other nations (including the new republics) of a friendly and we hope enduring and mutually helpful kind. This means, if you like, a Crown Commonwealth within a broader and looser partnership or alliance. Side by side with both of these things

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there is ample scope for regional or other collective agreements such as Western European Union or the Atlantic Pact.

All these things fit into the pattern of practical and intelligent international organization for peace, because each of them will itself create an area of peace. In my opinion they represent a much more sensible and effective means of securing peace than more elaborate and universal schemes which, while they possess an admirable and valuable idealism, make the error of starting from the wrong end. The real foundations of peace are not to be laid by destroying the nature or fabric of old associations which have been valiant for peace for many years, or by preventing the formation of new associations which are based upon geographical neighborhood or a deep community of interest. The best assurance of world sanity is that there should be more and more friendly peoples who have learned or are learning to work together, and to whom aggression and offensive war are alike abominable.

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ROOTS OF REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

By Donald Marquand Dozer

DURING World War II revolutions in Latin America resulted in the overthrow of governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama. Compared with earlier periods the number of revolutions was relatively small. Since the close of the war, however, the revolutionary tendency has reappeared with such vigor as to suggest that it may no longer be following the usual Latin American pattern. Recent events have excited apprehension in some quarters as to possible revolutionary developments in the entire area. Let us try to determine, then, what the Latin American pattern of revolution is; whether recent outbreaks do in fact conform to or deviate from it; and what the prospects are of continued revolutionary activity in the future.

Factors making for a violent change in the status quo exist in many parts of Latin America. Almost everywhere opulent minorities flaunt their riches before a "melancholy sea of illiterates." The wealthy few, who maintain estates of thousands of hectares, derive lucrative fees and commissions from foreign business firms and drive about in expensive American limousines, have little in common with the miserably underprivileged masses of the people, whose rôle throughout life is to serve as beasts of burden, shine the shoes of the upper class in the town plaza, or sell lottery tickets. It is difficult to name other areas of the world in which so few have so much and so many have so little. With the possible exception of Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, the Latin American countries contain only an infinitesimally small middle class. The social ladder has only two rungs — the lowest and the highest. The low is very low, and the high is very high. The gap is so wide that those on the lowest rung can almost never reach the one above. However passionately Lazarus may desire to become Dives his chances of doing so by orderly processes are, except in rare cases, nil.

This basic class cleavage can be illustrated by a few figures. Approximately 90 percent of the national wealth of Colombia is controlled by 3 percent of the population. In Argentina, 15 families own one-tenth of the entire land area of Buenos Aires prov-

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ince, the wealthiest area in the country; and the same families have land holdings throughout the nation amounting to 7,000,000 acres. In Chile .3 percent of the total number of landed proprietors own more than 52 percent of all the farm land of the nation. In Venezuela, fewer than 3 percent of the landed proprietors own more than 70 percent of the land. In Mexico a similar concentration of land ownership, under which in 1910 only 1 percent of the Mexican people owned 70 percent of the country's arable land, was a powerful factor in causing the epochal revolution which broke out in that year.

The overwhelming majority of agricultural laborers in the 20 countries of Latin America, all of them agricultural, live under oppressive conditions of peonage, sharecropping, and in some cases even unconditional slavery. As the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, said recently: "There are millions of inhabitants without a home or an organized family life, without schools, without land, without even personal belongings. Their only risk in joining a revolutionary movement is the loss of the following day's wages." The people live constantly on the verge of starvation and in the shadow of death from disease. It was calculated in 1942 that whereas wage earners in the United States had to spend less than 38 percent of their income for food those in Brazil had to spend 48 percent, in Mexico 56 percent, in Argentina 60 percent, in Colombia almost 66 percent, and in Chile as high as 80 percent. Today these percentages are higher. As a result it is estimated that two-thirds of Latin America's approximately 145,000,000 people are physically undernourished and one-half of them suffer from either deficiency or infectious disease. Life expectancy ranges from a high of 47 years in a few areas to a low of less than 32 in Peru, compared with almost 63 years in the United States.

Since the end of World War II the basic social and economic maladjustments in Latin America have been seriously aggravated by cost-of-living developments. Of 13 Latin American countries for which even fairly reliable statistics are available, only one — Uruguay — showed in June 1948 a cost-of-living index figure — 175 — which was comparable to that of the United States — 169 — both calculated upon a 1937 base. In the other 12, living costs ranged upward to almost four and one-half times the prewar level, reaching 334 in Peru, 364 in Mexico and 437 in Chile. To meet these rising costs the normally marginal and submargi-

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nal groups who in most cases derived no benefits from wartime prosperity have received either no wage increases or increases which have not been commensurate with rising prices. At the time of the revolution against President Elie Lescot of Haiti, in January 1946, groups of workingmen were striking for an increase in their basic wage of six cents an hour. Many similar groups throughout Latin America, remembering the wartime promises of a more abundant life, and struggling with their present difficult living conditions, are resolving to live no longer in the shadows on the husks.

The complete *rationale* of revolution in Latin America is not simple. Unsatisfying, for example, is the explanation of F. García-Calderón that "both the Indian and the Spanish races which settled America were warriors, and their spirit explains the disorders in these republics." Equally unsatisfying is the jaundiced view expressed 30 years ago by the Argentine scholar, Carlos Octavio Bunge, that revolutions in Latin America "result from the habitual inactivity of the people, who do nothing but accumulate bile." Bunge compared their periodic uprisings to epileptic fits. To him it seemed that throughout the nineteenth century Argentina had to experience an internal upheaval every ten years. In Bolivia between 1825 and the end of the century more than 60 revolts occurred and six presidents were assassinated. Venezuela had 52 important revolutions in a century. Revolutionary movements may thus be said to have become part and parcel of the Latin American way of life, and must be explained in terms of the entire Latin American *ambiente*.

What are the reasons for this frequent resort to revolution in Latin America? Certain secondary factors such as historical tradition, official defalcation and malfeasance, personal ambition, and inflexible constitutional and political practices contribute to it. In general, revolutions may be said to result primarily from social pressures which have been building up for generations and which finally find an outlet in violent change. A popular leader in Colombia, the late Senator Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, has been quoted as saying, "When pain becomes despair it breaks all the dikes." The Latin Americans have often found that they could attain the basic "goods" in life only by direct and forcible resistance to the status quo. That the methods which they employ are illegal tends to impeach the law rather than their methods.

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II

Maldistribution of wealth and income has been a characteristic of Latin American economy and society ever since the days of Spanish and Portuguese rule. Revolt has therefore been latent there at all times. The vast majority of Latin Americans, resentful of lifelong exploitation and frustration and despairing of any improvement in their levels of living by orderly methods, are chronically ripe for revolution. From this situation of underlying and widespread dissatisfaction with the social and economic status quo a dashing leader has often emerged to start a revolutionary movement. A century ago a vigorous and picturesque Argentine *caudillo*, Facundo Quiroga, his eyes flashing, was reported to have said to a companion: "Look you, if I should go into the street, and say to the first man I met, 'Follow me,' he would follow me!" This magnetic influence over men's minds and actions has impelled many a *caudillo*, whether lured on by unabashed greed for power or by zeal for the common good, to attempt a coup d'état which would overthrow his country's administration and install him in the presidency. Once established in office, he may try, either for personal or group ends, to enlist popular support by redressing social grievances and effecting constitutional reforms. As long as he can gratify the public demand for reform in this way he can gain and retain a popular following. Very often, however, because his leadership is intensely personal, his commendable social impulses are frustrated and his reform program defeated by the greed of the palace clique who surround him and who feel no comparable obligation to the masses of the people. So it is that attempts to redress social grievances usually result only in exploitation of the people by a new group of officeholders, and attempts at constitutional reform usually take the form of amendments confirming the *caudillo* in power. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* Such a revolution produces a change only in the chief of the government and the bureaucracy surrounding him; the perplexing problems of the basic political and social system continue. Such were the revolutions that made Getulio Vargas president of Brazil in 1930 and that brought the army, led by its own *caudillos*, to power in Argentina in 1943.

The experience of *caudillo* governments, whether or not they are of revolutionary origin, demonstrates that the problem of social stresses and strains in Latin America cannot be solved

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effectively by personalist and paternalistic methods. For if revolution is latent in Latin America, so also is democracy. Revolution is very often the price which a Latin American country is forced to pay in order to realize the democracy which would otherwise remain dormant or suppressed. It has been the common purpose of such revolutions to accomplish, in the words of a perspicacious Colombian publicist, Gregorio Sánchez Gómez, "the overthrow of systems which were considered outworn or anachronistic or contrary to the common interests and wishes in order to put in their place institutions better suited to the fulfilment of a people's destiny." New groups have arisen clamoring for a revision of basic economic, social and political processes and agitating for radical constitutional reform. In many of the revolutionary movements above the level of the palace coup d'état the primary motivation has often been an urge for a more democratic type of government, to be achieved mainly through the rewriting of constitutions.

The constitutions of the Latin American countries, usually drafted either by dictators or by conventions representing the privileged classes, and modeled along nominally republican and oligarchical lines, have been numerous and ephemeral. They have been changed so often largely because they were unsuited to the needs of their peoples. They did not satisfy the often inarticulate requirements of politically unsophisticated communities. Simón Bolívar's first constitution for Bolivia, for example, set up a grotesquely complicated machinery of government including a president with life tenure and a tricameral congress made up of censors, senators and a house of tribunes. Furthermore, the absence of a firm heritage of judicial review of legislative acts — a heritage which can be regarded as peculiarly Anglo-Saxon and North American — has rendered it difficult for national courts in the Latin American countries to interpret constitutions in such a way as to keep them in harmony with changed conditions. Small wonder that these organic documents are usually soon set aside by popular action or by the fiat of a dictator and come to serve only as curious historical exhibits!

Revolutionary reforms of constitutions have been frequent occurrences in all the Latin American countries. They have called attention to the difficulty if not the impossibility of revising basic constitutional forms by legal procedures and have represented in many cases a violent protest against the continued

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imposition or maintenance of a rigid political strait jacket on a society which was beginning to generate new dynamic elements. The constitutions of both El Salvador and Guatemala recognize "the right of insurrection" under certain circumstances. This type of revolutionary outburst was exemplified in the successful revolt against the Argentine dictator Juan Manuel Rosas by Justo José de Urquiza in 1852. This resulted in the Argentine constitution of 1853. Other examples were the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy of Pedro II in 1889, which culminated in the Brazilian constitution of 1891, and the successful movement against President José Manuel Balmaceda of Chile in 1891. Today, 15 of the 20 Latin American countries are governed by constitutions adopted since 1933, and nine of these by constitutions adopted since 1945. This rapid supersession of constitutions obviously has not tended to create a veneration for existing constitutional forms, although it has not derogated from the generally recognized importance of constitutional arrangements.

More specifically, many revolutions have sought to broaden the basis of government when the existing governmental machinery was cumbersome, inflexible and unresponsive to the political desires of the people. The presidential system, taken over from the United States constitution and providing for a fixed tenure of office for the chief magistrate, forces the opposition to wait for scheduled elections. But in these countries the mercurial temper of opposition parties, of those who mold public opinion in newspaper, press and radio, of exploited and underprivileged groups often changes too rapidly to make delay practicable. An administration which at the time of its election may admirably accord with the general will may in the course of a few months, or sometime before the expiration of its constitutional term of office, commit such egregious errors or fail so completely to fulfil popular expectations that the people rise in fury against it. If a president who symbolizes the shortcomings of such an administration insists upon serving out his legal term of office he can generally be ousted only by revolutionary means. It may be suggested that the long experience of the presidential system during the last century and a quarter has conditioned Latin Americans to the necessity of revolution, which provides them with a substitute for a needed but unscheduled election. Often it represents an effort by the nation's loyal opposition to make its influence felt upon the governing group. If their effort fails they are almost

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never denounced as traitors by the triumphant administration but, under the *noblesse oblige* of the system, are allowed to retire quietly into exile.

III

Several recent revolutions have demonstrated not only the seriousness of the social maladjustments which exist in Latin America but also the unsuitability of existing political systems to meet the problems which those maladjustments create. The revolutionary movement which resulted in the election of Juan Domingo Perón as President of Argentina in February 1946 was originally launched for the expressed purpose (among others) of overthrowing oligarchic control and effecting social and economic reforms. As suggested above, it followed the normal twentieth-century pattern of *caudillo* revolution, of which perhaps the best recent example was that of Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Just as Vargas, after seizing power by force in 1930, proceeded to introduce reforms by fiat and thus to build up powerful labor support for his régime, so Perón has sought to carry out a program of social and economic justice and has thus consolidated his position of leadership with the laboring and other underprivileged classes in Argentina. In executing this program he has been criticized for employing paternalistic and dictatorial methods which have denied political democracy and deprived even his followers of the means of complaint. Many Argentines fear that in the long run this policy will not create conditions of permanent political stability but rather will build up a revolutionary potential.

The revolution which overthrew President Isaías Medina Angarita of Venezuela in October 1945 came as the culmination of a movement for wider popular participation in government which had been growing ever since Juan Vicente Gómez's death in 1935. If the electoral base in Venezuela had been broader and a parliamentary system had been a part of the country's political pattern Medina's government probably would have been retired from office peacefully some time before it was finally ousted by violence. Presidential elections were scheduled for April 1946. As they approached, the construction work on Medina's new palatial home in a Caracas suburb gave rise to rumors of personal graft. At the same time the hope for political reform and the amelioration of obviously worsening social and economic conditions evap-

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orated. The president's popularity therefore declined to a low point. The constitution enabled only some 250,000 in a total population of more than 4,000,000 to vote even for municipal officials, and it contained no provision for direct popular voting for president. Medina had done little to broaden the voting base and nothing to prevent members of the National Congress, which would elect the new president, from serving in his bureaucracy. Indeed, early in October 1945 he singled out an unusually large number of senators and deputies for appointment to lucrative posts in his administration. According to the leftist opposition, the result was a "patriarchal autocracy" of a personalist character constituting a "palpably fictitious democracy."

Inasmuch as the Venezuelan constitution prohibited the immediate reëlection of a president, Medina selected as his successor his relatively little-known Minister of Agriculture, Angel Biaggini. This was interpreted as evidence of Medina's policy of *continuismo*, which violated the spirit of the constitution and was unpalatable to the opposition. The rightists immediately responded by nominating ex-President Eleázar López Contreras, who in the popular mind was identified closely with the remnants of the hated old dictatorial régime of Juan Vicente Gómez. Certain leftist opposition leaders, confronted by what they regarded as only a choice of evils and possessing no means of influencing the outcome of the election in the National Congress, readied themselves for revolutionary change.

The revolution was spearheaded by a tightly organized group of disaffected young army, navy and air force officers, but its political base rested in the small, efficient, Socialistic, non-Communist opposition party, Acción Democrática. These two groups concerted their plans for the overthrow of the administration. After the revolution started, the young officers' group invaded the presidential palace, seized Medina and López Contreras, formed a revolutionary governing junta with a civilian, Rómulo Betancourt, as chairman, and eventually forced the two ex-presidents into exile. During the revolution, riots broke out in Caracas, many shops were looted, and the homes of Medina's cabinet members and of other leaders of his party were singled out for ransacking by the mob. Similar uprisings occurred in other Venezuelan cities, where, although Acción Democrática was notoriously weak, dissatisfaction with the Medina administration

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was sufficiently strong to incite them. By October 22 order was restored and the new régime was receiving testimonials of support. It then proceeded immediately to make arrangements for a new constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage and to inaugurate certain popularly supported economic and social reforms. These reforms were incorporated in the new progressive constitution which was adopted in 1947. By these means the new forces which have been dominant in Venezuelan political life since 1945 expect to enable Venezuela to become politically stabilized.

Other postwar revolutions in Latin America have resulted either in the adoption of new constitutions embodying similar democratic reforms or in the return to constitutional practices of a democratic nature which had been violated or ignored by the overthrown government. In Brazil, the 15-year-old dictatorship of President Vargas tried to recoup its declining prestige early in 1945 by announcing plans to democratize the country. Among his avowed aims were a free press, freedom of political organization, amnesty for political prisoners and the promulgation of election laws. But then in October 1945 Vargas appointed as chief of police his brother, who was the leader of the forces urging the continuation of the dictatorship. The Brazilian army and people thereupon rose against him and brought the régime to an end. A provisional government headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court took control and held free elections on December 2, which resulted in the inauguration of a constitutional administration with General Eurico Gaspar Dutra as president. Soon afterward a new constitution was adopted.

Another example occurred in Haiti in January 1946 when student demonstrations broke out against the government of President Lescot. The demonstrators demanded abolition of the state of siege, liberation of political prisoners, granting of freedom of speech and press, and holding of normal elections. Lescot was taken prisoner and the homes of members of his administration were looted. A military cabinet of three officers then assumed charge of the government and proceeded to hold free elections. These brought to power a civilian, Dumersais Estimé, as constitutional president in August 1946 and resulted in the promulgation of a new constitution.

A revolution in Bolivia in July 1946 caused the overthrow and murder of President Gualberto Villarroel. It was provoked by a

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succession of unpopular acts by the administration, including fraudulent elections on the previous May 5, the subsequent declaration of a state of siege throughout Bolivia, the assumption of absolute control over the Bolivian press, and a bloody assault upon students demonstrating against the government. The provisional régime which supplanted Villarroel announced that it would govern the country in accordance with existing constitutional laws pending a free election, which was subsequently held.

Constitutions alone cannot solve the social problems which beset the Latin American governments. It nevertheless is noteworthy that the new constitutions contain whole chapters dealing with public health, education, the rights of labor and social security. Even if they are regarded only as piously hypocritical pronouncements which are not intended to be carried into effect, they at least show that deference must be paid to the new social forces in the politics of these countries.

It also is noteworthy that a few Latin American governments are tending to follow the example of Cuba, which since 1940 has had a cabinet responsible to Congress. The presidents of these countries are constrained by political exigencies, even if not by constitutional mandate, to govern through cabinets whose members are in effect responsible to a congressional majority. This *de facto* parliamentary system does not guarantee that administrations will be free from oligarchic control, or that political corruption will be eliminated; but it broadens the base of government representation, exerts a democratizing influence and is undoubtedly a deterrent to revolutions of the political type.

IV

Some of the above revolutions, though primarily political in character, showed overtones of the second general revolutionary type, the social. In this latter type, according to the Colombian publicist quoted above, "the very structure of human society . . . finds itself menaced by the presence of new and dark elements of dissolution and at times even of death. . . . Age-long injustices or tremendous tensions in human living conditions motivate and justify them." Such inversions of the social order have occurred in Latin America, but they have been rare. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, describing one phase of Argentina's revolutionary war against Spain, wrote that "in less than 24 hours a fiddler had become a general, a lame cobbler was making

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laws, and a clown deciding the fate of a country." A better example is furnished by the successful War of the Reform in Mexico, fought to vindicate the socially revolutionary constitution of 1857 and led by Benito Júarez, a full-blooded Indian. Another is the Mexican revolution which began in 1910 and which was associated with the names of Francisco Madero, Emiliano Zapata, Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregón and Lazáro Cárdenas. Of the revolutions which occurred in the depression year 1930 in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, however, Professor Clarence H. Haring observed: "In no case were elements of a social revolution involved, although . . . the word 'Communist' was frequently bandied about by the vested interests to disparage the violence of their adversaries." [1]

No event since World War II has so dramatically highlighted the factors making for revolution in this hemisphere or so vividly revealed the revolutionary potential that exists among our neighbors to the south as the abortive revolution in Colombia on April 9 last. Analysis of this incident will bring to a focus the generalizations made above, for, like a microcosm, it disclosed all the elements of Latin American revolution.

The movement within the Colombian Liberal Party headed by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán represented a protest against the record and program of both the right wing of the Liberal Party and the entire Conservative Party. To the *Gaitanistas* neither the old-line Liberals nor the Conservatives seemed to offer any hope of redressing grievances or improving living standards. The reforms accomplished by the Liberal Party while it controlled the presidency from 1930 to 1946 were considered the mildest of palliatives for the social sickness afflicting the mass of Colombians. The protest became articulate and importunate in Gaitán's unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in 1946. But though that campaign demonstrated the almost idolatrous fervor and surprisingly large strength of his popular following, it split the Liberal Party and made possible the election of the Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez.

The new president adopted a policy of national union against the determined opposition of the right wing of his own party. Recognizing the weakness of his own political position and the consequent necessity of deferring to the Liberal Congress, he appointed and maintained a cabinet equally divided between mem-

[1] "Revolution in South America," by Clarence H. Haring. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1931.

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bers of the Liberal and of his own Conservative Party. In the administration of the national government he thus in effect tempered the presidential system of Colombia with the parliamentary system by attempting to rule with a political coalition. The result, however, was neither the one system nor the other. The responsibility for government was not definitely fixed upon either the Conservative or the Liberal Party. The cabinet did not truly reflect the congressional majority, since Ospina Pérez assigned the key positions in it to members of his own party and gave only the less important posts to the Liberals. On January 28, 1948, Senator Gaitán, Chief of the Liberal Party, was joined by members of the Advisory Board of the Party in presenting a memorandum to Ospina Pérez charging that the president's policy of national union, with which they were in accord, was being violated by some of the president's closest collaborators. These, said the Liberals, were taking advantage of their positions to impose a reactionary pro-clerical educational system, to persecute organized labor, to perpetrate electoral frauds, and to instigate violence against Liberal Party members.

Meanwhile the worsening economic plight of the masses of the Colombian people, aggravated by war and postwar dislocations, was exacerbating already serious social tensions and increasing popular dissatisfaction with the national administration. During 1947 the cost-of-living index in the capital, Bogotá, rose more than 30 points to a new high of 254.2 (calculated on a base of February 1937). These rises continued in 1948. During the single month of March 1948 the cost-of-living index for an average Colombian workingman's family rose by 17.3 points to a new high of 283.8 (calculated on the same base). In the capital, where preparations for the forthcoming Ninth International Conference of American States had an inflationary effect, the cost of living rose 20.6 points for the same period, reflected principally in sharp increases in the prices of bread, butter, milk, potatoes, fresh vegetables and meat. Prices for shirts rose 25 percent. It became obvious that the Colombian Office of Price Control was powerless to curb speculation and prevent price inflation. Moreover, efforts of organized workers to secure wage increases commensurate with these increases in the cost of living appeared in several cases to be thwarted by government action.

As long as the government of national union continued, the Liberal Party had to share the blame for these acts of omission

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and commission by the administration. On February 29, therefore, the party decided to withdraw its members from all positions in the national administration and thus to terminate the hybrid arrangement on the grounds that it no longer was satisfactory to the party or consonant with the Colombian constitutional system. "Our position is based on two postulates," explained Liberal leader Darío Echandía in a letter to the editor of *El Tiempo*, "that this is a democratic country and that it is a country with a presidential régime. As a democratic country, its government must adapt itself to the laws, that is, to the administrative norms or directives dictated by Congress; as a country with a presidential régime, the political composition of its government is independent of its Congress." He thus stated succinctly the fundamental dilemma between the concept of "a democratic country" on the one hand and the constitutional requirement "of a presidential régime" on the other.

Thenceforth Ospina Pérez, a minority president, exercised power only because the opposition respected his constitutional position under the presidential system. He was to find this a weak reed on which to lean. He was at once confronted with the alternatives of appointing either a cabinet dominated by Liberals — a decision which all factions of the Liberal Party would undoubtedly have applauded — or an all-Conservative cabinet, which would obviously represent a stark return to the presidential system and which would consolidate control of the minority Conservative Party over the executive branch of the government. He chose the latter course, and in constituting his all-Conservative cabinet brought into it as Minister of Foreign Affairs the titular chief of the party, Laureano Gómez, who through a long political career had fought the Liberal Party, in season and out, as the party of radicalism, Communism and anti-Christ. To the Liberals of every faction, therefore, Gómez was a hateful figure symbolizing aristocracy, reaction and clericalism.

The assassination of Gaitán by an obscure taxi-driver ignited this combustible situation. The grief of rank-and-file Colombians over the death of their political champion soon gave way to rage, and rage to violent action against the Government. The building housing *El Siglo*, Laureano Gómez's newspaper, was burned to the ground; with one or two exceptions every building used by the Government was either gutted or burned; and even churches, closely interlocked in the public mind with the Conservative

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oligarchy, were sacked and in some cases burned. In other parts of Colombia, mobs which formed soon after the news of Gaitán's assassination was received descended upon Conservative newspapers and the homes and offices of Conservative officials. A general strike of all workers throughout Colombia was proclaimed by the Confederation of Colombian Workers, representing approximately 109,000 of the 165,000 organized workingmen in Colombia.

In the face of this appalling demonstration of mass opposition, as clearly revolutionary in spirit as in deed, Ospina Pérez declared a state of siege and later martial law, imposed strict censorship, and issued a statement charging that "professional agitators with express orders from Moscow" were responsible for the revolt. Finally on April 10 he announced the formation of a new cabinet which included six Liberal ministers. His solution to the problem of revolution in Colombia, therefore, was to return to the quasi-parliamentary system represented by his policy of national union. It remains to be seen whether the old formula of equal representation of Liberals and Conservatives in the cabinet will provide the democratic government and social justice which the Colombian masses obviously desire and which seem needed if the national tensions are to be relaxed.

V

Latin America is demanding democratic government and social justice. New leaders both of the Right and of the Left are making strong appeals to aggrieved individuals and frustrated social classes. In Argentina, President Perón, one of the first beneficiaries of the ferment of the *descamisados*, offers them material benefits which though satisfying to some seem to others to be purchased at the high cost of democracy. In Venezuela, Acción Democrática, and in Peru, Apra, or the People's Party, offer programs of social reform within the framework of capitalism. Further to the Left, in Colombia, Gaitán's program contains many elements of state Socialism, such as communal ownership of property by indigenous groups, obligatory use of land near towns for the production of prime necessities, the establishment of state coöperatives, national and municipal ownership of public services, worker participation in company profits in certain fields, and close government control over the professions to insure equitable geographical distribution. To Gaitán's followers, liberty has

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come to mean the right of each man to the opportunity to work, equality has become economic and social democracy, and fraternity means the coöperation of men in production. The Communists, too, with a still more radical program, are making strong bids for leadership in many parts of Latin America and, while generally disdaining the "social scum" or *Lumpenproletariat* of Marx, are consolidating their position in leftist labor organizations. But, as the Liberal Party leadership in Colombia declared in a recent statement rejecting the overtures of the Conservative Party for the formation of an anti-Communist front, "No responsible individual can accept the infantile opinion that the Communist hand is at work in every demand for social justice."

Political leaders in Latin America often resort to revolution as a desperate means — sometimes, indeed, the only means — to achieve democratic government and social justice. The demand for these "goods" may be expected to grow in scope and intensity as the governmental machinery through which they should be achieved falters, as political leaders show ineptitude or apathy in promoting them, and as controlling minorities refuse to relax their stranglehold on the prevailing political and economic system. Just as protests against an oligarchic political system often result in a revolutionary overturn of government, so protests against an oligarchic social and economic system by the increasingly self-conscious and restive masses in Latin America may, under the influence of appropriate leaders, take the form of a struggle between classes and social overturn.

It is the tragedy of Latin America that, in the existing sociopolitical milieu, the process of transferring power from one *caudillo* to another, from one ruling clique to another, or from the few to the many (this last-named operation being essentially a democratic one) has so frequently been accomplished by revolutionary means because, in the judgment of the political opposition, it could not be accomplished otherwise. It is an equal tragedy that once revolutions fall into the hands of totalitarians they may develop in a direction inimical to the interests of the masses and in this way may defeat the basic objectives for which they were organized. To the extent that this occurs, in Latin America or elsewhere, such revolutions may be considered to run counter to the interests of the democratic peoples of the world.

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EUROPEAN RECOVERY: A LOOK AHEAD

By Sir Arthur Salter

PRESENT policy, both in America and the rest of the world, clearly needs to be directed not only to immediate but also to long-term objectives; and it is reasonable that much that is done, or decided, during the present E.R.P. period should depend upon what it is believed will be the situation at the end of that period. A true picture of the future balance of international payments, and a realization of the consequences that must follow from it, would, I suggest, be a valuable guide to present action.

Any forecast made now must of course be based upon one of three alternative assumptions. The first — unhappily the least probable — is that the tension between west and east will be quickly resolved, that we shall soon enter a period of such reasonably assured peace as was hoped when the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945, with the restoration of confidence and reduction of military expenditure that would then follow. The second is that we shall soon be plunged into actual and open war, with consequences that are now incalculable. The third — not perhaps the least probable, and the only one on which any forecast is now both practicable and useful — is that we shall long continue in a state of dangerous conflict, but without actual hostilities.

The crux of present difficulties, or the most convenient reflection of them, is the "dollar deficit" — that is, the inability of countries whose economies were seriously impaired by the war to export enough to pay for what they need for their recovery from the rest of the world, especially from America. It is to meet this need that E.R.P. has been started. Its purpose is to enable the deficit countries, by aid over a transition period of a few years, to increase their production and exports so that, at the end of the period, they will be able to pay their way. Reasonably good progress is being made and, if the plan is not fatally injured by Communist obstruction, especially in France, there is every prospect that, within four years, European countries will at least be very much nearer equilibrium than they are at present. On the basis of present economic trends and policies, however, it does not seem probable that they will fully attain it. In other words, it

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is improbable that when the special aid ceases they will be able to pay currently for sufficient imports to enable them to maintain, still less improve, their standards of living. So far, E.R.P. appropriations have of course been made for the first year only, and future appropriations will doubtless depend upon the progress already made. The most reasonable assumption upon which to calculate is perhaps that the appropriations will continue for another three years on a diminishing scale and will then end.

One form of additional American appropriations has indeed been suggested by American spokesmen, the renewal of a form of lend-lease to cover the increased imports needed for greater military defense preparations. That, however, at the most is an offset against a greater burden, not an additional relief to the present one. And in present circumstances the most authoritative of recent American estimates contemplates a continuing deficit of something over $2.5 billions in the last year of the four-year period. If that should indeed be the position in 1952, and if the "gap" is not reduced by other measures (such as the revival of American foreign investment in new forms), the result must clearly be a sudden and drastic reduction of American exports, and a serious lowering of European standards of living. This would obviously endanger the political and humanitarian purposes of the E.R.P. policy. It is not improbable, too, that at that time such a reduction of exports would be directly injurious to the American economy, in starting or aggravating a depression. Sooner or later, under a free system, a recession is probably inevitable. Its magnitude cannot be calculated, nor its date foreseen — especially as increased armaments expenditure may first postpone and then aggravate it. But sooner or later it must come, and a sudden and drastic fall in exports might easily convert what would otherwise have been a salutary and short-lived adjustment into a serious depression.

Quite apart from this risk, however, a high level of international trade (if the constituent factors in the balance of payments which make it possible are sound) is advantageous even to countries whose resources would enable them to be nearly self-sufficient, though it is less essential to them than to others.

II

However, the disequilibrium between America and the rest of the world is much more than a problem of the next few years.

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It has, of course, been immensely aggravated by the recent war, but it did not originate then. America has for many years been increasing her production and efficiency at a rate with which older manufacturing countries could not keep pace; and in both wars her capacity, unlike theirs, was increased, not impaired. After the first war, as after the second, she had a surplus which the rest of the world needed. The export of this surplus was made possible for a time by the foreign loans of the 1924 to 1928 period, and the meaning of the 1931 financial crisis is that the borrowing world was unable in the respite so afforded to increase its exports so as to pay its way. There is no danger of a similar financial crash now since the export of American capital (in lend-lease, UNRRA and E.R.P. instead of war debts, privately subscribed loans and short-term credits) has happily been in a different form. But the difficulties of trade adjustments are not less.

In the nineteenth century, when Great Britain had a great surplus of manufacturing capacity available for export, the adjustment was immensely easier because her customers' economies were essentially complementary to her own. Typically, she exported locomotives to the Argentine which did not make them, and in return imported maize which she did not grow. Moreover, in the world of that time there were better opportunities than now for reasonably safe and productive foreign investment. But apart from a few raw materials, America grows or makes everything she needs, as efficiently and (in terms of man-hours if not of money) as cheaply as her customers, and in many cases more efficiently and more cheaply.

It is true that this need not prevent mutually advantageous trade. The economic inferiority of other countries is reflected in lower wage rates, and with the advantage of lower wage costs they can, if they are allowed to, compete successfully in the American market in those classes of goods in which the disparity in their manufacturing efficiency is least. On economic principles such trade is of course of advantage to all the countries concerned. But from the point of view of the particular American manufacturers, the importation of articles at a price only made possible by lower wages is "unfair competition," and, however sound the economists' arguments, the political difficulties of securing unimpeded entry for such articles on a sufficient scale are obviously likely to be very great.

For these and other reasons it seems certain that for many years

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there will be disequilibrium in the balance of payments in the sense that America will be able to produce more which she would wish to sell abroad than other countries (though they would wish to buy) will be able to pay for by current exports.

III

At this stage it may be well to discuss rather more broadly the balance of payments in relation to policy.

There is some confusion usually in the popular discussion of this question. In the exact sense there can, of course, be no such thing as an absence of balance in international payments. Not only for the world as a whole, but for every country, and not only in the long run but at every moment, the plus and minus items of every balance of payments account must be equal. Receipts from exports, invisible and visible (including gold), together with the net import if any of capital (whether through loans, capital investment, gifts or credits) must always cancel out to zero against the total of imports and any net export of capital. This is an inescapable arithmetic fact which no country can any more change than it can make two plus two equal three or five. It follows that when a change takes place in one item it is necessarily accompanied by a change in one or more of the other items to an exactly equivalent extent. The change may of course be in an export or import of gold which does not immediately affect the pattern of ordinary trade; or in an increase in sales on credit terms which postpones a decrease in their volume. But in one way or another an exactly equivalent adjustment is inevitable. In the end (as other adjustments fail) the only final adjustment possible is, of course, a decrease of the exports of the countries whose current transactions show a surplus and a corresponding decrease in the imports of the others.

It follows equally, of course, that if a government takes any action which affects one item in its balance of payments it necessarily causes equivalent changes in other items. If, for example, it reduces its imports of a given commodity by a new tariff by say $100,000,000, or by subsidies increases its exports by a similar amount, there must be consequent changes in the gold movements or its ordinary exports or imports, or its export of capital, which in total equal exactly $100,000,000.

In a world of free trade and a functioning gold standard in which all governments abstained from interference with the

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course of trade, these adjustments would be made automatically, as they were for a period in the last century. But that world, for good or ill, has gone. For many years all governments have, in varying degrees, taken action which is designed to affect, and does affect, certain items in their balance of payments. Only, however, where current trade deficits are threatening their reserves and their means of importing essentials, do they usually have anything like a balance of payments policy which is conceived as a whole. Such a policy must be based on a calculation of the result of governmental action on some items and a consideration of what is the most desirable form of consequent adjustment in the others.

Throughout the attempts at Geneva during the later twenties to reduce the barriers to international trade I always felt that this was the greatest underlying difficulty. So far from there being an international policy, there were not even, in any true sense, national policies. Each country's tariff was the result of pressure for protection from particular home industries. It rarely had as its counterpart a policy of encouraging such adjustments in other items as would make a total desirable pattern of trade and payments. In particular, while countries with current trade deficits aimed at removing them, for example by reducing imports, those with trade surpluses aimed at maintaining them. And they usually took no precautions to ensure that the consequent adjustments were of a desirable character, even from their own point of view, to prevent them, for example, from taking the form of unsound loans, which, in view of general world trade, were bound to lead to a financial crisis.

I thought, then, that it would be a great advantage if "surplus" as well as "deficit" countries would take their general balance of payments position as a guide to all policy affecting it. This does not mean that governments would replace a free by a directed economy. But it does mean that, with the help of nongovernmental institutions, they should attempt to forecast their balance of payments as a whole, that before changing tariffs or subsidies affecting some items of the balance they should consider the probable consequences to the other items, and that, so far as the ordinary means of governmental influence allow, they should try to encourage such adjustments as will make, in total, a desirable pattern of payments. What this might involve in detailed policy will be discussed later.

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IV

Even on the most optimistic assumptions of progress in Europe, and of a resumption of productive foreign investment by America, it would seem certain that, for many years to come, the limit to the total value of American exports will be determined absolutely, and to a dollar, by the ability of her customers to pay.

If this is agreed, as surely it must be, the acceptance of the inevitable consequences may have an important influence on many aspects of immediate policy. It is perhaps worth while to look, from this point of view, at a few current problems.

The first concerns loans and investment policy. It is to be hoped that a substantial part — though it can only be a part — of the gap which will be left when E.R.P. ends will be filled by the export of capital in other forms, whether through private channels or through such an inter-governmental agency as the International Bank. All such capital exports will of course enable American exports to be maintained on a higher level than could otherwise be the case. During the E.R.P. period itself there is not much expectation that much dollar capital will flow into Europe aside from the E.R.P. loans and grants themselves. Private investment will hardly be attracted during this precarious transition period, and the International Bank (apart from the half billion dollars lent before E.R.P. began) will naturally look mainly to other investment areas. Its chief task during this period will be to find where and under what conditions safe productive investment can be made, and, in particular, where after its own pioneering work there is a reasonable prospect of a substantial later development through private loans or private enterprise.

The task is difficult and the scope limited. Foreign investment, if it is to be permanently productive and not lead to the same disaster as was witnessed between the wars, needs not only promising economic conditions but such political conditions as will give economic development its chance and reasonable assurance to investor against confiscation. In many areas where the economic condition is satisfied the political condition is obviously not. This will, for example, restrict investments in Asia. But there is one category of countries, covering the greater part of the undeveloped regions of Africa, which perhaps merits especial consideration, namely those under colonial government. In these areas there is a metropolitan government, whether French,

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British or Dutch, which provides more stability than in countries of a similar type which are independent, and with which it is possible to make reliable arrangements. Foreign investment will not easily flow into such areas, unless special steps are taken to clear a channel for it, because the metropolitan government establishes conditions to the entry of foreign capital, sometimes in the interest of the natives, sometimes to give a preference to their own nationals. It is difficult for a succession of private investors to negotiate separately with the metropolitan governments. But if the Bank, as an inter-governmental agency, negotiates loans even on a limited scale, the channel might be cleared for considerably greater private investment later. If so, many advantages might follow. The natives would benefit from the higher standard of living that would result from a more rapid and extensive development than the limited capital available from the metropolitan countries would make possible. The latter countries would benefit from a relief to the strain on their capital resources which their present development policies involve. If the American capital is forthcoming under conditions which enable it to be spent on imports from non-dollar countries, the general dollar deficit would be reduced (without, for the reasons given, reducing at all the total of American exports). And, lastly, in the difficult but inevitable evolution of the status of colonial areas a useful association would develop between the "imperial" countries and the greatest of the "nonimperial" countries.

But with the utmost practicable development of American foreign investment, whether in colonial areas or elsewhere, this certainly will not, in any future that can now be foreseen, do more than reduce the gap; it cannot close it. World conditions are too precarious, and the investor, after earlier experience, will naturally be cautious and reluctant. Foreign investment will keep the level of American exports higher than it would otherwise be; but it will still be true that the limit, and the absolute limit, to them will still be set by a continuing dollar shortage. Nothing, therefore, that can be done to increase production in the non-dollar countries, and trade among them, will diminish the total value of what they buy from America. It will only increase the total resources at their disposal, and make a difference in the choice of the commodities they import. Some essentials now imported which can be produced in the deficit countries as well, or with the least comparative disadvantage, will no longer need to be im-

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ported; and what America continues to send will be what she produces with the greatest comparative advantage. American exports, without being reduced by a dollar, will be then what she can most advantageously supply. That is, the changed pattern of trade will be to the benefit of all parties. These reflections clearly have a bearing on all that is now being done to rebuild and readjust the economy of Western Europe.

The conception of "Western Union," of an integration of the countries of Western Europe, including Great Britain, into a single economic union, within which the specialization of industry and the pattern of trade would develop as it has in the federated republic of the United States, has fired the imagination of both Europe and America. In the modern world the nineteenth century dream of an international trade so unrestricted by governmental action as to make political frontiers economically without significance can obviously not be realized. Failing a world economic unit in this sense, there would obviously, in the final result, be a great increase in the total wealth of the countries concerned if an area as large and potentially as rich as Western Union could be a single economic unit. Here is an area with a population of some 250,000,000, rich in resources of industrial skill and easily able to manufacture enough to raise standards of living greatly, with an ample surplus of manufactured products to pay for any deficit of food and raw materials. The economies of mass production, which can be realized only with the assurance of an adequate market exempt from tariffs and other governmental interferences, could in time give to Europe the same advantages as they have to the United States. And with economic union, and the increased economic strength that would result, there would of course be a corresponding increase of defensive power against any threat of aggression from without.

The advantages of union are indisputable. But the obstacles to rapid and complete union are formidable, and perhaps insuperable. It is natural that the difficulties should be felt more acutely by European countries than by those who have a more distant, and more global, view from across the Atlantic; and, within Europe, that those who, as ministers and officials, are enmeshed in the daily problems of current administration, should be more conscious of these difficulties than those who have no such official responsibility. Those who are all the time in the midst of the trees may fail to see the wood. It is easier for America than for

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Europe, and in Europe for those out of office than those in office, to see the wood as a whole. But, after all, a wood consists of trees, and its pattern can be changed only by dealing with the trees. Changes can come only through the machine of actual government if the impetus to the change must come largely from without. This is why, in the development of Western Europe, governments seem to lag behind public opinion, and European action behind what America believes to be both practicable and desirable. It is perhaps equally important at this moment that European governments should, by external impulsion, be pressed to make the utmost progress that is in fact practicable; and that those who press them should equally realize that there are, after all, practical limits to progress and its pace.

An economic union, with the abolition of all internal tariffs and barriers, is a simple and attractive conception, and it would automatically avoid all the difficulties that arise from the "most-favored-nation" principle of commercial policy. But practicable Western Union, now and for some time to come, must mean both much less and much more than this.

In the first place, internal tariffs are not now the only, or the principal, obstacles to intra-European trade. Inconvertible or unstable currencies (and the differences in trade balances which cause them), and economic restrictions on imports which are more prohibitive than tariffs, are all more important. Practical progress involves painful and intricate action in clearing and compensation agreements, with agreed general plans for the location of power installations and heavy industries. If economic union does not include this, it does little good; if it does, it involves political changes that amount to something approaching federation. Even under prewar conditions the attempts to create economic unions failed unless they were accompanied, or quickly followed, by political union. Tariffs were so important as a source of revenue, and as determining the pattern of national development, that a common political authority entrusted with the power of deciding the common tariff necessarily also determined the internal policy of each constituent country. Still more if such a common political authority deals also with currencies and every form of governmental action touching reciprocal trade, it necessarily affects the domestic expenditure (including that on social services) of every member country. That is, it reduces the national governments to something like states in a federal system.

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The rapid adoption of anything like a federal system comprising an economic union would, however, encounter the most formidable obstacles, both political and economic. Quite apart from all the interests and ideas that buttress national sovereignty, there is the special difficulty at this moment of comprising in the same political and electoral system countries in which the industrial and electoral strength of Communist organization differs greatly. It is often forgotten that even the 13 States of America, though homogeneous in race, language and outlook as the European democracies are not, and with a clean slate to write on, took many years before they achieved federation under the leadership of such great personalities as Washington and Hamilton.

However, the economic problems of a complete and rapidly established union are no less than the political. The reallocation of basic industries which would result, and is indeed its purpose, would necessarily mean great transfers of the population. In America the transfer of population caused by the de-industrialization of large parts of New England as industries established elsewhere drove them out of business was facilitated by the free migration westward to available land with ample and immediate opportunities for absorption. No such free migration is possible in Europe, and the unemployment that would result, without this preparation, from the quick transfer of industries on a large scale would have the most dangerous social and political results. This does not preclude union, but it is bound to retard the pace of our approach to it. For a long time we must contemplate progress toward closer union by stages, and the progress cannot be rapid.

It is important that this should be clearly realized, not only because there must otherwise be serious disillusionment in America, but because intermediate stages raise questions of the most-favored-nation principle and of nondiscrimination generally. The purpose of these principles was, of course, to secure the greatest practicable range of unrestricted trade by the general extension of reductions of tariffs and trade barriers negotiated bilaterally. But in the Geneva negotiations of 1927 and the following years it became evident that the strict application of the most-favored-nation clause under modern conditions was an obstacle and not a help to the realization of this purpose. If it was impossible for two contiguous and homogeneous countries to lower their tariffs against each other without admitting similar goods at

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the same reduced tariff from other countries, including those which had a more advanced industrial organization and a higher general tariff level, the result was that either they did not make the tariff reductions at all or they evaded the purpose of the clause by various administrative devices.

Belgium and Holland attempted a half stage at the Conference of Ouchy in 1932. Their attempt was then blocked, I have always thought unwisely, by the opposition of Great Britain and America, who had commercial treaties with them that included the most-favored-nation clause. The same two countries are now attempting a complete union, and finding that effective union requires much more than the abolition of internal tariffs. Even if they succeed, other countries in the west will certainly find that they must choose between a halfway union or no union at all; and the first will be possible only if the rest of the world, especially America, will consent to waive the "nondiscrimination" principles.

Temporary and conditional exceptions are indeed contemplated in the recent Havana conventions, and doubtless no objection would be made to discrimination as a merely intermediate stage to an early economic union of a complete type. But it may prove necessary that the halfway stages should be of long duration, or even permanent. The situation I have briefly sketched was realized after the breakdown of the Ouchy attempt in 1932. The Montevideo Conference of 1933, which included representatives from the United States, recommended much wider exceptions to the most-favored-nation clause while still preserving its main purpose. Those recommendations were not binding and were in fact abortive at the time. But they may yet prove a useful starting point for a reconsideration of the main doctrine.

In the meantime, if this difficulty presents itself, as it certainly will, in the course of the movement for closer union in Europe, the main argument of this article is surely relevant. For, if it is true that, not merely in the next few years, but for many years to come, the total of American exports will be determined by the dollar resources of other countries, what advantage is it to America to insist that a reduction of the tariffs, for example on automobiles between France and Italy, should be extended to America? That might increase the number of American cars exported to those two countries, but it would reduce other American exports to an equivalent value.

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I believe that Western Union must not only come gradually, with intermediate stages of long duration, but that it will grow out of the attempts to deal with immediate and pressing tasks, and through the organizations set up for the purpose, such as the military defense committees and O.E.E.C. If these organizations develop successfully and are continued they will form an embryonic common political authority with some of the powers of a federal government. True federation, if it comes at all, is most likely to come as the climax and culmination of a successful development of political organs of this kind. An attempt to establish at once a full federal authority based upon popular election, or to organize an economic union, not through O.E.E.C., but by the creation of a separate and parallel body for the purpose (without the driving force that is given by such an immediate and inescapable task as that of distributing and utilizing the E.R.P. funds), would almost certainly fail.

V

The practical problem for E.C.A. is how far and by what methods it can and should exercise pressure upon reluctant or resisting European governments when a particular scheme obviously advantageous if taken as a whole is in danger of being blocked by local or national interests.

A new location of certain basic industries, or the establishment of hydroelectric power installations, on a scale and with a range covering areas within several national sovereignties, will in time bring a great increase in total wealth of which the benefits will be shared by all the countries affected. So will the development of unimpeded through transport services by rail, road, water and air. But in every such case, vested local interests will be injured, and some redistributions of population — with consequent social and political difficulties — will be involved. Moreover, considerations of national security will arise. These may indeed diminish as the common military defense measures acquire strength, but they will be serious while they are still in their earlier stages.

In these circumstances, agreement among the several countries on a general plan, and on the means of securing its application, is likely to be slow and difficult. The influence of a powerful and disinterested country, in an arbitral position, may often in such cases make just the difference; may overcome a separatism which each national representative may realize is against the

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general interest but which in view of pressure from interests in his own country he is impotent to resist. For E.C.A. to be completely passive in such a case, and merely to stand ready to help whatever may be agreed by O.E.E.C., and no more, would be to decline one of the most valuable services it can render. On the other hand, to try to force through schemes against the determined resistance of governments, who after all are responsible for the social and political problems of their countries, by making acceptance the condition of grants, would be highly dangerous. Much may be done by tactful persuasion; all may be risked by a harsh insistence.

An instance of the middle and best way has been afforded in the course of distributing the first grants. Where O.E.E.C. agrees upon the distribution of the available funds, E.C.A. accepts. But where O.E.E.C. has found agreement difficult, a solution has in fact been made possible by the tactful, persuasive influence of an authority which has, and is known to have, the power in the last resort to enforce.

It is obvious that the whole pattern of trade relationships between different parts of the world will be profoundly different from what it was before the war. This future pattern is now difficult to discern because temporary war dislocations, for which adjustments will be found, are entangled with other changes both earlier in origin and destined to be of longer duration. It can be neither exactly foreseen nor meticulously directed. But much of its broad outline is already obvious, sufficient to afford a useful guide to policy in many issues of current policy.

Those best qualified to understand it — American economists and the leaders of finance and the exporting industries — can, I suggest, render a great public service if they agree upon and make widely known the best practicable forecast of America's future balance of payments and the conclusions that follow from it. A policy based on such advice would greatly help the efforts that are being made to establish a new equilibrium and greatly reduce the frictions and wasteful dislocations that attend the process.

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BENEŠ AND THE SOVIETS

By Edward Táborský

THE cold-blooded murder of Czechoslovak democracy last February by the ruthless agents of the Cominform shocked the free world. When the other states of Central and Southeastern Europe had been engulfed by Soviet totalitarianism it was often said, by way of explanation, that they had always lived under some form of dictatorship, that they were bound to have authoritarian régimes of some kind after this war, and that since the earlier monarchical and right-wing governments were compromised by collaboration with the Nazis, power naturally gravitated to Communist hands. Moreover, three of those states — Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria — had fought against the Russians. Poland had had a bitter territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. And in Jugoslavia, the Communist leader Tito had seized power before the war ended.

In Czechoslovakia matters were quite different. Here was a country which had enjoyed real democracy from its birth in 1918 until the tragic events of Munich in 1938. Its people treasured political and personal freedom above everything else, and at the same time entertained the friendliest possible feelings toward the Russians. Dr. Beneš, the former president, came back to his country enjoying tremendous prestige and was again installed as President of the Republic in the majestic old castle of the Bohemian kings overlooking the Moldau. Throughout the war he had made every effort to keep on good terms with the Soviets, and in some quarters had been called an "agent of Bolshevism" for his endeavors to bring the east and west together. One would have thought that the men of the Kremlin had every reason to be grateful to him.

Stalin and Molotov had promised Beneš on many occasions that they would not interfere with the internal affairs of his country. Yet when the opportune moment came, they let their pack loose on him without the least scruple and ordered the destruction of the democracy which he had salvaged from the ruins of Munich and the Second World War. Sick in body and broken in spirit, with his life's work in ruins and no hope of repeating the miraculous recovery of freedom which he had engineered in 1938–1945, President Beneš left the Hradcany Castle to spend

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his last sad months as a virtual prisoner guarded by strong detachments of Communist police, at his country seat at Sezimovo Usti. There merciful death released him from his torments.

Today old foes of Dr. Beneš raise a triumphant: "I told you so!" Others, including some of his friends, ask: "Was it not to a great extent his fault? Didn't he foster feelings of confidence in Stalin and in Russia? Didn't he argue that Communism and western democracy can live peacefully side by side? Didn't he sign a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia? Didn't he give Communists the key government positions which made it possible for them to crush democracy in Czechoslovakia with a few regiments of Communist police and Red workers' militia? Wasn't he in all these respects wrong?"

To understand the facts in their right proportions, one must go back many years. Beneš was a convinced democrat in the western sense, and he never ceased to oppose Communism. But after the Russian Revolution he worked hard to bring Soviet Russia into the commonwealth of civilized nations. He saw that without Russia, the European balance of power was seriously impaired and that there was no eastern barrier against a renewal of the German *Drang Nach Osten*. This is why he made such exertions to get the Russians into the League of Nations. And this, of course, is why he travelled to Moscow in 1935 to sign the first Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of alliance. By reinforcing the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance with the strength of the Red Army he hoped to intimidate Hitler and put a brake on any aggressive Nazi intentions against the "Czech bastion." In 1938, when the hour of decision was drawing near, he felt he had done everything possible to protect his country from the Nazi danger. Confronting Germany stood the triple alliance of France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia, and he was convinced that it in addition would have the active support of Great Britain.

Without warning, the western friends of Beneš deserted him. His main ally, France, broke her pledge at the last minute and, with Great Britain, handed him an ultimatum to give up the frontier regions of Czechoslovakia to Germany, to surrender all the lines of fortifications, and to trust the fate of his people to a man who had already showed himself to be, and who gloried in being, a conscienceless liar. Acting on the express instructions of their Governments, the British and French envoys woke up the head of the state in the middle of the night of September 21–22,

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1938, to force him to accept the ultimatum. Betrayed and deserted, Beneš had no choice but to bow. Munich followed, then the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia by Hitler's troops on March 15, 1939, and then six years of terrible suffering for the Czechoslovak people and for the world.

Only those who were with Dr. Beneš on those tragic occasions in September 1938 and March 1939 can fully understand the effect they had on all his subsequent political actions. During the war the memory of the terrible night of September 20–21, 1938, never seemed to leave his mind. The thought of Munich was with him when he was seated at his desk in his small villa in Putney, a suburb of London, preparing the lectures which he was to deliver at the University of Chicago. It travelled with him across the Atlantic. He himself did not speak about it, and his reticence was generally appreciated; but the sense of outrage was deep in his heart. It was what made him believe that he could not guarantee his people's security except by a pact with the cynical men in the Kremlin, and it was what drove him, in consequence, into the arms of the Soviets. It is the clue to his tenacious belief that mutual tolerance between Communism and democracy was possible and that there even could be active coöperation between the two systems.

The Russian attitude at the time of Munich actually was by no means as straightforward and courageous as the world was led to believe by clever Soviet propaganda and the reluctance of those who knew the full facts, to speak in a derogatory way about the U.S.S.R. In order to find out whether he could rely on Soviet aid in case Germany attacked in those critical days of September 1938, Dr. Beneš sent for the Soviet Minister at Prague, Alexandrovsky. He described the situation to the Soviet Minister and requested him to obtain clear and unequivocal assurance from Moscow regarding the aid that might be expected. On September 21 Alexandrovsky came back with a reply. It contained two points: "1, that the Soviet Union was ready to fulfill its obligations arising from the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance to the last letter, and that it would help immediately and efficiently if France too remained faithful to her obligations; 2, that the Soviet Union was prepared to fulfill all its obligations as stipulated in articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

Such a promise to fulfill all legal obligations must certainly be

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put down as quite correct behavior; but for practical purposes the Soviet assurance was worthless. For the Russians knew that the French would not honor their obligation, and Beneš knew it also. In fact, the Russians knew it before the Czechoslovak Government did. Our Minister in Moscow at the time, Fierlinger, reported to Prague as early as the end of August that the Soviets did not believe that France would stand by us in the coming crisis. In making his offer to honor her obligation conditional upon French action, Soviet Russia reduced it to an abstract gesture. Similarly his promise to fulfill his obligation in the manner prescribed by the Covenant was without substance. With Britain and France committed to another course, who could rely on positive action by the League of Nations? Beneš was, of course, fully aware of the abstract character of the Russian promises, and that was why he saw no other way out than capitulation. Nevertheless, he never forgot that while Chamberlain and Daladier were working to break down his resistance, the Russians at least made a gesture of willingness to help, and no other country did even that.

Another factor which pushed Beneš toward dependence upon the Soviets was the difficulty which he experienced during the war in persuading Great Britain and France to proclaim the Munich agreement and its consequences null and void. He thought that they would repudiate Munich as soon as its disastrous results became apparent. In fact, he had to wait four years before the British fully admitted the error of Munich. It was not until August 1942 that innumerable discussions and persistent effort brought him formal vindication. Here is a typical entry from my diary of April 9, 1942, when Beneš, then almost at the end of his proverbial patience, urged the matter in a talk with the British Ambassador, Philip Nichols:

> New negotiations about repudiation of Munich with Nichols. This time Dr. Beneš entered into the matter in a very sharp manner. Again he repeated to him all the reasons for which he considered imperative that Munich should be liquidated in a proper manner between us and Britain. "If you do not want to grasp this," he said, "I shall have simply to state failure of negotiations and inform Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill about it. I shall also have to consider whether or not to inform our friends of the Liberal and Labour Parties of this sad failure, in order to have it clear that we, Czechoslovaks, have done all that was in our power to have this blot erased, and that it was the British Government which not even at this stage of the war was prepared to repudiate Munich. Every Englishman has to be aware that Munich still lies between our nation and

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Britain and that it will not be forgotten unless it is repudiated. I am afraid that you, Englishmen, with your lack of political imagination and anticipation, do not realize what consequences for postwar Central Europe and European Continental politics in general this attitude of yours might have.

What Beneš said on this and many other occasions was not bluff. He well knew that in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere the Communists were rubbing their hands in expectation of the profit they would draw from Munich and from Britain's reluctance to make good the wrong she had committed. "Dr. Beneš who a year ago preferred to capitulate rather than let his people fight side by side with the Red Army," reads one of the many anti-Beneš pamphlets which the Czech Communists were distributing in Czechoslovakia throughout 1940, "who preferred to save capitalism from the consequences of the defense of the Republic, now capitulates again . . . " That is to say, he was capitulating to western "plutocrats," while "only the U.S.S.R. is helping the oppressed to realize in a dramatic way the full consequences of the principle of self-determination."

Stalin raised the question the very day Beneš arrived in Moscow in December 1943 to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Soviets. The writer accompanied Dr. Beneš as secretary on that journey, as he did again in 1945. Our train arrived at Kurski station at ten a.m., and at eight p.m. an official banquet was held in Beneš' honor at the Kremlin. Hardly an hour had elapsed, and only the first third of that huge dinner had been eaten, when Stalin shot a sharp question across the table to Beneš, who was sitting opposite: "And why didn't you fight in September 1938?" A few days later the Czech Communists, headed by Gottwald, raised the same question. In a long and by no means polite harangue they attacked both the attitude Beneš had taken in September 1938 and the validity of his explanations.

Of course, it was no coincidence that both the Russian Communist leader and the subservient Czech lieutenant "spontaneously" took up the Munich question and, each in his own way, reproached Beneš for the Czechoslovak capitulation. Both were well aware what a trump card Munich represented in their bid to Communize Czechoslovakia and crush democracy there, and they began preparing to play it long before the final showdown.

Thus Munich influenced the relations of Beneš with Soviet Russia in two ways. Betrayal by the west convinced him that he must seek guarantees of safety for his country in the east. And

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because he knew that the Communists could exploit the feelings which Munich left in all Czechoslovak hearts, he had to try to be on the best possible terms with the Soviets. He based his whole policy on the expectation that Soviet Russia would participate in the war as an ally of the western Powers. Many Americans who met him while he was in the United States in the spring of 1939 can testify to this. He did not allow himself to be deflected from his deep conviction either by the Soviet-Nazi pact of nonaggression of August 1939, or by the signs of coöperation which marked that bargain almost to the very day when the German Luftwaffe began blitzing Russian airfields and towns.

Here is a message, typical of many others, which Beneš sent to his collaborators of the Czechoslovak underground movement on September 1, 1939, the very day of the German invasion of Poland, conveying to them his opinion of the Nazi-Soviet pact:

> The Soviets think that it is impossible to stop the further development of war in Europe. They apparently wished to drag Europe further into the conflict with Germany and to proceed in such a manner as to avoid becoming involved in the war from the outset as in 1914. They wished that the war might break out first between the west and Germany, so that they could stand aside for a while and could then intervene at a moment most suitable to their own purposes. Do not place any reliance upon the words of Hitler that there is eternal peace between Germany and Russia.
>
> It is evident that the Soviets are expecting a social revolution in the spirit of their policy. *Therefore, even we shall have to be careful concerning this.* It may well be that they could later overestimate their chances. I do not think they judge Western Europe correctly just as they didn't in 1918, when they expected a world revolution. Western Europe is socially and economically very strong and will certainly oppose a social revolution very strongly even if this war will change it quite a lot in that direction. Poland, Germany, and Central Europe are, however, in a much more dangerous situation.

No wonder Beneš felt himself the luckiest man in the world when, on that sunny Sunday, June 22, 1941, war began between Russia and Germany. The great anti-German alliance between east and west which he had been advocating for so many years became almost at once an established fact; and through it victory was assured. His relief personally was very great, for in the west he had been denounced as an agent of Bolshevism and in the east as a tool of capitalists.

A fortnight after the German invasion of Russia, Ambassador Maisky was reading to a jubilant Beneš the following message from Moscow:

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1. The political program of the Soviet Government includes an independent Czechoslovakia with a national government.

2. It is self-evident that the Soviet Government will not interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and that her internal régime and structure will be decided by the Czechoslovak people alone.

3. If the Czechoslovak Government wishes to send an envoy to Russia, the Soviet Government will be pleased to receive him. The Soviet Government will willingly give assistance to organize Czechoslovak military units in Russia. In that case they think it will be possible to establish a special Czechoslovak National Committee which will help to organize the Army. The only condition is that these units will be subordinate to the High Command of the Russian army in operative and technical matters. Otherwise they will have a Czechoslovak commander as well as Czechoslovak officers.

Of course, Beneš welcomed all this — except the idea that a special Czechoslovak Committee in Moscow should have a hand in organizing the Czechoslovak Army in Russia. Poland's experience with a similar procedure demonstrated the wisdom of his political instinct in this particular.

From that time the Russians gave Beneš repeated and absolute assurances of Soviet noninterference in Czechoslovak internal matters, and reënforced these direct promises in other ways. Three weeks after Maisky's declaration, the Soviet Commissar, Beria, a member of the newly established Committee of Five for the Defense of the State, took pains to stress the promise of noninterference in a conversation with the Czechoslovak military delegate in Moscow, Colonel Pika. And the principle of noninterference was solemnly pledged in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship of December 1943.

But on Wednesday, February 25, 1948, the means used by Gottwald to extort from Beneš, broken and sick as he was, the signature which he demanded for setting up his "people's" government was the threat that if the Communist police and Red workers' militia encountered opposition, the Soviet Army was on the border, ready to march in.

In 1941 — and until the late autumn of 1944 — Beneš took the Soviet assurances at their face value. Typical of his belief in the sincerity of Soviet intentions regarding Czechoslovakia is the letter which he sent to Marshal Stalin on August 6, 1941, by Dr. Fierlinger. The main passages of that letter read as follows:

I take the liberty of citing to you what I am simultaneously writing in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. V. J. Molotov, concerning our present and future relations with the Soviet Union:

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"I would like to stress that from the year 1935, in spite of all that has happened in the world, in nothing and never have I changed my policy. I expected that the Soviet Union would take part in this new war in one form or another, and I therefore consistently and systematically prepared myself for the moment when both our countries would again be able to renew the policy which I regard to be natural and obvious for them, and essential to their present and future interests and of course preëminently corresponding also to all feelings and requirements of the nations of both states.

"On this reality I should also like to establish our relations and our coöperation. By this I express the desire of a tremendous majority of the people of my country. I shall continue to pursue this line during this wartime coöperation and especially during preparations for the future peace and even after its conclusion. For I believe that, even after victory has been won, the interests of our countries will not conflict and that in the future organization of Europe the foundations of our mutual relations, established in 1935 and renewed on 18th July, 1941, will be one of the most important factors for preserving peace in Eastern and Central Europe."

Even then, however, Beneš qualified his confidence in one very important respect. He was aware of the duplicity of the Soviet Government's pretense that it knew nothing at all about Communist activities. Here is what he wrote to his collaborators in Czechoslovakia four days after his conversation with Maisky:

The Soviet declaration concerning our internal affairs can be taken seriously. The Soviets as a State will actually proceed in this manner. Naturally, the Comintern and the Communist Party will carry on their policy as before. On the other hand, our Communists here and at home have no influence, or very little, on the course taken by the Russian Government and State. During the entire negotiations with Maisky there was not the slightest indication from the Soviet side that they would request anything in regard to our Communists.

The trust which Beneš placed in the Soviets, and his belief in the happy outcome of the Anglo-American-Soviet brotherhood in arms, reached their peak during his visit to Russia in December 1943. This visit took place about the time of the Teheran Conference in an era of special good feeling between the east and the west. The visit made a profound impression on Beneš. We entered the U.S.S.R. through Azerbaijan and the big Baku oil fields. For four days and nights we travelled by train through towns and villages which had recently been the scenes of terrific battles. Beneš was shown Stalingrad, where the backbone of Hitler's attack was broken. He was taken to factories where he saw the feverish war effort. He spoke not only with statesmen but with soldiers and common people. And when he compared what he saw and heard with what he had witnessed during his last visit

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to Moscow and to Stalin in 1935 he was amazed at the tremendous progress which he seemed to find. He returned to London with the firm conviction that the Soviet régime, having stood the most difficult test of a war, was now passing through a stage of gradual transformation into a Socialistic democracy. As a sociologist he knew that a revolution can be victorious only if in due time it evolves into peaceful forms. He thought he saw that process at work in Russia in 1943. One of his comments to me on our journey back to London was: "T. G. Masaryk persistently refused to believe that the Soviet régime would last. I wonder what he would have said now." And another: "A régime which can improve the living standard of 90 percent of the people is bound to maintain itself. That is what so many people in the west failed to realize."

Also very influential with Beneš were his personal meetings with Stalin, Molotov and some other of the Soviet leaders. Stalin in particular impressed him very powerfully. Stalin apparently was sincerely realistic and took a practical, almost pragmatic attitude, devoid of every kind of doctrinaire dogmatism. With this he showed an obvious disdain for excessive ideology, a sense of good humor and an appreciation of jokes — all of which helped convince Beneš that he was dealing with a fatherly national leader rather than with World Communist Number One. His feeling was that Stalin had no other ambition than to lead his people out of their seclusion and gain for them a fair and equal share with the other Great Powers in shaping a new and better world. He almost saw in Stalin another Peter the Great, opening the windows of Russia to the breezes of the west — with the difference that this time the current of fresh air was to go in both directions, that of political liberties from west to east and that of social improvements from east to west.

If it was the purpose of the Soviet leaders to stage "Potemkin villages" for Beneš during his 1943 visit to Russia, and to lure him deeper into the Soviet net, then I must say that it succeeded beyond all their expectations. Whatever Beneš asked was granted, generously and without hesitation. Stalin and Molotov promised to support Czechoslovak claims to the pre-Munich Czechoslovak frontiers (while the British, be it noted, were still stubbornly refusing to give any promise of that kind). Stalin even suggested himself that Czechoslovakia ought to take the Glatz region (which, however, the Poles were given in 1945). He was

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very eager to help the Czechs to get rid of the Sudeten Germans. When Beneš requested that Czechoslovak military units should march into Czechoslovakia together with units of the Red Army, and that the liberated territory should be transferred to Czechoslovak civil authorities without delay, Stalin immediately gave his consent and said that he would issue orders accordingly. When Beneš attempted to outline for Molotov the solution of Czechoslovak internal questions which he had in mind, Molotov almost refused to listen and made every effort to show that the Soviets were not at all interested in that, since they adhered to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs of other states. Both Stalin and Molotov had abundant praise for the results of the Teheran Conference and for President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

To make the optimistic picture brighter still, it should be added that Beneš also was returning to London full of hopes that a fair compromise could be reached in the Soviet-Polish dispute. At the moment that seemed the only serious threat to the unity of the Allies. Beneš discussed the matter at length with Stalin and Molotov, cleared the ground for Mikolajczyk (with whom he had talked before he left London for Moscow), and made Stalin promise to give back to the Poles the districts of Bialystok, Lomza and Przemysl, and to reëstablish diplomatic relations with Mikolajczyk's Government, with no conditions except that it be cleared of inveterate anti-Russian elements.

"We came to a complete agreement about everything!" was the triumphant exclamation of Beneš when he returned from his final talk with Stalin, just before we left Moscow. His pleasure, however, did not last a year. When the Red Army began to liberate Czechoslovakia from the east, in the autumn of 1944, the Czechoslovak Government Delegate came to the liberated areas to take over, according to the agreement between Beneš and Stalin and according to the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty signed in May 1944. To his bewilderment, he soon discovered that Stalin's pledge did not seem to have any importance for the Russian commanders in the field. Despite the Soviet recognition of the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia, repeated on so many occasions, the Communist emissaries who arrived in Czechoslovakia with the Red Army started a campaign for the annexation of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. They forced the local mayors to sign petitions asking "reunion" with the Ukrain-

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ian brothers on the other side of the Carpathians. They organized "spontaneous" meetings and caused telegrams advocating "reunion" to be sent to Stalin and Beneš. The Ukrainian radio propaganda took the same line.

The Czechoslovak Delegate protested, but to no avail. How could one expect, asked the Russian generals, that they would oppose the "will of the people"? This was the first flagrant breach of a Russian pledge. For the first time since July 1941, when Maisky gave his government's formal assurance of noninterference, Dr. Beneš understood the Russian interpretation of that word. Yet so deep was his trust in Stalin that even then he was unable to believe that he deliberately intended to cheat him. Here is a message which he sent to the Czechoslovak Government Delegate in reply to the latter's desperate complaints about the Russian behavior:

1. Immediately upon receiving news about the difficult situation in the liberated territory we took steps in Moscow. On two occasions, I personally negotiated with Lebedev who, after our second conference, brought me Molotov's reply. Simultaneously we asked Fierlinger to intervene, which he in fact did.

2. I presume that these matters do not please Moscow very much, that they do not welcome them just as our Government does not, and that they would like to settle them in a conciliatory manner in agreement with our Government. I believe that both governments are proceeding with all sincerity in this matter.

3. But it appears to me that the Ukrainian Government, Ukrainian soldiers and especially the Ukrainian Communist Party intentionally proceed differently. The Ukrainian Communist Party wants to confront Moscow and ourselves with accomplished facts and does not respect anybody but follows its own aims heedlessly. I do not think that Moscow is playing a double game in regard to this, and I have the impression that the situation is beginning to get out of the hands of the central government. This would, of course, be a serious development. One should not forget that Ukrainian nationalism is and will be dangerous in every respect, and Moscow must reckon with this. This is, at least, how I view the matter at present.

4. We shall proceed in this situation as follows: (a) Come what may, we shall adhere to the treaty and will ask in Moscow that it be fulfilled. We shall not relinquish anything and shall not abandon our rights. (b) Where we shall be prevented from asserting and exercising our rights, as you are, we shall state the fact, and will become observers and passively await future developments. It would be a mistake on our part to use force. On the one hand, we do not possess sufficient executive power and on the other, they would use such an act as a pretext against us and would exploit it. (c) We shall not relinquish our position, but will remain correctly at our post and fulfill our duty to the last.

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It was no use, however. True, Stalin was full of excuses, but he made it perfectly clear that nothing could be done. "The will of the people" was sacrosanct for him, and it was being made clear through the telegrams which he and Beneš were receiving from the Ruthenian "population." So Beneš had to swallow the bitter pill and make the best of the situation.

He might have refused to acquiesce, of course, but he was convinced that it would not help and that it would make the whole situation even worse. He knew that in Slovakia the Communists had agents like the ones in Ruthenia and that it would not be difficult to begin to evoke "the will of the people" there in much the same manner. He knew that some of the Slovak Communists were playing with the idea of a "Soviet Slovak Republic." He looked at his map of the war fronts and saw that while the allied armies were still battling on the far side of the Rhine, the Red Army was penetrating deep into Slovakia. And what was worse, he knew by this time that, without consulting him and without even having deemed it necessary to notify him, the western allies made some sort of agreement with the Russians regarding zones of occupation, and that under this plan Czechoslovakia was to be put in the hands of the Red Army. This had become painfully apparent when the British and Americans disregarded his urgent requests for arms for the Czech and Slovak patriots.

Thus Beneš became convinced that against his wishes, against his warnings, and against their own vital interests, the western allies once again were giving a single Power a monopoly of influence over his country and the rest of Central Europe. And General Patton's sudden halt 50 kilometers from Prague, which was desperately entreating help — a halt fraught with fatal consequences — was corroboration of his forebodings.

When Beneš had gone to Moscow in 1943 to sign a treaty of friendship and alliance with Russia, his first purpose, of course, was to obtain an ally against the possible renewal of German aggression. But he also wanted to bind the Soviets by a treaty which included a firm principle of noninterference. He reasoned that it would be much more difficult for the Russians to violate an unequivocal written agreement than a vague oral declaration. He had the same end in view when he favored a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement, signed in May 1944, delimiting the rights of Soviet commanders on Czechoslovak territory and stipulating that Czechoslovak authorities would take over the administration of the country at

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the earliest possible moment. If the Russians do break such pledges, he thought, the whole world will know it, and the western allies will react sharply. He hoped that the Russians would hesitate to push their differences with the west to the breaking-point. In both these basic expectations he was refuted by events. The Soviets showed utter disregard for their treaty obligations, and Stalin's pledge proved as worthless as Hitler's.

It can be argued that this or that detail of the Beneš policy was not correct. In particular it might be held that Beneš ought not to have yielded to Gottwald's ultimatum, but should have left the country and begun another fight for its liberation. But on the whole a responsible statesman could not have followed any other line in the given circumstances. Whatever policy any small country of central and southeastern Europe might adopt in the face of Soviet expansion, the result would be the same unless western armies were present to stop the Red Army. Somewhere an attempt had to be made to see whether sincere and honest coöperation between east and west, between Communism and democracy, was possible. Czechoslovakia was the test case and Beneš was its protagonist. The attempt failed, and the destruction of Beneš proved to the world that no pledges by the Soviet Union, written or oral, however fine they may sound, are a basis for cooperation. The lesson is not unlike that which the fate of Beneš taught the democratic world in 1938.

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DIPLOMACY ON THE DANUBE

By John C. Campbell

IN THE summer of 1948 a conference to work out a new international régime for the Danube was held in Belgrade. Out of it came a new Danube Convention, drafted in Moscow, accepted without change by the Communist Governments of the Danubian states, and passed in the conference by a majority vote. The three western Powers — the United States, the United Kingdom and France — were an impotent minority at Belgrade. Mr. Vyshinsky did most of the talking. His manner was overbearing and offensive. And he had the votes. The western Powers had no influence on conference decisions. The final convention, which they refused to sign, was the document which Mr. Vyshinsky brought with him from Moscow.

Was this conference a defeat for western diplomacy? Should the United States have sent a delegation to Belgrade in the first place? What are American interests in the Danube area, specifically in trade and navigation on the river, and how well have we promoted and defended those interests? These questions have been asked repeatedly during and since the Danube Conference. They are answered in part by the statements of the American delegation at Belgrade and by the Department of State's press releases and articles on the subject. The present article will attempt to put in its historical setting this most recent phase of the long controversy over the Danube; to clarify the circumstances under which the conference was called; to describe the main issues as they were presented at Belgrade; to evaluate the results of the conference; and to look ahead to the next phase of the problem.

II

Since the Crimean War the Danube has been legally subject to regulation as an international river. The Treaty of Paris (1856) reaffirmed the principle of freedom of navigation by the ships of all nations on a basis of equality, and established the European Commission of the Danube to regulate navigation and technical work on the lower or "maritime" Danube (from Braila to the Black Sea). This commission, of which all the Great Powers were members, represented the "Concert of Europe." It exercised broad powers approaching those of a sovereign state, maintaining

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its own vessels, police force and courts in addition to carrying out technical works.

After the First World War the principle of freedom of navigation on the Danube and provisions for its implementation were written into the peace treaties with the enemy states. The Danube Convention of 1921, signed by 12 European states, riparian and non-riparian (but not including Soviet Russia), completed the legal structure. The European Commission (composed "provisionally" of Great Britain, France and Italy representing the European community and Rumania as the riparian state) was continued. A new International Commission of the Danube was established for the upper or "fluvial" Danube (from Braila in Rumania to Ulm in Germany), composed of all riparian states plus the non-riparians represented on the European Commission.

Inasmuch as this process of "internationalizing" the Danube contributed to freer and more active trade, it was a great benefit to the peoples of Europe. But that was not the only motive behind it. The Danube has always been a *political* question. As a commercial route it has never lived up to its potentialities. Those Powers which have been concerned either with opening it or closing it have been more interested in their influence and control in the Danubian region than in navigation on the river itself. For imperial Austria and later for Germany it was a highway of expansion to the southeast. For Russia it was a possible barrier, and a possible aid, to control of the Balkans. To the western Powers the system of international control was a means of preserving their own political and economic position in southeastern Europe against those who wished to exclude them.

The Treaty of 1856 formalized Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. England and France had fought that war to block Russian expansion in the Balkans and the Near East. The treaty provisions for the Danube were part of the larger settlement which included the Straits, the demilitarization of the Black Sea, the cession by Russia of the Danube delta and southern Bessarabia (bordering the lower Danube), and the ending of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, which were made wards of the Concert of Europe and later became an independent state, Rumania. Russia, before the Crimean War, had allowed the mouths of the Danube to become blocked with silt, to the disadvantage of British, French and Austrian trade. The European Commission was created to keep

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the river open to that trade. Financial support from the west helped it to do its job well. But it was not intended merely to dredge channels and collect dues. By its physical presence at the mouth of the Danube it was a symbol and sentinel of the political interest of the west in preserving southeastern Europe and Turkey from Russian domination.

Just as the Danube arrangements of 1856 were part and parcel of a settlement imposed on defeated Russia, so those of 1919 and 1921 were a part of the "Versailles system" in Central and Eastern Europe which was based on the temporary disappearance of both Germany and Russia as Great Powers. The Convention of 1921, on paper, represented the application to the entire navigable Danube of the principle of freedom of navigation, given formal international sanction in the Barcelona Convention concluded earlier in the same year. In fact, it was tied also to the new territorial and political settlement by which the western Powers, especially France, hoped to block the resurgence of German or Russian power in the Danube basin. It stood only so long as that general settlement stood.

In the late 1930's Germany again made its influence felt. As Hitler drew the Danubian states into his net by political and economic pressure, he declared Germany's right to participate in the régime of the Danube. In 1939 the western Powers felt compelled to admit Germany as a member of the European Commission. But Hitler wanted more than participation. In September 1940 Germany convoked at Vienna a conference of riparian states (Germany and the small nations brought under Germany's thumb), which suppressed the International Commission, excluding Britain and France from the fluvial Danube. But on the lower Danube there was now a new riparian state. The U.S.S.R., by its seizure of Bessarabia in June 1940, had extended its frontier to the Danube. The Soviet Government, protesting its exclusion from the Vienna Conference, declared its interest in "all problems of the Danube."

Germany and the Soviet Union then called a conference at Bucharest. It ended without result, largely because the interests of the two expanding Powers clashed on the lower Danube and because Rumania, in a surprising assertion of independence, refused to accept a new régime "not conforming to the fundamental principles of international fluvial law and the sovereignty of Rumania." The proposals made by the U.S.S.R. in 1940 were a

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preview of the convention which it put forward at Belgrade in 1948: 1, suppression of the European and International Commissions; 2, creation of a new commission for the entire river from Bratislava to the sea, composed of riparian states only; 3, establishment of a special Soviet-Rumanian administration on the maritime Danube including all three mouths; 4, exclusion of all mouths but the Sulina channel from the régime of free navigation; 5, recognition of the right of Soviet warships to navigate on the lower Danube. These proposals were calculated to give the Soviet Union control over the maritime Danube — joint administration with Rumania could only mean Soviet control — and a share, with Germany, in control of the fluvial Danube. By 1948, with Germany out of the picture and every riparian state from Czechoslovakia to the Black Sea in the Soviet camp, the same plan was a blueprint for Soviet control of the river. It meant the end of the entire international structure built up since 1856.

During the war the Danube was a German river. After the war, from Linz in Austria to the Black Sea, it was a Russian river. But Britain and France had not given up their interests in the Danube, and a non-European Power, the United States, was also asserting its own interest. In order to speed Europe's rehabilitation, the United States was urging that the Danube be opened up to trade as soon as the mines and wrecks of bridges could be cleared away. As the occupying authority in German and Austrian territory through which the navigable Danube flowed, the United States felt entitled to propose and to participate in an interim scheme for regulation of navigation on the river. Over the longer term the United States' interest was in a settlement which would stimulate intercourse among European nations, prevent selfish control of international rivers, and thus contribute to the maintenance of peace. It was not Stalin nor Churchill but President Truman who inaugurated the postwar discussion of the Danube question when at Potsdam in 1945 he proposed that there be international agreements to assure freedom of navigation on Europe's major inland waterways.

III

In the long process of negotiating peace treaties for the former German satellites in Danubian Europe — Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria — the United States and Great Britain pressed for the inclusion of clauses dealing with the Danube. Their approach

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was somewhat different. The British were concerned with re-establishing their prewar position as a member of both international commissions. Mr. Bevin stated several times that it was unthinkable that Britain should be asked, after great sacrifices in a victorious war, to accept a position in the Danube basin less favorable than that which it had held before the war began. The United States, taking a more general approach, proposed that the treaties contain a uniform general article providing for freedom of navigation and equality of treatment, reasonable and non-discriminatory tolls and regulations, and reference of disputes to the International Court. Both were less concerned with commercial interests — the United States had had no shipping on the river before the war — than with preventing Soviet economic and political domination of the Danubian region. The Soviet Union resisted these proposals, taking the position that the Danube was not a proper subject for the peace treaties. The Danube, Molotov and Vyshinsky said many times over, was the vital concern of the Danubian nations and could not be dealt with in their absence by three or by four Great Powers, only one of which, the U.S.S.R., was itself a Danubian nation.

During the negotiations of 1946 the western Powers finally succeeded in winning Soviet acceptance of articles in the three treaties stating that "navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all states, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping." Supplementing this agreement was a decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, on December 6, 1946, that there should be a conference, within six months of the entry into force of the peace treaties, "to work out a new convention regarding the régime of navigation on the Danube." On the surface, the western Powers won a victory. Actually, the Soviet Union made only paper concessions. The treaty clauses could hardly be enforced if the U.S.S.R. and the ex-enemy state in question should collaborate in violating them, as it could be expected they would. Nothing was said as to the continued validity of the 1921 Convention. The proposed conference was to be composed of the four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers plus Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the Ukrainian S.S.R.; Austria was to take part in subsequent conferences "after the question of a Treaty with Austria has been settled." With no previous agreement on

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voting or on a review of its decisions by the Council of Foreign Ministers, this decision on the composition of the conference meant that the Soviet bloc would have a clear majority and that the Soviet Union would write the new convention, if it desired to have one. It was a calamitous concession on the part of the United States and Great Britain if they really hoped to get a Danube régime which would actually guarantee freedom of navigation. However, they could hardly argue against giving representation to the riparian states, and it was a melancholy fact that those states were all Soviet satellites. Moreover, so long as the Soviet Union controlled the Danube, no convention could be forced on it against its will. Soviet power, which the western nations did not wish to challenge in this area, except with words, had already decided the issue of the Danube so far as the immediate postwar settlement was concerned.

The peace treaties came into force on September 15, 1947. The following March 15 was the outside date for calling the Danube Conference. None of the four Powers seemed in a hurry to do anything about it. Relations between Russia and the west had grown rapidly worse since the agreement of December 1946. Holding a conference on the Danube was not likely to improve them, or to produce an agreed new convention. Neither the Soviet Union, which was in control of the Danube, nor Great Britain and France, which saw no chance of breaking that control, took the initiative in proposing the calling of a conference. The United States did. It was a decision which may have been taken without full consideration of all the political consequences. But there were plausible reasons behind it. Since 1945 the United States had taken the lead in urging freedom of navigation on the Danube and in securing mention of it in the peace treaties. To have let the March 15 date pass by in silence without mentioning the conference would have been a declaration of disinterest in the Danube, estopping us from raising the question in the future. The conference, successful or not, would test the good faith of the other parties to the agreement of December 1946.

Since the U.S.S.R. was sure to control seven out of ten votes, the United States had to decide whether to safeguard its position by insisting on acceptance of some particular voting procedure before the conference met. There were several alternatives: 1, to consider the decisions of the conference as recommendations, subject to confirmation by the Council of Foreign Ministers, where

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each of the four Powers had a veto; 2, to follow the procedure of the 11-nation Far Eastern Commission, where decisions required a majority including the concurring votes of the four Great Powers; 3, to include Austria as a member of the conference and then apply the two-thirds rule, so that a minority of four votes could block decisions. The United States did not insist on any of these procedures. Having made such an issue of Soviet use of the veto in the United Nations, the United States would not have found it easy to argue in favor of the veto merely because at this particular conference the western Powers were going to be in the minority. As for Austria, Washington did propose in strong terms inclusion of that country as a full-fledged participant — which required a rather "liberal" interpretation of the 1946 decision to the effect that Austria would be brought into such a conference only after the Austrian treaty had been settled — but finally agreed that Austria should be invited to attend "in a consultative capacity." Once that was decided, the question of voting by two-thirds or simple majority became academic.

The United States had, of course, a final safeguard for its own position. The conference was being called to work out a treaty. No participating state could be compelled to accept a treaty as binding on itself merely because it had been passed by majority vote. The American delegation went to Belgrade with only an outside hope that an acceptable treaty might be negotiated. Nothing in past history or in recent Soviet diplomatic conduct led one to believe that the U.S.S.R. was ready to agree to an effective régime guaranteeing freedom of navigation on the Danube. But it seemed barely possible that, as in the peace treaty negotiations, the Soviets might make some concessions to western views. The Smith-Molotov exchange of May 1948 indicated that Moscow might be willing to make a start toward a settlement of differences; the Danube might be the place where the start could be made. At any rate, the American delegation went to Belgrade prepared to negotiate a treaty. Its transportation men, maritime lawyers and other experts had worked out a detailed convention. The State Department had, indeed, overemphasized the technical side of its preparation at the expense of the political. Moscow did not send Vyshinsky to Belgrade to negotiate on port charges and docking facilities.

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IV

What were the issues at Belgrade? From the American viewpoint, the first question was whether the Soviet Union had any serious intention to negotiate. That question was answered by Vyshinsky at the opening session, supposedly devoted to formalities; by pushing through a vote excluding English as an official language he set out to demonstrate that he was going to run the conference to suit himself, and perhaps hoped to goad his opponents into an undignified withdrawal. The following day he made his now famous remark: "The door was open for you [the western delegates] to come in; the door is open for you to leave, if that is what you wish." Vyshinsky obviously relished his position. He had six other delegates to make speeches in support of the Soviet position when he himself tired of talking, which was not very often. He had an automatic majority whenever he chose to call for a vote.

As the American representative, Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon, pointed out in his final statement, it was a "unique" conference. There was no attempt to negotiate. Vyshinsky presented a draft Danube convention. The satellites, including Jugoslavia, endorsed it as a "perfect instrument" before it was even discussed. They proposed no amendments, not even the change of a comma. They acknowledged no differences of views among themselves or with the U.S.S.R. Anyone who questioned the Soviet draft was an imperialist bent on violating the sovereignty of the Danubian states.

In these circumstances, what choice did the western delegates have? They could stay and be insulted and outvoted, or they could walk out. The British and French, who at the very start were subjected to abuse for standing on their rights under the 1921 Convention, on several occasions were ready to "take a walk" but did not do so. The three western governments wished to maintain solidarity at least to the point of staying on or quitting together. The American decision to sit it out to the end was based on several considerations. In the first place it was undesirable to appear, before American and world opinion, as "bad sports" who would participate in international conferences only when in the majority. Secondly, the United States believed that its proposals for a new Danube régime were based on the permanent interest of all nations, including the Danubian nations, in a

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maximum flow of trade on the river. It wished to get these proposals on the record and to set forth its arguments in favor of them even if the assembled Communists around the table voted them down without a second thought. Thirdly, the United States wished to give Vyshinsky full opportunity to show the world how a Soviet delegation conducted itself when it held the whip hand. He obliged by playing the part at his domineering best. Toward the end he seemed to realize that he had overplayed his hand and belatedly introduced some "additional Soviet proposals" on a few minor points, taking them from the American draft; but this manœuvre could not give the procedure the appearance of a negotiated settlement.

The United States delegation expected that Great Britain and France, being more directly interested, would take the lead in presenting the western case. However, the British and French had prepared no draft convention or draft articles. Their principal concern was to assert their rights as parties to the 1921 Convention, which they considered still legally in force, in opposition to the Soviet view that it no longer conformed to existing conditions and had in fact been killed by Britain and France themselves when they concluded the Sinaia agreements with Rumania in 1938. Under these circumstances the United States felt it necessary to submit its own draft convention and thus to take the lead in arguing the western case against Vyshinsky. As it was obvious that there would be no agreement, the United States wished to argue the case on the basis of its conception of an ideal convention rather than on the narrower legalistic basis represented by the British and French position.

The American strategy was to focus the debate on the major points of difference between the Soviet and American drafts. Superficially there were some resemblances, principally because both drew heavily on the 1921 Convention for their technical clauses. Article 1 of the Soviet text provided for freedom of navigation and equal treatment in the exact words of the Danube article in the three peace treaties. The United States was convinced, however, that the Soviet convention was designed not to guarantee freedom of navigation but to give a legal basis for the existing system of Soviet control over the river. To prove this point it framed its amendments and concentrated its arguments on a few main issues.

The first of these was the practical meaning of the general

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principles of freedom of navigation and nondiscrimination. Those principles were already written into the peace treaties. But in practice Danube navigation was not open to all on equal terms; it was largely in the hands of monopolistic concerns, the so-called 50-50 companies which were under joint Soviet-local ownership and under Soviet direction. They owned the shipping and the port facilities. The American proposals spelled out in concrete terms specific provisions for equality of treatment with respect to docking, loading facilities and the like. Freedom to navigate meant little unless it included freedom to trade and to do business in Danube ports. The Soviet draft provided that such matters must be handled through agreements with the "appropriate agencies," that is, with the 50–50 companies.

The second big issue was the structure and powers of the new Danube commission to administer the convention. The Soviet draft limited membership to riparian states. Disagreement on this point was enough to ensure the failure of the conference even if agreement had been possible on the others. The U.S.S.R., as the only riparian Great Power, was certain to dominate any commission limited to riparians. The western Powers insisted first of all on the principle of non-riparian representation. It had been recognized for half a century that navigation on this great arm of the sea reaching up into Central Europe did not concern the riparian states alone. The three leading nations in prewar shipping on the maritime Danube were all non-riparians: Greece, Italy and Great Britain. Great Britain and France had been on both the European and the International Commissions of the Danube. The United States rested its claim to representation on two considerations—its temporary position as an occupying Power responsible for riparian territory in Germany and Austria and its permanent interest, as one of the major Allied Powers which had already made a great material contribution to Europe, in European recovery and economic progress. But it did not insist on permanent membership; once Austria and Germany had been admitted and provision had been made for adequate non-riparian representation, the United States was willing to forego its claim to membership on the commission.

The western Powers also had objections on the subject of the powers of the new commission as defined in the Soviet text — particularly the provision for independent special administrations which in effect removed the important Iron Gates sector and the

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mouths of the river from the commission's jurisdiction — but the flat Soviet refusal to let the western nations even be present as a minority on the commission made it useless to go into these clauses further.

Another point of difference concerned Austria. An Austrian delegation sat at the conference table "in a consultative capacity." After a few attempts by the Austrians to state their views and defend their position provoked long and abusive speeches, they subsided into silence until the final session. Austria is one of the most important riparian states from the point of view of navigation, and Vienna has been a great Danube river port. But as a country under four-Power occupation and not fully sovereign, Austria's position was delicate, to say the least. The United States championed it at every turn. It proposed Austria's full membership in the conference and was voted down. It proposed that Austria become an original party to the convention and member of the proposed Danube commission, and was voted down. Fortunately for the western Powers, Austria was not willing to become a party to a convention such as the Soviet delegation presented to the conference.

Fourth of the major points raised by the United States was the establishment of a relationship between the new Danube régime and the United Nations. The proposal was based on the general concept of "support" for the United Nations and more specifically was aimed at providing some means of checking, in an organization where the United States would not be automatically outvoted, on a Danube commission dominated by the Soviet Union. Except in the provision for reference of disputes to the International Court, the American proposal was not very clearly worked out, for there was no obvious connection between the Danube régime and any particular U.N. body. The Danube commission might be required to submit reports to the Economic Commission for Europe, or directly to the Economic and Social Council, according to arrangements worked out with those bodies. However, since the Soviets rejected out of hand the whole idea, the American delegation did not have to be specific. It merely chalked up another point on which no effort had been made to meet the American point of view.

Finally, after a long delay, the United States took a firm stand on the legal position that the 1921 Convention was still in force and that the parties to it could not be deprived of their rights un-

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der it without their consent; and its signatories included not only Britain and France but also three states not present at Belgrade — Italy, Greece and Belgium. All these rights were ignored in the supplementary protocol to the Soviet draft convention, which simply declared the former régime null and void and abolished the European and International Commissions, whose assets, but not liabilities, were to be taken over by the new commission. The primary purpose of this American stand was to give aid and comfort to the French and British and keep the western front solid. In the light of the concurrent negotiations on the Berlin situation, this was a matter of some importance.

Every one of the 28 western amendments was rejected by a solid bloc of seven votes. Every article of the Soviet draft was accepted, thanks to the same seven votes. The conference then solemnly accepted the entire Soviet convention. The United States cast the lone negative vote. The British and French delegations ignored the final vote altogether, not even recording their abstention, on the theory that the whole procedure was improper and a violation of their legal rights.

V

The new convention was signed, with appropriate ceremony and in the absence of the western delegates, on August 18, 1948. Mr. Vyshinsky had his hour of triumph, as there had never been any doubt that he would, given the circumstances under which the conference was held. But how much of a triumph was it? The Soviet Union has given the stamp of legality to a control which it held anyway. The new convention is not recognized by nations outside the Soviet bloc as superseding the old international régime. The new Danube commission cannot operate on the upper Danube above the zone of Soviet control. Austria and Germany remain outside it. Without western participation and support the necessary work to develop the river and even to keep it navigable is not likely to be accomplished.

The U.S. delegation has been criticized for not engaging in a propaganda duel with Mr. Vyshinsky. The unspectacular, firm and reasoned arguments of the American representative probably were more effective than fiery speeches would have been. Some of the satellite delegates seated round the table may have recognized the weight of those arguments. Indirectly, they may reach the people of those countries. Nations for which the Danube is a

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principal route to world markets can scarcely feel happy, in the long run, about a system which puts control of that route in the hands of a single Great Power. Danube trade within southeastern Europe, as they well know, has never compared in importance with the trade with Austria and Germany on the upper river and with the Mediterranean and Western Europe through its mouth.

Western policy, at this present point in history, is in open competition with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of Europeans both in the west and in the east. To increase trade and contacts between the two halves of Europe is a basic assumption of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe's recovery. Looking beyond the Marshall Plan, there is the possibility of bringing the Eastern European nations back into the European community. To open up the Danube, on the basis of freedom of navigation and non-discrimination, would of course further these purposes. It was a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union, having dedicated itself to the defeat of the Marshall Plan, would not agree to restore the prewar type of international régime and open up the Danube, and the Danubian basin, to the trade and influence of the west. All the western Powers could hope to do at Belgrade was to show that their plans for the Danube were conceived to benefit the Danubian nations themselves as well as non-riparian states, and to prove that the charge of imperialism in the Danube basin lay not against the west but against Russia.

The western Powers may take the case to the United Nations; they may seek from the International Court an opinion on the legal validity of the 1921 Convention. A favorable decision in either case would be helpful in the war of propaganda, although it could hardly change the actual state of affairs on the Danube. That could come only from a weakening of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe through further developments such as those which have already taken place in Jugoslavia. The policy of the western Powers in Soviet Europe must be, for some time to come, to try to drive a wedge here and a wedge there. If what was said at the Danube Conference, besides having set the record straight, contributes to the success of such a policy, it may prove to have been well worth while to have gone into the lists against Mr. Vyshinsky. There could be no settlement at Belgrade. The Danube can be free and open only when it unites Europe. A solution to the problem of the Danube can be found only when we are much nearer to a solution of the problem of Europe.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. VOLUME I: THE GATHERING STORM. By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. Boston: Houghton (in association with the Cooperation Publishing Co.), 1948, 784 p. $6.00.

In this first of what will probably be five volumes, Mr. Churchill initiates his monumental work on the origins and course of the recent conflict — to him "the unnecessary war." This is more than an autobiography and less than a history, for the account is personal and despite the author's stellar rôle in the drama, the record he sets forth is of necessity incomplete and not all parts of it may stand the test of historical criticism. The present volume deals with the inter-war period and Churchill's tenure at the Admiralty from September 3, 1939, to May 10, 1940, and in it he indulges in a few well-merited "I-told-you-so's," though his narrative as a whole is magnanimous toward lesser men. He has woven much new information into his story and has inserted a quantity of documentary and other source material. His colorful, majestic and slightly archaic prose recalls a better and more spacious age.

THE WEST AT BAY. By BARBARA WARD. New York: Norton, 1948, 288 p. $3.50.

Miss Ward, assistant editor of the authoritative London *Economist*, presents in this most timely volume a none-too-reassuring analysis of the state of the Western European nations. Indeed, she sees the salvation of that once dominant part of the world only in (1) closer coöperation among those nations, including Britain, but more in the economic and military than political realm; and (2) continued, even increased, support from America, not only through the Marshall Plan but by a revival of lend-lease — and all this now, not at our leisure.

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE, 1938–1939. By L. B. NAMIER. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 502 p. $5.00.

Professor Namier of Manchester University has produced a remarkably balanced and informed history of the immediate events that led to war. He has examined critically the available sources — the "colored" books and other official documents, press reports, memoirs — and he has sought the testimony of participants in the drama. He expects to keep abreast of current revelations in future editions of what should become a standard work.

HOW TO STOP THE RUSSIANS — WITHOUT WAR. By FRITZ STERNBERG. New York: Day, 1948, 146 p. $2.00.

The thesis of this brief, provocative tract is that the best way to stop Soviet expansionism is not by war, despite our present advantage, but by supporting progressive elements in countries like China and Germany where we are directly competing with Communism.

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THE FREE SOCIETY. By John Middleton Murry. London: Dakers, 1948, 292 p. 12/6.

Mr. Murry forsakes his pacifism with a vengeance and comes out for an Anglo-American preventive war on the Soviet Union.

FAREWELL TO EUROPEAN HISTORY. By Alfred Weber. New Haven: Yale University Press (London: Routledge), 1948, 204 p. $3.75.

At the end of the war, Weber, now over 80 years of age, came out of the retirement into which the Nazis had forced him and took a leading part in the reconstruction of the University of Heidelberg. Though Spenglerian in scope, his book is not as pessimistic in outlook. He believes that the recent period of two world wars forms a great watershed in history, and that we have left the age of independent nations for one of what he calls "world syndicates."

FROM THE LEAGUE TO U.N. By Gilbert Murray. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 217 p. $4.50.

One of the leading lights in the League of Nations Union in Britain has assembled a number of his speeches and writings from the thirties and early forties to provide a running commentary on the death of the League and the birth of its successor.

ORGANISACE SPOJENÝCH NÁRODŮ. By Vlastimil Kybal. Prague: Vilímek, 1948, 103 p. Kč. 48.

A concise, systematic history of the development of the United Nations.

MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP. By H. Duncan Hall. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1948, 429 p. $5.00.

The major portion of this first-rate monograph contains an historical and analytical study of the operation of the League Mandate system. In Part IV the author, an Australian authority on colonial problems and onetime League official, examines the beginnings of the Trusteeship system of the United Nations. The last 110 pages consist of relevant documents and bibliography.

HISTORY: A GUIDE TO PEACE. By Erno Wittmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 423 p. $5.50.

A Hungarian-American scholar defends the balance of power as a necessary condition precedent to real world peace.

VINGT ANS D'ERREURS POLITIQUES. By Renaud de Jouvenel. Paris: Éditions Hier et Aujourd'hui, 1947, 405 p. Fr. 180.

An exposition of the view that the recent war originated in the imperialist cupidity of the capitalist states, above all, of the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

DIE POLITIK: IHRE ELEMENTE UND IHRE PROBLEME. By Adolf Grabowsky. Zurich: Pan-Verlag, 1948, 452 p. Sw. Fr. 22.

A comprehensive treatise, in which Part II deals with international politics.

MAJOR ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By Joseph Dunner and Others. Grinnell (Iowa): Grinnell College Press, 1948, 163 p. $2.50.

Lectures delivered at the Grinnell College Institute of International Affairs in the summer of 1947.

TOTAL POWER: A FOOTNOTE TO HISTORY. By Edmund A. Walsh, S.J. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 373 p. $5.00.

Father Walsh, Regent of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, served as consultant at Nuremberg and became acquainted among others with General Haushofer, of whom he writes understandingly. He analyzes some of the revelations of the seized German documents, and in conclusion draws a parallel between the power hunger of the Nazis and that of the Kremlin.

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YOU CAN'T TURN THE CLOCK BACK. By R. W. G. Mackay. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948, 367 p. $3.50.

A British Labor M.P. wanders far afield while demonstrating that the way to true world government is through the creation of Socialist federated states comprising large regions such as Western Europe.

SURVIVAL OR SUICIDE. Edited by Harry H. Moore. New York: Harper, 1948, 209 p. $2.00.

Uneven chapters on the pressing problems of the atomic age.

MAN'S LAST CHOICE. By E. M. Friedwald. New York: Viking, 1948, 128 p. $2.00.

A French scientist-journalist exposes the failure of current political doctrines to meet the challenge of the atomic age.

PROFILE OF EUROPE. By Sam Welles. New York: Harper, 1948, 386 p. $3.50.

The author is an associate editor of *Time*, and his book is the result of eight months recently spent in Europe and the Near East, including two on an officially shepherded tour in the Soviet Union. Mr. Welles not only reports but interprets, and his guess on Russia is that she will not be ready for war before 1960.

LANDS OF THE CROSS AND CRESCENT. By Cyrus H. Gordon. Ventnor (N. J.): Ventnor Publishers, 1948, 267 p. $3.75.

An archeologist looks at affairs in several countries of the Middle East, as well as Western and Northern Europe.

LE CONTINENT AMÉRICAIN ET LE DÉSÉQUILIBRE MONDIAL. By M. Apchié and Others. Paris: Rivière (for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère), 1948, 227 p. Fr. 280.

The book results from the work of a study group organized in 1946 by the Centre and comprises contributions by various experts, French and American, including Drs. Bidwell and Diebold of the Council on Foreign Relations.

PEOPLE IN COLONIES. By Kumar Goshal. New York: Sheridan, 1948, 329 p. $3.50.

An Indian writer presents the seamy side of modern imperialism.

THE PATTERN OF IMPERIALISM. By E. M. Winslow. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 278 p. $3.75.

An honest and intelligent attempt to define and criticize the "theories of power" current during the modern era.

CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP. By Clinton L. Rossiter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, 322 p. $5.00.

A comparative analysis and appraisal of the operation of the constitutional apparatus for meeting crises in Weimar Germany, France since 1875, Britain since Waterloo, and the United States since the Civil War.

DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES VÖLKERRECHTS ALS MENSCHHEITSRECHT. By Valentin Tomberg. Bonn (British Zone): Schwippert, 1947, 195 p.

A statement of the problem and of the legal basis already developed by international practice.

IL MARE TERRITORIALE E LA SUA DELIMITAZIONE. By Franco Florio. Milan: Giuffrè, 1947, 116 p. L. 220.

A monograph on current law and practice, by an Italian naval officer.

GROTIUS INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 1940–1946. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1948, 320 p. Guilders 16.

Scholarly articles, documents and bibliography.

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THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS: 1948. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1948, 376 p. 20/.

Volume II in a series of objective and well documented essays on a variety of political and legal subjects.

THE PATTERN OF WAR. By Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker. London: Cassell, 1948, 159 p. 8/6.

A British field commander and military theorist finds that the pattern of war is much more consistent and predictable than has generally been recognized.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER. Edited by Ivison S. Macadam. New York: Longmans, 1948, 568 p. $15.00.

This useful reference work, reviewing "public events" for the year, has been published annually for 188 years. It now appears under the editorship of Ivison S. Macadam, Director General of Chatham House.

General: Economic and Social

BRETTON WOODS EN HET INTERNATIONAAL MONETAIR BESTEL. By Harold Jules Stokvis. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1948, 448 p. Guilders 12.75.

A scholarly monograph on the relation between the gold standard and the mechanisms created at Bretton Woods.

A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS. Edited by Howard S. Ellis. Philadelphia: Blakiston (for the American Economic Association), 1948, 490 p. $4.75.

Authoritative accounts of the development of economic thought in 13 fields during the past decade and a half. Sponsored by the American Economic Association, this book is intended primarily to keep economists abreast of affairs outside their specialties, but it will be of use to anyone who wants to know what economists are thinking about nowadays, especially if his college training stopped with, or short of, Keynes.

FINANCES COMPARÉES. By Henry Laufenburger. Paris: Sirey, 1947, 432 p. Fr. 450.

A competent survey in which the author, a professor at the University of Paris, compares the budgetary, fiscal and credit policies of the United States, France, Great Britain, Switzerland and the Soviet Union.

DAS GESICHT DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Herbert Gross. Hamburg (British Zone): Hammerich und Lesser, 1947, 408 p.

After introductory chapters on economic and financial developments in general, the author examines conditions by country or continent.

CARTELS OR COMPETITION? By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1948, 516 p. $4.00.

An analysis of the workings and effects of international cartels, based on case studies by the same authors already published as "Cartels in Action." The book concludes with the report of the Fund's Committee on Cartels and Monopoly entitled, "A Cartel Policy for the United States."

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: CAN WE HAVE BOTH? By Albert Lauterbach. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948, 178 p. $2.50.

The author seeks to reconcile the deep desire for individual freedom with the necessity for some measure of planning and regulation in our economic life.

INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER. By Friedrich A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 271 p. $5.00.

In these essays the author of "The Road to Serfdom" expatiates on the dangers of planned economy.

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EUROPE ON THE MOVE: WAR AND POPULATION CHANGES, 1917–47. By Eugene M. Kulischer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 377 p. $5.00.

A careful analysis of recent European migratory movements — voluntary and forced — and of their economic implications. The author believes that Germany's population must be reduced by organized emigration.

PORTS OF THE WORLD. Edited by Sir Archibald Hurd. London: Shipping World, 1948, 1,138 p. 30/.

Detailed data on the principal ports of all maritime countries.

GEOGRAFÍA DE LAS GRANDES POTENCIAS (Y LOS PRODUCTOS BÁSICOS). By José Luis Asián Peña. Barcelona: Bosch, 1947, 202 p. Ptas. 20.

A popular review of the economic geography of the major Powers and some of the smaller ones.

TO THE ARCTIC! By Jeannette Mirsky. New York: Knopf, 1948, 334 p. $5.00.

"The story of northern exploration from earliest times to the present," with maps and illustrations.

THE DOMAIN OF IDEOLOGIES. By Harold Walsby. Glasgow: Maclellan (in collaboration with the Social Science Association), 1947, 231 p. 10/6.

"A study of the origin, development and structure of ideologies" stressing the psychological element and couched in somewhat metaphysical language.

CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 263 p. $3.50.

Essays, for the most part already published or delivered as lectures, in which the noted English historian gives us the long view rather than any prescriptions for immediate action.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMANITY. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, 247 p. $3.00.

A leading sociologist trains the batteries of his scholarship on popularly cherished cures for war including democracy, prosperity, free enterprise, free speech, the United Nations and world government. His remedy, basic reforms within nation states which would stimulate and give freer play to the altruistic motives of individuals.

ALTERNATIVE TO SERFDOM. By John Maurice Clark. New York: Knopf, 1948, 153 p. $3.00.

A distinguished American economist deals pragmatically with the problems of freedom and responsibility in American economic policy. His alternative to serfdom is the balance of competing groups and institutions.

POWER AND PERSONALITY. By Harold Dwight Lasswell. New York: Norton, 1948, 262 p. $3.00.

A stimulating application of psychoanalytical methods to the study of political leaders, democratic and otherwise.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA. By Leonard W. Doob. New York: Holt, 1948, 600 p. $5.00.

A scientific synthesis of current practice and theory in this newly developed, borderline field between psychology, sociology and politics.

The Second World War

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By E. L. Hasluck. London: Blackie, 1948, 358 p. 15/.

A popular account, not devoid of errors of fact and more useful in political than military matters.

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LA GUERRA SUI MARI, NEL CONFLITTO MONDIALE 1939–1941. By Romeo Bernotti. Leghorn: Società Editrice Tirrena, 1947, 459 p. L. 800.

The first volume in a semi-popular synthesis being prepared by an Italian Admiral.

THE CANADIAN ARMY 1939–1945. By Colonel C. P. Stacey. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948, 354 p. $2.50.

An official history of the Army's operations in Europe and the Far East, illustrated with numerous folded maps in color.

PERSUADE OR PERISH. By Wallace Carroll. Boston: Houghton, 1948, 392 p. $4.00.

Mr. Carroll was one of the creators of American psychological warfare against the Axis and for a time Deputy Director of the Office of War Information. This is the story of our successes and failures in that field, of the reasons behind them, and of what they should teach us about how to make and keep friends — and confound enemies — in the future.

QUARTO DE VIGIA. By Luís Vieira de Castro. Lisbon: The Author, 1948, 260 p.

Articles on the recent war and Portugal's relation to it.

ANNÉES CRUCIALES. By General G. Roton. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1947, 304 p. Fr. 300.

The author of this report on the campaign in France (1939–40) was chief-of-staff to General Georges, commander of the northwest front. The fact that Roton seeks to defend Georges against certain charges by Gamelin and others does not detract from the underlying competence of his book.

DUNKERQUE ET LA CAMPAGNE DE FLANDRE. By General A. Doumenc. Grenoble: Arthaud, 1947, 318 p. Fr. 295.

A circumstantial account of the operations from May 13 to June 4, 1940, with sketch maps.

AIRBORNE WARFARE. By Major General James M. Gavin. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1947, 186 p. $3.00.

An American parachute commander reconstructs airborne actions in Sicily, southern Italy, Normandy and Holland, concluding with remarks on the future of this form of warfare.

LE DÉBARQUEMENT DU 8 NOVEMBRE 1942 EN AFRIQUE DU NORD. By Pierre Barjot. Paris: Gigord, 1947, 222 p. Fr. 175.

A popular account of the operation and its preparations.

CON L'ARMATA ITALIANA IN RUSSIA. By Giusto Tolloy. Turin: Silva, 1947, 233 p. L. 550.

This personal record of the inglorious campaign waged by the Italian expeditionary force in southern Russia was first published clandestinely in Nazi-occupied northern Italy.

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME I. PLANS AND EARLY OPERATIONS: JANUARY 1939 TO AUGUST 1942. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 788 p. $5.00.

This is the first instalment of an official seven-volume series being prepared by trained historians for the Office of Air Force History.

THE MARINES' WAR. By Fletcher Pratt. New York: Sloane, 1948, 456 p. $5.00.

A competent, accurate, undramatic record of the campaigns fought by the Marines from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. Though strictly speaking not official, this book was

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prepared at the request and with the full assistance of the Marine Corps, and is based on ample documentation, including Japanese sources.

THE AAF AGAINST JAPAN. By Vern Haugland. New York: Harper, 1948, 515 p. $5.00.

Prepared under the auspices of the National Air Council, this volume provides a factual record, based in part on confidential documents, of the Army's air war in the Pacific 1941–45.

BATTLE REPORT: THE END OF AN EMPIRE. By Captain Walter Karig and Others. New York: Rinehart, 1948, 532 p. $5.00.

This fourth volume in a series on the U. S. Navy's part in the Pacific war comprises the epoch from Tarawa to Leyte Gulf, when Japan in effect lost her sea power. Like its predecessors, it is a useful interim report rather than definitive history.

LA GRAN EXPERIENCIA DEL PACÍFICO. By Armando Zegrí. Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag, 1947, 299 p.

A Chilean correspondent reports on MacArthur's campaign from Manila to Tokyo.

MEMOIRS OF A SECRET AGENT OF FREE FRANCE. VOLUME I: JUNE, 1940 – JUNE, 1942: THE SILENT COMPANY. By Rémy. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 406 p. $4.00.

The amazing story of an intelligence network organized in occupied France by Colonel Gilbert Renault-Roulier for de Gaulle and the Allies. The original French edition was reviewed here in July 1946.

AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II. By Carl J. Friedrich and Associates. New York: Rinehart, 1948, 436 p. $3.50.

The record and the lessons it teaches.

The United States

THE TURNING STREAM. By Duncan Aikman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 440 p. $5.00.

In this vigorous and sweeping critique of the American political scene Mr. Aikman, an experienced journalist, challenges many of our current prejudices and heaps scorn on our shortcomings.

THE MEDITERRANEAN: ITS ROLE IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By William Reitzel. New York: Harcourt, 1948, 195 p. $2.75.

A pioneer study in which the author, on the staff of the Yale Institute of International Studies, stresses the parallel, but not identical, Mediterranean interests of Britain and the United States and the necessity for the latter to evolve a comprehensive policy for the whole region.

AMERICAN OPINION ON WORLD AFFAIRS IN THE ATOMIC AGE. By Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., and Sylvia Eberhart. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, 152 p. $2.50.

A technical description and analysis of the state of our minds and emotions on international affairs in 1946. No one will be inclined to dispute the general implication of the study, which is that there is enormous room for improvement.

BASES AND EMPIRE: A CHART OF AMERICAN EXPANSION. By George Marion. New York: Fairplay Publishers, 1948, 199 p. $3.00.

A Leftist exposé of American imperialist activities, primarily in the Pacific.

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THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL CHARACTER. By Geoffrey Gorer. New York: Norton, 1948, 246 p. $3.00.

This attempt by a British cultural anthropologist to explain the behavior patterns he discerns in America leads to some mighty weird interpretations, both Freudian and non-Freudian.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR: POSTWAR YEARS, NORMALCY, 1918–1923. By Frederic L. Paxson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948, 401 p. $6.50.

The concluding volume in a sober trilogy on the decade 1913–23, by a conventional historian of the contemporary American scene.

THIS WAS NORMALCY. By Karl Schriftgiesser. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1948, 325 p. $3.00.

In this critical review of politics during the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era, the Republican Party is definitely not the hero on either the domestic or international scene.

THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION: 1929–1941. By Dixon Wecter. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 362 p. $5.00.

In this concluding volume of Schlesinger's and Fox's "History of American Life" Mr. Wecter has caught the spirit as well as recorded the facts of the 1930's.

WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT. By Ellis Gibbs Arnall. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948, 286 p. $3.50.

How the American people appeared to the ex-governor of Georgia after an extensive lecture tour among them.

THE MORE PERFECT UNION. By R. M. MacIver. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 311 p. $4.00.

An analysis of racial discrimination and tensions in the United States and a program for controlling, and eventually eliminating, them.

BALANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE. By Henry Lee Moon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 256 p. $3.00.

An examination of the Negro's political rôle in the United States and of the possibilities it offers for exercising power through bloc-voting in key areas.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICAN LIFE. Edited by Jerome G. Kerwin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 181 p. $2.75.

Eight experts contribute papers stressing why we should not let military necessity undermine our democratic procedures.

AIR VICTORY: THE MEN AND THE MACHINES. By Harold B. Hinton. New York: Harper, 1948, 428 p. $5.00.

A sound, readable review of the development of the United States Air Force with particular attention to its accomplishments in World War II and a look into the future, written by a onetime *New York Times* Washington correspondent, under the auspices of the National Air Council.

OUR UNKNOWN EX-PRESIDENT. By Eugene Lyons. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 340 p. $2.95.

A flattering portrait of Mr. Hoover.

HARRY TRUMAN — PRESIDENT. By Frank McNaughton and Walter Hehmeyer. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 294 p. $3.00.

Though not an uncritical campaign book, the authors treat the President with sympathy and understanding.

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WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EUGENE V. DEBS. New York: Hermitage Press, 1948, 486 p. $4.00.

Some fourscore pieces by the militant leader of American Socialism, with introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A recent biography of Debs that tries to tie him to the Communists is "Gene Debs: The Story of a Fighting American," by Herbert M. Morais and William Cahn (New York: International Publishers, 1948, 128 p. $1.50).

Western Europe

FIN D'UNE EUROPE. By Georges Bonnet. Geneva: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1948, 433 p.

In this second volume of his "Défense de la Paix," M. Bonnet continues to justify his conduct of French foreign policy from Munich to the outbreak of war. He bases his story on documents concealed from the Nazis and for part of which at least there are said to be no other available copies. He reiterates that his devotion to peace was in the best interests of his country and was supported by the government of which he was a member and by the French parliament.

LE TEMPS DES ILLUSIONS: SOUVENIRS (JUILLET 1940–AVRIL 1942). By H. du Moulin de Labarthète. Geneva: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1946, 436 p. Sw. Fr. 8.50.

These memoirs by a onetime official of the Vichy Government throw much light on the events, personalities and states of mind during the first two years of that régime.

THE CASE FOR DE GAULLE. A Dialogue between André Malraux and James Burnham. New York: Random House, 1948, 87 p. $1.50.

Mr. Burnham, of "Managerial Revolution" fame, journeyed to Paris and engaged in this dialogue with Malraux, novelist and exponent of Gaullism. Their conversation may in parts be somewhat metaphysical, but is clear enough in showing the general's anti-Communist movement to be authoritarian and ultranationalist.

L'EXPÉRIENCE DES NATIONALISATIONS, PREMIER BILAN. By Marcel Ventenat. Paris: Médicis, 1948, 290 p. Fr. 300.

A mining engineer, after studying the causes and achievements of the French nationalization program and comparing it with similar projects elsewhere, turns in a generally unfavorable verdict, particularly on the political plane.

ICELAND, NEW WORLD OUTPOST. By Agnes Rothery. New York: Viking, 1948, 214 p. $3.75.

A delightful tour through the country, its history and its distinctive way of life.

L'EUROPE ET LE PÉRIL ALLEMAND. By Joseph Calmette. Paris: Aubier, 1947, 508 p. Fr. 420.

The record of Germany as a trouble-maker since the partition of the Carolingian Empire in 843, with emphasis on the last 30 years.

UNKNOWN GERMANY. By Hanna Hafkesbrink. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, 164 p. $2.50.

Impressions of World War I as recorded by German soldiers in diaries and letters.

LA GUERRE POUR 1948? By Jean Bardanne. Paris: Siboney, 1946, 221 p. Fr. 100.

Admonitions on the revival of the eternal German danger.

THE GERMAN OPPOSITION TO HITLER. By Hans Rothfels. Hinsdale (Ill.): Regnery, 1948, 172 p. $2.50.

A penetrating analysis of the composition and motives of the anti-Nazi resistance, by a onetime professor at Koenigsberg, now at Chicago.

SCHULDIG ODER ENTLASTET? By J. Eckert. Schliersee (U. S. Zone): Rechts- und Wirtschaftsverlag Gruber, 1948, 206 p.

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The author held office under the Nazis but insists that his heart was with the downtrodden and that he belonged to a resistance group. He feels that at Nuremberg the Nazi leaders did expiation for the whole German people.

POSTWAR GERMANS: AN ANTHROPOLOGIST'S ACCOUNT. By David Rodnick. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, 233 p. $3.75.

Though the author confined his researches to a few hundred Germans in two Hessian towns, his findings reveal some interesting patterns of social behavior.

WHITHER GERMANY? By Hans Zbinden. Hinsdale (Ill.): Regnery, 1948, 90 p. $2.00.

A Swiss writer rejects the doctrine that all Germans share the responsibility for Nazism and its works. He believes we must assist them spiritually as well as physically, for without them Europe is lost.

DER SS-STAAT. By Eugen Kogon. Berlin: Verlag des Druckhauses Tempelhof, 1947, 384 p.

A liberal Catholic journalist, editor of the *Frankfurter Hefte*, gives us the facts of concentration camp life, from daily routine to the prisoners' illegal camp government and the psychology of the SS personnel. This German best seller is not a memoir, but a treatise on the whole system of concentration camps with their organized brutality and destruction of personality which formed a crucial part of the Nazi system.

ALLEMAGNE NOTRE SOUCI. By Edgar Morin. Paris: Éditions Hier et Aujourd'hui, 1947, 255 p. Fr. 125.

A rather severe criticism of the policies of the French Military Government in its Zone of Occupation, from a trade-union, left-wing point of view.

ERZIEHUNG ZUR FREIHEIT. By Johannes R. Becher. Berlin: Volk und Wissen, 1946, 181 p.

The President of the Kulturbund zur Erneuerung Deutschlands seeks a new "German doctrine," recognizing Germany's historical guilt for her own near-destruction.

SOZIALISTISCHE POLITIK? By Otto Winzer. Berlin: Dietz, 1947, 111 p.

A critical analysis of the policies advocated by Dr. Kurt Schumacher, Social Democratic leader in Germany, in his speeches and writings.

LE COLONEL NICOLAÏ, ESPION DE GÉNIE. By Jean Bardanne. Paris: Siboney, 1947, 190 p. Fr. 90.

Nicolaï cast as "the real organizer of the Bolshevik Revolution and of Hitlerism."

JOSEPH GOEBBELS. By Curt Riess. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 367 p. $3.95.

The author, a journalist who left Germany early in the Nazi era, fills in gaps left by Goebbels' own diary, published last year, and seeks to present a full-length portrait of the propaganda minister. Much of his account is based on postwar investigation and interrogation in Germany.

DEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFT UND INDUSTRIEPLAN. Essen/Kettwig (British Zone): West-Verlag, 1947, 292 p.

Statistical surveys on Germany's industrial production, foreign trade and living standard, prepared for use in the British Zone.

AUSTRIA FROM HABSBURG TO HITLER. By Charles A. Gulick. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948, 2 v. $20.00.

A monumental work of historical analysis, combining exhaustive documentary research with extensive personal investigation in Austria. The author, professor of eco-

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nomics at the University of California, centers his history around the rise of the democratic and Socialist forces, and their betrayal by Seipel, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg.

DIE INTERNATIONALE STELLUNG ÖSTERREICHS. By Stephan Verosta. Vienna: Manz, 1947, 148 p. Schillings 25.

A lecturer on international law at the University of Vienna holds that Austria's sovereignty was suspended, not destroyed, during the German occupation.

LA CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE DE LA SUISSE. By William E. Rappard. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1948, 476 p.

A monograph on its development, by a leading Swiss political scientist. He gives parallel texts of the original document of 1848 and of the provisions now in force.

ITALY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Pietro Badoglio. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 234 p. $3.50.

Badoglio's narrative begins with the last days of peace and proceeds through Italy's entry into the war, Mussolini's fall and the transition government headed by the Marshal himself. He presents by no means a full or unbiased story, for the gaps are many and wide, and Badoglio is continually concerned to prove that he was right and others wrong. His work, and its extensive documentation, is nonetheless of first-rate importance to the historian of World War II.

IL TRENTENNIO FASCISTA. By Sinibaldo Tino. Milan: Mondadori, 1947, 251 p. L. 500.

An indictment of the Fascist régime as illegal, corrupt and anti-Italian.

HO DIFESO LA PATRIA. By Rodolfo Graziani. Milan: Garzanti, 1947, 596 p. L. 1,600.

Graziani takes on all comers and bars no holds in this defense of his career as Proconsul in Africa and head of the armed forces of Mussolini's puppet republic in North Italy.

LA LEGISLAZIONE DEI DANNI DI GUERRA. By Abele Gallo. Rome: Ateneo, 1947, 127 p. L. 275.

How the Italian Government provides assistance for rehabilitation.

ENTRE HENDAYA Y GIBRALTAR. By Ramón Serrano Suñer. Madrid: E.P.E.S.A., 1947, 405 p. Ptas. 35.

Serrano Suñer, brother-in-law of Franco, served as Foreign Minister of Spain from 1940 to 1942, but eventually was dismissed as too pro-Nazi when the outlook for an Axis victory began to fade. The historian will find these "notes and reflections" on Spanish policy during the Civil and Second World Wars to be devoid of that documentation and candor which alone could give them real value. The French edition is "Entre les Pyrénées et Gibraltar" (Geneva: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1947, 342 p.).

THE MASQUERADE IN SPAIN. By Charles Foltz, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1948, 375 p. $4.00.

Despite occasional lapses, this is a sound and perceptive account of the rise, consolidation and present state of Franco's régime, which the author finds to be a "front" for the oligarchic interests that have ruled Spain since Philip II. Mr. Foltz was correspondent on the Rebel side during the Civil War and later chief of the Associated Press bureau in Madrid.

EL MAÑANA ECONÓMICO DE ESPAÑA. By Antonio Robert. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1947, 251 p. Ptas. 40.

A comparative and somewhat theoretical analysis of Spain's position as a producer and trader, supported by numerous graphs.

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Eastern Europe

STALIN AND GERMAN COMMUNISM. By Ruth Fischer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 687 p. $8.00.

Ruth Fischer, charter member No. 1 in the Austrian Communist Party and sister of Gerhart and Hanns Eisler, went to Germany in 1919, was elected to the Reichstag, and become a member of the Presidium of the Third International. In this partly autobiographical account, supported by diligently assembled documentation, she traces the rise of the Communist Party in Germany and its gradual subjection during the 1920's to the purposes and will of the Kremlin.

THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Dial Press, 1948, 661 p. $5.00.

This is the first volume in a solid, readable work on the origins and course of the Russian Revolution centered around the careers of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. The period covered here ends in 1914, and Lenin is of course the dominant figure.

PRÉSENTATION DE L'U.R.S.S. By Jean Bruhat. Paris: Vautrain, 1947, 287 p. Fr. 261.

A sound description of the origins, development and current state of the Soviet experiment, particularly in its economic aspects.

MOSCOU 47. By Dominique Auclères and Others. Paris: Tiranty, 1947, 211 p. Fr. 177.

Superficial but interesting impressions by four French newspapermen.

L'ARMÉE ROUGE DANS LA PAIX ET LA GUERRE. By Robert Goudima. Paris: Défense de la France, 1947, 428 p. Fr. 390.

Of Russian origin, the author served during and after World War II in the French Army. In the first third of this solid work he reviews the development of the Red Army, its place in the Soviet economy, and its strategic concepts before World War II. The rest of the book describes the Russian campaigns of the recent conflict in some detail and with the aid of sketch maps.

ESPAÑOLES EN RUSIA. By Rafael Miralles. Madrid: E.P.E.S.A., 1947, 248 p. Ptas. 20.

A Cuban Socialist dispenses lurid tales of affairs and conditions observed in Moscow where he was press attaché at the Cuban Legation.

SOVIET EDUCATION, ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. By Maurice J. Shore. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, 346 p. $4.75.

An objective analysis of Marxist doctrine on education, and how it has — and has not — been applied in the Communist state.

GEOGRAPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN IM RAUME DER SOWJETUNION. By Carl Figdor. Vienna: Touristik-Verlag, 1947, 149 p. Schillings 45.

Varied data on the Union's physiography and its economic and human geography, with a brief chapter on its autarchical possibilities.

KUINKA SE OIKEIN TAPAHTUI? By Väinö Tanner. Helsinki: Tammi, 1948, 504 p. M. 640.

This second volume of reminiscences by the Finnish Social Democratic leader covers the period from the Russian Revolution in 1917 to the first presidential election in Finland in 1919. While shedding new light on this epoch in Finnish history, it is more interesting for its interpretation of this period as less a "war of independence" than a class conflict between the Whites and the Reds — the former being the villains.

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VÉRITÉS SUR LA FINLANDE. By Didier de Roussillon. Paris: Raisons d'Être, 1947, 223 p.
A review of Finnish domestic and foreign affairs from 1918 to 1945.

SUOMEN SOTAKORVAUS JA MAKSUKYKY. By Br. Suviranta. Helsinki: Otava, 1948, 160 p. M. 350.
A scholarly survey of Finland's war reparations and an estimate of the country's ability to pay them, by a professor of economics at the University of Helsinki.

LA DÉMOCRATIE EN FINLANDE. By Arvid Enckell. Paris: Sirey, 1947, 140 p. Fr. 250.
A description of Finland's constitution, administration and political life.

BALTIC ECLIPSE. By Ants Oras. London: Gollancz, 1948, 307 p. 15/.
An Estonian professor, now living in England, tells of his country's happy life as an independent state and of the extinction of its freedom by the Soviets.

TIETEEN MATKAMIEHEN UUSIA ELÄMYKSIÄ. By Lauri Kettunen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1948, 294 p. M. 375.
Observations on affairs in Estonia, Latvia and Hungary.

GUERRE ALLEMANDE, PAIX RUSSE: LE DRAME HONGROIS. By Antal Ullein-Reviczky. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1947, 235 p. Sw. Fr. 6.50.
A none too successful attempt to justify the foreign policy of Hungary from 1929 to 1944, particularly during its later philo-Nazi phase, as one devoted to peace.

A TOLL MÁRTIRJAI. Edited by Sándor Mester. Budapest: Magyar Ujságirók Emigrált, Deportált, Internált Csoportja, 1948, 240 p.
Case histories of the 77 Hungarian professional journalists, victims of the White Terror of 1919–20 and the German-sponsored atrocities of 1944–45.

MAGNUM CRIMEN. By Viktor Novak. Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Hrvatske, 1948, 1,119 p. Dinars 455.
A Jugoslav historian's lengthy indictment of clericalism in Croatia over the past half-century. The latter half of the book, covering the period of the "independent" Croatian state of Ante Pavelić on the basis of a wealth of material from many sources, pays particular attention to the rôle of Archbishop Stepinac.

APPLE OF DISCORD. By C. M. Woodhouse. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 320 p. 21/.
Colonel Woodhouse, chief of the British Military Mission with the Greek guerrillas during the war, presents a detached, authentic panorama of recent events in that country and relates them to larger European developments.

REPORT ON THE GREEKS. By Frank Smothers and Others. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1948, 226 p. $2.50.
In carrying out his investigation on the spot and in writing this report, Mr. Smothers was assisted by W. H. McNeill and the latter's wife. The treatment of political questions is not as sound as that in McNeill's recent book, "The Greek Dilemma," and some of it is already out of date.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE CHARACTER OF ENGLAND. Edited by Ernest Barker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 595 p. $10.00.
Profusely illustrated chapters by 27 English men and women on many facets of the changing institutions of their country.

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THE AWAKENING. By L. S. Amery. London: Macdonald, 1948, 272 p. 8/6.
An old-line Tory and imperialist states the case for a policy of planned commercial relations within the Commonwealth to offset America's reciprocal trade program.

ARE THESE HARDSHIPS NECESSARY? By Roy Harrod. London: Hart-Davis, 1947, 178 p. 5/.
A Keynesian analysis of the economic justification for Britain's postwar austerity.

ORDEAL BY PLANNING. By John Jewkes. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 248 p. $3.75.
A somewhat discursive indictment of the Labor Government's reliance on economic planning to the detriment of "free enterprise."

PROBLÈMES DE L'ANGLETERRE SOCIALISTE. By Bertrand de Jouvenel. Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1947, 356 p. Fr. 300.
This critique of the manner in which the Labor Government met its early financial and economic problems is vitiated by the author's inability to distinguish between Socialism and planned economy in general.

LE PARTI TRAVAILLISTE DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE. By Fernand Renaudeau. Paris: Aubier, 1947, 286 p. Fr. 225.
A factual précis of the Party's history to 1945.

OLD DIPLOMACY. By Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. London: Murray, 1947, 288 p. 18/.
An informative record of 43 years in the British Diplomatic Service ending in 1922, during which time the author held several high posts including the embassies in St. Petersburg and Paris and the Permanent Under-Secretaryship in the Foreign Office.

A WANDERING STUDENT. By Sir Bernard Pares. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press (in coöperation with Howell, Soskin), 1948, 448 p. $4.50.
In this rather pedestrian autobiography, the great English student of Russian affairs fails to do justice to his own remarkable career.

EXPERIMENT IN WORLD ORDER. By Paul McGuire. New York: Morrow, 1948, 412 p. $4.00.
An Australian writer reviews the history of the development of the British Commonwealth and Empire, and finds that it affords more apposite lessons on how to get peoples to live with one another than does the artificial constitutionalism of the United Nations.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY EMPIRE. By H. V. Hodson. London: Faber, 1948, 186 p. 15/.
An attempt to place British Commonwealth affairs in their changed postwar setting, by an acute observer of imperial problems.

BRITAIN'S COLONIES IN WORLD TRADE. By F. V. Meyer. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1948, 273 p. $6.00.
In this scholarly monograph the author has examined the effects of Britain's imperial preference and other commercial policies on trade within the Empire and between the latter and foreign countries. Statistical tables and selected bibliography.

THIS IS SOUTH AFRICA. By Leslie Blackwell and Henry John May. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter, 1947, 169 p. 12/6.
Varied information, pleasingly presented and illustrated.

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INDIA. By T. Walter Wallbank. New York: Holt, 1948, 118 p. $1.40.
This compact "survey of the heritage and growth of Indian nationalism" is the latest addition to the Berkshire Studies in European History.

GANDHI'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By M. K. Gandhi. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 640 p. $5.00.
In this "story of my experiments with truth" the late Mahatma describes and explains the crucial experiences before 1920 that contributed to his spiritual and intellectual development.

THE BASIS OF PAKISTAN. By Nafis Ahmad. Calcutta: Thacker and Spink, 1947, 203 p. Rs. 7/8.
Though the Pakistan envisaged by the author, professor of geography at Ismailia College (Calcutta), does not coincide precisely with that created after he wrote, his survey of the economic basis for the Moslem state is nonetheless useful.

SOCIALISM AND THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION. By Acharya Narendra Deva. Bombay: Padma, 1947, 208 p. Rs. 5/8.
Selected writings by a Socialist leader in the Congress Party of India.

THE MONETARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. By B. E. Dadachanji. Bombay: Taraporevala, 1947, 347 p. Rs. 7/12.
Book I deals with recent monetary and banking developments in India, while Book II contains a history of the Indian currency system during the last 120 years.

POPULATION AND FOOD PLANNING IN INDIA. By Baljit Singh. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1947, 156 p. Rs. 4.
A statistical analysis.

The Near East

THE MIDDLE EAST: 1948. London: Europa Publications, 1948, 377 p. 50/.
An up-to-date compendium on the parties, economic life and cultural activities in 13 countries from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to Afghanistan.

AL-KITAB AL-URDUNI AL-ABIAD — SURIA AL-KUBRA. Amman: National Press, 1947, 294 p.
Documents supporting King Abdullah's scheme for a Greater Syria.

APPROACH TO PALESTINE. By Robin Maugham. London: Falcon Press, 1947, 99 p. 5/.
A very brief and honest attempt to present the background of the struggle for the Holy Land, by a young British novelist.

QADIYAT FILASTIN. By M. Rifaat Bey. Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1947, 118 p.
An Egyptian historian, after reviewing the record of the Mandate, hopes that the Palestine question may be solved by returning the Jews to the countries whence they came.

PALESTINE: LAND OF ISRAEL. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948, 128 p. $5.00.
A pro-Zionist picture book, with lengthy introduction by Pierre van Paassen.

AT-TATAWWUR AL-IJTIMA'I WAL-IQTISADI FI FILASTIN AL-ARABIYA. By Muhammad Yusuf al-Husayni. Jerusalem: Bayt al-Maqdis, 1947, 204 p.
An Arab describes recent progress among his people in the Holy Land.

CULTURAL SURVEY OF MODERN EGYPT. By M. M. Mosharrafa. London: Longmans, 1947–48, 2 pts. 7/6.
These booklets deal cursorily but intelligently with social, economic and historical factors. Numerous illustrations.

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The Far East

ASIAN RELATIONS. New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948, 314 p. Rs. 15.
The proceedings of the First Asian Relations Conference, held at New Delhi in 1947.

EASTERN ASIA. By Thomas E. Ennis. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948, 627 p. $5.00.
A systematic historical treatise giving major attention to China and Japan.

POST-WAR GOVERNMENTS OF THE FAR EAST. Edited by Taylor Cole and John H. Hallowell. Gainesville (Fla.): "Journal of Politics," 1947, 272 p. $1.75.
These dozen well-informed chapters, by as many experts, include treatments of India, southeast Asia and the Indies.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. By John King Fairbank. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 384 p. $3.75.
Few Americans know as much about China, past or present, as Professor Fairbank of Harvard, whose competence rests on practical experience in that country as well as on intensive research. In this latest volume of Sumner Welles' "American Foreign Policy Library" the author sets the stage for the drama in China today and introduces us to its principal actors. He dwells on the desirability of letting the Chinese work out their own destiny without making their country an arena for contending outside interests.

THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS: 1931–1932. By Sara R. Smith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948, 281 p. $3.75.
This expert historical reconstruction, in which particular attention is given to American policy and League behavior, pricks several myths that have grown up around the history of the crisis.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION. By D. K. Lieu. New Brunswick (N. J.): Rutgers University Press, 1948, 159 p. $3.00.
The basic analysis of this careful study still holds, despite the rapid evolution of China's financial situation since the book was written in 1947.

CHRISTIAN VOICES IN CHINA. Edited by Chester S. Miao. New York: Friendship Press, 1948, 216 p. $2.00.
A symposium on the position of the Protestant churches in contemporary China.

CASE HISTORY OF JAPAN. By Francis J. Horner. New York: Sheed, 1948, 260 p. $3.00.
The author, an Englishman writing under a pseudonym, taught in Japan for some time before the Pacific war and was imprisoned there at its outbreak. After outlining the historical and cultural origins of modern Japan, he argues that what that country needs is conversion to Christianity.

MIRROR FOR AMERICANS: JAPAN. By Helen Mears. Boston: Houghton, 1948, 329 p. $3.50.
Miss Mears believes that modern Japan was made in the image of the western imperial nations. But in her effort to do what she regards as justice, she finds it necessary to minimize or condone obvious Japanese shortcomings as revealed in the recent war. She is critical of our occupation policies, which she observed at close range.

THE INDONESIAN STORY. By Charles Wolf, Jr. New York: Day, 1948, 201 p. $3.00.
The author of this factual account of "The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Indonesian Republic" was American Vice-Consul in Batavia after the war. He confirms the essentially western and moderate outlook of the Republican leaders.

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Africa

LE RADAR À L'OMBRE DE LA MOSQUÉE. By Jean Bardanne. Paris: Siboney, 1947, 221 p. Fr. 200.
Superficial sidelights on contemporary Morocco.

THE NEW CONGO. By Tom Marvel. New York: Duell, 1948, 395 p. $5.00.
The author stresses the economic achievements of Belgian rule.

AFRICAN CONTRASTS. By R. H. W. Shepherd and B. G. Paver. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 266 p. $9.00.
With word and picture the authors tell the fascinating story of how Bantu and European ways have reacted upon one another and at many points meshed together.

THE ROMANCE OF RHODESIA. By Ardaser Sorabjee N. Wadia. London: Dent, 1947, 146 p. 21/.
A travelogue with appealing text and handsome illustrations.

THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. By J. W. Davidson. London: Faber (for Nuffield College), 1948, 150 p. 12/6.
Volume III in Margery Perham's "Studies in Colonial Legislatures."

Latin America

LATIN AMERICA: CONTINENT IN CRISIS. By Ray Josephs. New York: Random House, 1948, 503 p. $4.50.
In this diary of a seven-month trip (June 1947 – January 1948) the forest is sometimes hard to see for all the trees and underbrush.

THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS (AS OF JANUARY 1, 1948). Edited by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 847 p. $10.00.
The texts, translated into English, of the current organic acts of the 21 republics and Canada, with bibliography.

EL SISTEMA CONSULTIVO PANAMERICANO. By Aldo L. Ciasullo. Montevideo: The Author, 1947, 124 p.
A brief analysis of its organization and operation.

HIGHWAY ACROSS THE WEST INDIES. By Herbert C. Lanks. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948, 197 p. $5.00.
A superficial but readable and well-illustrated travelogue through the major islands.

GEOGRAFÍA DEL PACÍFICO SUDAMERICANO. By Emilio Romero. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947, 194 p. Pesos 7.50.
An enthusiastic introduction by a Peruvian professor.

UN PUEBLO EN BUSCA DE SU DESTINO. By Arturo Aldunate Phillips. Santiago de Chile: Nascimento, 1947, 224 p.
A concise, systematic analysis of Chile's potentialities as an industrial state.

L'ARGENTINA E LE SUE RICCHEZZE. By Bruno Zuculin. Florence: Lingue Estere, 1947, 292 p. L. 700.
Up-to-date and multifarious data on the country's economic life.

ARGENTINA EN MARCHA. Volume I. Buenos Aires: Comisión Nacional de Cooperación Intelectual, 1947, 466 p.
A dozen chapters, by as many contributors, on various cultural and social problems in contemporary Argentina, including an essay on the geography of the Falkland Islands.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

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Agriculture

Long-Range agricultural policy and program. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, House, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. May 3, 1947-Jan. 22, 1948. Washington, 1947–48. Pts. 3–15.

——. Report of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., pursuant to S.Res. 147. Feb. 9, 1948. Washington, 1948. 68 p. (S. Rept. 885.)

Agricultural Act of 1948. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 2318. April 12–24, 1948. 468 p. $1.25.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, March 24, 1948, including a guide to the study of the Charter. Washington, 1948. 155 p. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series 114.) 35¢.

World trade in sponges. Washington, 1948. 95 p. (Dept. of Commerce. Industrial Series 82.) 30¢.

Economic Conditions

Selected world economic indices. Lake Success, United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, 1948. 53 p. (1948. IIA. 2.) $1.00.

Overseas Economic Surveys. London, 1948.

Turkey. 228 p. 4s. Egypt. 87 p. 2s. Brazil. 91 p. 2s. United States of America. 207 p. 3s. 6d. British East Africa. 93 p. 2s. Iran. 50 p. 1s.

Economic indicators, August 1948. Prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 1948. 31 p. 15¢.

Far East

Economic survey of Asia and the Far East, 1947. Shanghai, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 1948. 233 p. $2.00.

Korea, 1945 to 1948. Washington, 1948. 124 p. (Dept. of State. Far Eastern Series 28.) 25¢.

Present agricultural position of South Korea. Seoul, United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1947. 34 p.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944. Washington, 1948. v.1. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series I, 3.) $3.50.

International Monetary Fund. Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the fiscal year ended April 30, 1948. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1948. 124 p.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development securities. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 6443. June 4–5, 1948. Washington, 1948. 143 p.

American Mexican Claims Commission. Report to the Secretary of State. Washington, 1948. 676 p. (Dept. of State. Arbitration Series 9.) $1.50.

First Hemispheric Stock Exchange Conference. Record of Proceedings, September 15–18, 1947, New York City. Santiago de Chile, Imprenta y Litografiá, n.d. 116 p.

Germany

The Berlin crisis; a report on the Moscow discussions, 1948. Washington, 1948. 61 p. (Dept. of State. European and Commonwealth Series 1.) 20¢.

Great Britain

The Colonial empire (1947–1948). London, 1948. 101 p. (Cmd. 7433.) 2s.

Revival of pre-war treaties and agreements between His Majesty's Government . . . and the Governments of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Roumania. London, 1948. 7 p. (Cmd. 7395. Miscellaneous no. 5.) 2d.

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India

One year of independence. Washington, Embassy of India, 1948. 39 p.

Review of the Co-operative movement in India, 1939–46. Bombay, Reserve Bank of India, 1948. 111 p. 2Rs.

U. N. Commission for India and Pakistan; documents connected with the cease-fire proposal of August 13, 1948. Washington, Government of India Information Services, 1948. 32 p.

White paper on Hyderabad 1948. n. pl., Government of India, 1948. 79 p.

Israel

Israel before the Security Council May 15 – July 15, 1948; a record of fidelity to the United Nations. New York, Israel Mission to the United Nations, 1948. 67 p.

Palestine; termination of the mandate, 15th May 1948. Statement prepared for public information by the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. London, 1948. 11 p.

Labor

International Labour Conference, 31st session, San Francisco, 1948. Reports. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1948.

1. Report of the Director-General. 128 p. *2.* Financial and budgetary questions. 52 p. *3.* Reports on the application of conventions (Article 22 of the Constitution). 185 p. Appendix. 46 p. *6. (a)* Wages (a) General report. 361 p. 7. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organise. Supplement. 34 p. Appendix. 23 p. *8. (2).* Industrial relations. 297 p. *9.* Partial revision of the convention (No. 4) concerning employment of women during the night (1919) and of the convention (No. 41) concerning employment of women during the night (revised 1934). Supplement. 4 p. *10.* Partial revision of the convention (No. 6) concerning the night work of young persons employed in industry (1919). Supplement. 8 p. *12.* Privileges and immunities of the International Labour Organisation. 38 p.

International Labour Conference, 32nd session, Geneva, 1949. Reports. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1948.

4. (1). Application of the principles of the right to organise and to bargain collectively. 18 p. *6. (1).* Labour clauses in public contracts. 35 p. *7. (1).* Protection of wages. 40 p. *9. (1).* Vocational guidance. 52 p. *10. (1).* Revision of the fee-charging employment agencies convention, 1933. 30 p. *11. (1).* Migration for employment. 218 p.

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